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Abstract
As computer system size and complexity grow, formulating effective
policies require more sophistication. There are many risk factors that
need to be considered, some of which may be in conflict. Inevitably,
unpredictable circumstances that demand decisions will arise during
operation. In some cases an automated response may be imperative;
in other cases these may be ill-advised. Manual decisions are often
made that override the current policy and serve effectively to redefine
it. This matter is further complicated in highly dynamic operational
environments like mobile ad-hoc networks, in which the risk factors
may be changing continually. Thus, security policies must be able to
change and adapt to the operational needs.
This study investigates the potential of evolutionary algorithms as a
tool in determining the optimal security policies that suit such envi-
ronments. This thesis reviews some fundamental concepts in related
domains. It presents three applications of evolutionary algorithms
in solving problems that are of direct relevance. These include the
inference of security policies from decision examples, the dynamic
adaptation of security policies, and the optimisation of security poli-
cies for a specific set of missions. The results show that the inference
approaches based on evolutionary algorithms are very promising.
The thesis concludes with an evaluation of the work done, the extent
to which the work justifies the thesis hypothesis and some possible
directions on how evolutionary algorithms can be applied to address
a wider range of relevant problems in the domain of concern.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Information security is not a new concept. Information has always been of value
and has been something to protect. The computer age has merely increased
the volume and nature of information stored and processed, and has provided
enhanced opportunities for creating and accessing that information. As compu-
tational equipment becomes increasingly embedded in the fabric of our environ-
ment and information processing permeates ever more aspects of our lives, we are
forced to continually assess the risk taken with respect to such information.
We have now moved significantly away from the mainframe computer era.
Much modern computation is built around highly distributed resources. There
are many advantages to providing resources in a distributed fashion. However,
securing resources in such environments is distinctly non-trivial.
A recent development in this area has been the emergence of dynamic coali-
tions. Whereas present distributed systems might comprise a variety of agents
and nodes that we know about and largely have control over, dynamic coalitions
may arise where parties with little or no experience of each other need to work
together to achieve their goals. These coalitions give rise to significant issues
concerning how the risk of interaction may feasibly and effectively be managed.
A significant tool in the risk management of existing system has been security
policies. Security policies are often defined to restrict the information accesses
to restricted groups of users. For example, the Multi-Level Security (MLS) Bell-
LaPadula model [5] is concerned with the information confidentiality in a com-
puter system processing classified information. This model is a very simply stated
1
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and implementable policy. It has been adopted in military computer systems.
1.1 Motivation
However, as system size and complexity grow, creating and implementing effective
policies require more sophistication. In the context of large distributed systems,
the concept of policy hierarchy has been introduced in [6]. This concept suggests
that high-level policies can be derived from business goals and refined into low-
level policies, which can then be executed by the system [6, 7]. Since then,
there has been a proliferation of research work carried out in this domain, mainly
focussing on the security policy analysis and refinement processes. This has led
to the birth of many policy refinement models, languages and tools.
1.1.1 Many risk factors to be considered
Even with the aid of these tools, formulating an optimal security policy remains
a difficult problem because there are many factors that need to be considered,
some of which are in conflict. The tradeoffs among these factors are often made by
the security administrators based on their experiences and intuitions. Inevitably,
there is some degree of subjectivity and arbitrariness in this assessment. The
security risk analysis may also be incomplete and some risk factors may be left
out of consideration.
1.1.2 Operational needs change
Additionally, in current practice, security is typically managed in terms of fixed,
rigid security policies. There is a growing acceptance that current security mech-
anisms are not appropriate for many future network systems, for example, mobile
ad-hoc networks (MANETs). This problem has recently received increasing atten-
tion in the research community. Inevitably, unpredictable circumstances that de-
mand decisions will arise during operation. In some cases an automated response
may be imperative; in other cases these may be ill-advised. Manual decisions
are often made that override the current policy and serve effectively to redefine
it. (It is accepted that a policy may not be suited to all circumstances, and in
2
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particular, not suited to the current one.) This matter is further complicated in
highly dynamic operational environments like MANETs, where the risk factors
are constantly changing. A new requirement is thus needed: the security policy
has to be able to change and adapt to the operational needs or else will inevitably
be circumvented in creative ways (often referred to as workarounds) [2, 8].
A common solution to this problem is manually creating exceptions to policies
by granting the required permissions to the users to meet operational needs [8].
This process can be tedious and time consuming. Worse, the exceptions granted
are often never revoked when they should be [8]. People with goals to meet
will find ways around policies. For example, information is sometimes classified
at a lower sensitivity level than it should be to facilitate information sharing.
The security policy is thus being tweaked and used in such a way as to fit the
operational needs. A more principled and conceptually clear approach taking this
requirement into account would therefore be advantageous.
1.1.3 Deriving effective security policies is hard
The interaction between the security administrators and the decision makers is
often able to elicit, at best, a partial description of the security policy. These
stakeholders may well be able to give specific decisions to specific instances of
authorisation requests, but may not always be adept at generalising these deci-
sions to a security policy, especially when the complexities of MANETs are taken
into account. The matter is further complicated by the fact that the operational
benefit as well as risk must eventually be taken into account. There is currently
no coherent way forward on this issue. It would be very useful to be able to
codify what a “principled basis” consists of, since this serves to document “good
practice” and facilitates its propagation. We might ask whether we can leverage
the knowledge, experience and decision-making abilities of the stakeholders in
a creative fashion to elicit more generally applicable security policies. We shall
address this issue later.
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1.1.4 One size (policy) does not fit all
In addition to these problems, the security requirements may differ on a case-
by-case basis. Recent research [8] has provided excellent articulation of why
precanned one-size-fits-all security policies and mechanisms are inappropriate to
many modern day operations. Many more abstract frameworks for access control
systems are being proposed to cope with the realities of modern systems. An
example of these is the risk-budget based approach [8]. In this framework, users
are given risk budgets that they can spend to access information. Riskier accesses
cost more. We believe such approaches raise several issues: what initial budgets
should be given? Should we allow an unfettered free market? If not, then what
constraints should we impose? Should there be minimum costs associated with
specific accesses?
We can see that the risk-budget based approach is not a single policy; it
is really a policy family. Each policy instance constrains operations in its own
way and affects operational behaviour and effectiveness. The question arises: for
a specific mission (with all its nuances and characteristics), which of this vast
family of policies will lead to the best overall results? Currently there is no way
of knowing. We believe that such a policy must be found rather than specified
without investigation and finding a policy would appear to be a computationally
hard task. This shifts the emphasis away from specifying and refining a one-size-
fits-all policy towards searching for a policy that has beneficial and acceptable
outcomes from a family of policies. We believe this is entirely novel.
This problem resonates elsewhere. Current governments use macroeconomic
levers such as setting interest and taxation rates to achieve overall economic
goals. The economy is a complex system with emergent properties and there
is often no agreement amongst economists about the consequences of particular
choices of system parameters. Different countries also have different sorts of
economy: there is no one policy fit for all. This is precisely the situation we
are in for military operations. The goals and capabilities of organisations and
missions will vary, as will capabilities and staffing characteristics. Why would
we expect a one-size-fits-all security policy to satisfy our needs and allow us to
make appropriate risk decisions in all cases? Parts of a given security policy
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may apply across settings but some notion of mission or organisational specificity
needs to be taken into account. We observe that it may be difficult to determine
the effect a particular economics based policy may have on attaining mission
goals. (Indeed, predicting the operational effects of almost any security policy
may be hard. Emergent properties are recognised as a major difficulty across the
system engineering discipline.)
Similar problems appear in many other domains. Consider, for example, the
proliferation of social networking websites and the privacy issues that arise with
regard to the information published. Coming up with a default privacy policy to
suit all users is inherently difficult; yet simply providing fine grained controls that
allow users to set their preferences is neither sufficient nor realistic to solve the
problem [9]. The process of specifying who is allowed to access which information
can be cumbersome and becomes a usability nightmare. Consequently, users are
unlikely to use these privacy controls even if they are made available to them.
As discussed earlier, the task is far from being straightforward. Even if the users
were dedicated in spending time to set up their custom privacy policy, they might
not be adept in doing so.
1.2 Technical approach
Our approach to the above problems is a radical one. We view security policy
management as a control problem. Authorisation to carry out particular actions
is usually given before an action is carried out. However, operational needs may
well require that local decisions be taken that are subsequently subject to review.
Thus, security management may say “yes, you were in a tough situation and
that was acceptable”. Policy change is thus understood as a control problem,
with security management giving feedback to define and redefine the acceptable
envelope.
We investigate interactions between real-time decision making and security
management control actions. In particular, we investigate how a specific set of
decisions may be generalised into an applicable security policy. Thus, if manage-
ment authorises a specific instance (either in real-time or post facto), which the
underlying security policy does not, we might reasonably conclude there are many
5
1.2 Technical approach
difficult but similar examples that might also be authorised. Similarly, wider con-
straints would seem to follow for refusals. What should those wider relaxations
or restrictions be? We propose to investigate a variety of inference techniques. A
developed inference system could generate policy rules and then pose interesting
instances to confirm or contradict generalisation. We would envisage that there
would be limits on how far or how fast that system policy can evolve without
security management intervention.
Essentially, we are seeking learning techniques to partition the risk-decision
space, with each partition defining an appropriate risk-related response, e.g., yes,
no, yes but only if additional requirements are met. A presented vector of risk-
related information associated with a request will be categorised in order to de-
termine the appropriate response. There is considerable flexibility available in the
way we may choose to recognise and codify appropriateness of yes/no/conditional
yes responses. Traditionally, security policies are generally developed on the basis
of human reviewable rules of one form or another. This seems rather restrictive;
there are many instances where relaxing the requirement of human comprehensi-
bility enables more effective solution. For example, bio-inspired techniques such
as evolutionary algorithms (EAs) and artificial immune systems can outperform
traditional techniques in many engineering domains [10, 11].
In this thesis, we investigate the potential of using EAs as the means of de-
termining the optimal, or at least excellent, security policies for initial system
configuration and also the means of adapting the security policies in the light
of changing circumstances. EAs are heuristic optimisation techniques that draw
loose inspiration from the natural selection process of the biological world. EAs
often begin with an initial population of individuals that are randomly gener-
ated. Each individual represents a candidate solution to the problem in question.
This population is then repeatedly subjected to the evolutionary process, which
evaluates the fitness of each individual (i.e., how good the solution is) and se-
lects these individuals according to their fitnesses to breed the population of the
next generation. This process produces populations that are increasing better in
solving the problem. This process is often iterated until the predefined maximum
number of generations has been reached or a “good enough” solution has been
found.
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The main reason that we choose EAs is that these techniques make very
weak assumptions on the solution space and have the ability to search for so-
lutions of unknown or controlled size and shape in vast, discontinuous solution
spaces. Moreover, these techniques have achieved many significant successes in
their applications on many other domains, especially when the problems are com-
putationally hard. Other data mining algorithms and heuristic search techniques
are also potentially applicable.
Two EAs chosen here for investigation are Genetic Programming (GP) and
Grammatical Evolution (GE). These techniques were originally proposed to evolve
computer programs; security policies are essentially decision making programs.
The individual representations that these techniques use fit the problem very
well. The tree based individual structure in GP and the use of grammar rules to
map binary individuals to programs in GE are both very flexible in presenting a
program. The use of grammar rules in GE also provides the ability to constrain
the search space efficiently and the advantage of decoupling the search compo-
nent from the solution representation (programming language). Additionally, GP
has been shown to be very effective in evolving competitive artifacts. There are
currently more than forty human-competitive artifacts successfully evolved [10].
To investigate this approach, we need decision examples. Ideally, these exam-
ples should be from the real world. This could be from monitoring manual deci-
sion making or else as part of a more standard requirements elicitation activity.
However, it is very difficult to obtain such examples. From a security perspec-
tive, revealing such information, to an organisation, can be very risky. (Having
said that, we had tried without success to acquire such decision examples from
various organisations and research collaboration partners.) Moreover, MANETs
of the sorts we envisage do not really exist right now. Aiming to acquire decision
examples from such environments is doomed to fail.
To overcome this problem, we generate these decision examples by running
known, standard policies. Using these examples, we attempt to use EAs to infer
the original policies. We start with some simple binary decision policies, e.g., MLS
Bell-LaPadula policy model and budgetised MLS policy model and then continue
with a multi-decision model, e.g., Fuzzy MLS policy model. We also investigate
the performance of various EAs. To investigate how well EAs can mould and
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shape the policies to adapt with new decision criteria with new decision examples,
we design a simple, yet non-trivial policy that varies with time. This time-varying
policy has two purposes: generating training decision examples and serving as the
benchmark against which the security policies learnt are evaluated. Lastly, we
show how simulation runs can be used in place of a set of decision examples to
learn the optimal security policies for a specific set of missions of concern.
1.3 Thesis hypothesis
Formally, the hypothesis of the thesis is stated as follows:
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) have the potential to be an effective
means of determining the security policies that suit dynamic challeng-
ing environments.
By effective we mean the ability to determine the (near) optimal security policy
that fits the needs of the mission in its operational environment. We attempt to
examine this hypothesis from three different perspectives:
• Exploring the potential of EAs in inferring the (near) optimal static security
policies from a set of decision examples.
• Exploring the potential of EAs in dynamically updating security policies
with new decision examples.
• Exploring the potential of EAs in searching for the (near) optimal policies
that fit a specific set of missions using simulation runs.
Our approach is radical and arguably targets systems that, in a real sense, will
not exist in practice for several years yet. However, we believe it is appropriate to
investigate the above in order to be prepared when such systems come on stream.
We will not be able to evaluate our approach on full scale policies (because they
do not yet exist). However, we do aim to establish the plausibility or, at the very
least, a greater understanding of the strengths and weakness of our approach.
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1.4 Thesis organisation
The subsequent chapters of this thesis are organised as follows:
Chapter 2 presents the fundamental computer security concepts that are re-
lated to this thesis. It begins with a brief introduction to security objec-
tives and security risk analysis. It then presents the concept of dynamic
coalitions, with an emphasis placed on MANETs and the challenges they
impose on current security mechanisms.
Chapter 3 firstly reviews some influential security policies and models. It then
presents some recently proposed risk-budget based models that aim to pro-
vide more flexibility and discusses the top-down policy hierarchical develop-
ment model that enables policy composition and refinement. The chapter
concludes with an identification of those research issues in security policy
development that we will attempt to address in this thesis.
Chapter 4 introduces the learning techniques used in this thesis. The first part
introduces EAs; it begins with a brief introduction to the common features
shared among all EAs followed by the concept of multi-objective evolu-
tionary algorithms (MOEAs). It then details two EAs used in this thesis,
namely GP and GE. The second part introduces fuzzy expert systems.
Chapter 5 details the experiments in using EAs to infer static security policies
from a set of training decision examples. It begins with experiments that
attempt to infer some simple binary decision policies and continues with
experiments that attempt to infer a more complicated multi-decision pol-
icy. Lastly, it details an experiment that demonstrates how the fuzzy set
concept can be integrated into the policy inference framework to improve
the performance.
Chapter 6 begins with the design of a time-varying, risk-budget based security
policy model. This model is used to generate decision examples that are
to be used for training as well as evaluation purposes. It then details the
experiments carried out in using MOEAs to continually infer the dynamic
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policy from the generated decision examples, i.e., evolves and adapts a
policy as new decision examples are obtained.
Chapter 7 presents the experiments in using MOEAs to discover the (near)
optimal policies that fit a specific mission (or at least a specific family of
missions). The experiment also shows how simulation runs can be used in
place of a set of decision examples in evaluating the fitness of a policy with
respect to the specified high-level objectives.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis by evaluating the degree to which the hypothesis
has been justified and outlines potential work for the future.
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Chapter 2
Computer Security
Security is about the protection of assets against threats [12]. This definition im-
plies that we need to know what assets require protection. As computer systems
have evolved, the nature of specific assets and threats has changed [13]. Prior to
the invention of the personal computer, computer security was mainly concerned
with the protection of computer mainframes. Here, particular threats could be
countered by simple physical controls. For example, storing a mainframe in a
room with effective physical access controls to prevent unauthorised access.
In recent years, computer and network hardware has grown cheaper; using
a computer has now become commonplace. Individuals use computers to store
their private information, e.g., credit card numbers, bank account passwords, pri-
vate diaries. Organisations use computers to increase their operational efficiency.
There is an increasing amount of valuable information stored in computers. The
sheer ubiquity of valuable information signifies the importance of security as an
issue for us all.
This chapter presents the fundamental computer security concepts related to
this thesis. It begins with a brief introduction to common security objectives and
security risk analysis. It then presents the concept of dynamic coalitions, with an
emphasis placed on MANETs and the challenges they impose on current security
mechanisms.
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Traditionally, the objectives of computer security are commonly summarised as
confidentiality, integrity and availability; often collectively known as the C-I-A
triad [13]. Over time, many security practitioners have realised the incomplete-
ness of the triad and attempted to augment it with new objectives. These objec-
tives include authenticity, accountability and non-repudiation. In [14], Donn B.
Parker introduced the Parkerian hexad, which adds three more objectives to the
C-I-A triad: possession (control); authenticity; and utility.
The following sections briefly summarise each of these objectives and their
established scopes respectively. For extensive discussion, refer to [15–17].
2.1.1 Confidentiality
Confidentiality is concerned with the protection of information from unauthorised
disclosure. In computer systems, confidentiality is about preventing unautho-
rised subjects from reading information. Confidentiality is often confused with
the terms “secrecy” and “privacy”. Gollmann clarifies these terms in [15]. He
views both secrecy and privacy as forms of confidentiality. Whilst privacy is con-
cerned with the confidentiality of personal data, secrecy is concerned with the
confidentiality of organisational data. For example, a privacy violation happens
when an organisation shares the personal information of its customers with other
organisations without the knowledge (or permission) of the customers.
Sometimes, it is necessary to protect the confidentiality of subject identities.
This objective is often known as anonymity. More formally, anonymity is the
state in which a subject’s true identity remains unknown by other subjects [18].
An example to show why anonymity is necessary is the traffic analysis attack [15].
The attackers can derive information such as the relationship between the parties
from patterns in communication, even when messages are encrypted. In order to
preserve the anonymity of the subject identities, there needs to be a property of
unlinkability between identities of the participants and the communication.
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2.1.2 Integrity
In computer security, integrity is concerned with the protection of assets from
unauthorised modification [15], as opposed to “the quality of having strong moral
principles” defined in the Oxford Dictionary of English [19]. In computer sys-
tems, integrity is typically about preventing unauthorised subjects from writing
information. For this reason, integrity is sometimes perceived as the dual of con-
fidentiality and similar techniques can be expected to be used in achieving this
objective, e.g., the Biba model [20] has the mirror properties of the Bell-LaPadula
model [5].
Further interpretations and constraints on what integrity implies have also
been made in the literature. Clark and Wilson argued that the usage of a data
modification method, which causes data loss or corruption, should not be per-
mitted even by an authorised subject [21]. The integrity requirement is split into
two parts: internal and external consistency. Internal consistency is concerned
with ensuring the consistency of data representation and modification within the
computer systems; external consistency is concerned with ensuring that the data
reflect the real-world objects that they represent. The Clark-Wilson definition is
more sophisticated and reflects the subtleties present in commercial environments.
On the other hand, the definition of integrity given in the Trusted Computer Sys-
tem Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) is concerned only with external consistency;
integrity is defined as “the state that exists when computerised data is the same
as the source documents and has not been exposed to accidental or malicious
alteration or destruction” [22].
2.1.3 Availability
Availability is concerned with the likelihood of a system is able to provide some
services. In particular, the availability at time t, usually denoted by A(t), is the
probability that the system can provide a specific service at time t under stated
conditions [23].
Availability may be compromised by a variety of mechanisms. A simple ex-
ample is hardware failure. Traditionally, the threat from such failure is countered
by the use of redundancy [24]. Redundancy can be made in two forms: either the
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redundant components act as backups that are activated should one component
fail, or all duplicate components run concurrently and form a voting system, in
which the consensus output is the majority vote. Denial of service (DoS) attacks,
which aim to make a system unavailable to the authorised users, may take many
forms. At one extreme, an army of compromised hosts may be used to clog up
a large network by wide-scale consumption of resources. At the other, a smart
attacker may target a specific server aiming only to issue service requests at the
rate they are dispatched but in a manner that keeps the service request queue
full, and hence unavailable. This is usually known as a low-rate DoS attack [25].
2.1.4 Authenticity
Authenticity is concerned with the genuineness of the identity a subject claims
to be. Something is said to be authentic when it really is what it claims to be.
Authentication is the verification of such claims [17]. We may be interested in
verifying that the user at a terminal is who he claims to be. This is personal
identity authentication. Authentication is clearly a prerequisite for many other
aspects of security. Access control is used to dictate the access given to subjects
with regard to specific objects. However, it makes the assumption that the subject
in question really is the person concerned or acts legitimately on that person’s
behalf, e.g., a process started by that user.
There are a great many means of authenticating the identity of a person.
These can be loosely categorised into three groups as follows:
1. Something the user has, e.g., a token card.
2. Something the user knows, e.g., a password, a pin, a signature.
3. Something the user is (giving rise to biometrics such as fingerprints, iris
patterns, and various behavioural characteristics such as dynamic signature
properties).
An example of authenticity violation is an attacker logging in as an ordinary user
using a stolen password.
In many security protocols, received messages may seem to be recently created.
However, we know that messages can be recorded and replayed and thus it is
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often required to verify any such claims to recency. This is a form of message
authentication. Often, we may also wish to verify the sender identity of a received
message, e.g., the sender of an email that requests a bank statement.
2.1.5 Accountability and non-repudiation
The security objectives discussed so far have sought to prevent unwanted events
from happening. What if these preventions fail? Accountability attempts to
answer this by ensuring the actions that affect security can be traced to the
responsible subject [15]. In other words, accountability attempts to establish
the links between the subjects and the actions made. This often conflicts with
anonymity that strives to unlink them. A common way to achieve accountability
is to keep a secure audit trail on the systems. Illicit modification or deletion of an
audit trail would clearly compromise accountability. A DoS attack on the audit
server provides an alternative and possibly easier way to achieve the same goal.
Non-repudiation is a strong form of accountability. Non-repudiation is con-
cerned with the ability to ensure that a subject is unable to deny carrying out
the action [15]. This objective is commonly achieved with the use of digital sig-
natures. In signing a piece of data with a private key, an unforgettable binding is
established between the subject and the data. Disclosure of a private key would
clearly compromise any claims to legitimacy of binding [15]. Thus, users must
keep their private keys secure.
2.1.6 Summary
The security objectives discussed in the section can be summarised as follows:
1. Confidentiality — Prevention of unauthorised disclosure of information.
2. Integrity — Prevention of unauthorised modification of information.
3. Availability — Prevention of the DoS.
4. Authenticity — Verification of identity one claims to be.
5. Accountability and non-repudiation — Prevention of the denial of actions
made.
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2.2 Security risk analysis
Security risk analysis is the process of ensuring that the security of a system is
commensurate with the risk it is exposed to. All protection measures come at a
price. Security risk analysis provides a means to justify the tradeoff between cost
and benefit for the security controls implemented. Despite the various method-
ologies in conducting security risk analysis and some of them being tailored to a
particular discussion, they all share a common framework composed of the fol-
lowing steps: assets, vulnerabilities and threats identification, risk assessment,
selection of control, and re-evaluation.
2.2.1 Assets, vulnerabilities and threats identification
Assets are resources that have values in a system [13]. Assets in a computer sys-
tem can be mainly categorised into three groups: hardware, software and infor-
mation. At times, the workforce and the reputation of a company are considered
as part of the assets [15]. To do risk assessment, all assets are first identified with
their values evaluated. Whilst the values of tangible assets are easy to quantify
by considering the monetary replacement cost, the values of intangible assets are
difficult to estimate. For example, the loss of confidential information on sup-
pliers and clients may affect the reputation of the company. In addition, any
damage to the assets in the above categories can cause damage to the quality of
service. One possible way to estimate the values of these assets is based upon
their importance [26].
Vulnerabilities are the weaknesses of a system. Attackers attempt to discover
the vulnerabilities of a system in order to cause damage to assets, either ac-
cidentally or intentionally [15]. Vulnerabilities can exist at different levels and
places in a computer system, e.g., operational environments, operating systems,
application software, networks, communication media and operational practices.
Threats are the potential actions that can be used by attackers to exploit
vulnerabilities in order to cause damage to assets [1]. Threats are caused by
threat agents, which can be both internal and external to the system. Examples
of threat agents may be hackers, system administrators or viruses that exploit
bugs in a software to launch attacks on a system. In the literature, the term
16
2.2 Security risk analysis
“threat” is often used where the term “threat agent” should be. One example
is the definition of threat as “the party with the capabilities and intentions to
exploit a vulnerability in an asset” [27].
The relationship between these terms is best illustrated by the following ex-
ample. In a computer network, a possible vulnerability is the use of a default
password at the network router (asset). A hacker (threat agent) can exploit this
vulnerability to take control over the router and launch a DoS attack to prevent
authorised computers from connecting to the network.
2.2.2 Risk assessment
The definition of risk varies considerably in the literature depending on the do-
main in which it is considered for. For example, risk can be the standard deviation
on the return of an investment in finance [28], or a function on the amount of loss
and the probability of the loss [2, 29]. Nevertheless, there is a common theme
behind these definitions. Risk is always related to expected loss, which can be
caused by an action and the estimated probability of such loss arising.
In security, risk is defined as a function of the value of assets, vulnerabilities
and threats [15]. This definition is coherent with the engineering definition of
risk by considering the amount of loss as a function of the value of assets and
vulnerabilities in the system. Based on this definition, the risk assessment of a
computer system can be carried out quantitatively or qualitatively [15].
In a quantitative assessment, the values are calculated using various math-
ematical theories and formulae [30]. For example, risk can be calculated based
on the monetary replacement values of assets and the probabilities of threats
happening. The advantage of this analysis is that it provides a precise numerical
risk value, which is useful for cost-benefit analysis of recommended controls [30].
However, the precise meaning that a given numerical risk value represents can
become unclear, e.g., a high risk value can be due to the high value of the asset,
the high probability of threats happening, or both factors. This may cause prob-
lems in selecting suitable controls to protect the system assets because different
assets may require different protection mechanisms.
In contrast, a qualitative assessment uses descriptive variables to represent
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risk [30]. For example, each asset is given a value on a scale of cheap, medium
and expensive; criticality of vulnerabilities is given a value on a scale of very low,
low, medium, high and very high; and each threat is given a value on a scale of
very low chance, low chance, medium chance, high chance and very high chance.
The mapping of these values to the risk can be obtained by using a mapping
table based on the advices of security experts [26]. There are also other qualita-
tive analysis techniques, including scenario analysis and questionnaires [15]. The
advantages and disadvantages of using a qualitative analysis are more or less the
mirror of using a quantitative approach. This analysis provides a means to iden-
tify the vulnerabilities of the systems in a relatively short time [15]. However, the
cost-benefit analysis of recommended controls becomes difficult in the absence of
a precise numerical risk value [15].
2.2.3 Selection of controls
Controls, also known as countermeasures, are the ways to protect a system against
threats. The controls selected must be commensurate with the risk identified.
Controls for the computer systems can be categorised into three types: adminis-
trative, physical and logical.
Administrative controls are concerned with the relationship between security
and human factors [31]. Administrative controls specify how a system can be
used. Examples of administrative controls include organisational security policies,
user registration processes, business continuity plans and disaster recovery plans.
For example, the computing service in a university defines the security policy
that students must agree and abide by. It is often the case that this high level
security policy, defined in administrative control documents, forms the basis of
the selection of logical and physical controls. In other words, the logical and
physical controls implement and manifest the administrative controls.
Physical controls protect the physical hardware of computer systems from
physical and environmental threats. Some examples include locks, closed circuit
surveillance cameras (CCTV) or security guards (protection from unauthorised
accesses), cooling systems (protection from heat) and backup sites (protection
from natural disasters).
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Logical controls protect computer systems using software and data measures.
Some examples include data encryption, access controls, firewalls and intrusion
detection systems. In recent years, logical controls have received much attention
from the security community and have achieved significant advancement. Con-
sequently, the knowledge gained in logical controls has also been transferred to
protect and to improve physical controls, e.g., the use of PINs in conjunction
with door entry cards.
Security is only as strong as the weakest link [32]. In practice, all three types
of controls have to be implemented and balanced in order to achieve security
objectives of concern. For example, for availability, strong physical controls such
as a reliable cooling system and backup site are needed to protect the physical
hardware of a computer system from physical threats. At the same time, strong
logical controls such as a strong user authentication process and a good access
control policy are also needed to protect the system from unauthorised accesses
to the services provided. The lack of either control can easily result in the system
becoming unavailable.
2.2.4 Re-evaluation
A detailed security risk analysis on large computer systems is not feasible for every
organisation as it requires significant resources (time and cost) [1]. Furthermore,
new threats and vulnerabilities emerge each day because the operational envi-
ronment is constantly changing. Therefore, security risk analysis is an ongoing
iterative process and must be indefinitely repeated.
2.2.5 Summary
A conceptual model that summarises a security risk analysis process is shown
in Figure 2.1. In a security risk analysis process, the system owners attempt
to quantify the risk of the system exposed to by analysing vulnerabilities of the
system and identifying the threats to system. Based on the risk, appropriate
security controls are then selected to protect the system. The ultimate objective
of the process is to ensure that the security controls of a system implemented are
commensurate with the risk that the system is exposed to.
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Figure 2.1: The conceptual model of a security risk analysis process [1].
2.3 Dynamic coalitions and MANETs
A coalition is defined as a “temporary alliance for combined action, especially of
political parties forming a government” in the Oxford Dictionary of English [19].
This definition underpins two important characteristics of a coalition. Firstly, a
coalition is temporary; the alliance between parties is not permanent and will
cease to exist in the future. How long the coalition lasts depends on the type of
coalition. Secondly, an alliance is formed to achieve a common objective, which
may be difficult or even impossible to achieve alone by each individual party.
This implies that sharing of resources such as objects, applications and services
is an integral part of a coalition. Without common objectives, each party may
not be willing to share their resources [33].
A dynamic coalition is a coalition that allows parties to join or leave during the
lifetime of the coalition. Some examples of dynamic coalitions are as follows [33,
34]:
1. In a war, two or more countries may come together in an alliance to
strengthen their forces. These countries may decide to share some classified
information such as locations of forces and bases to increase the efficiency
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of the operation. However, a friend today might become a foe tomorrow;
an alliance member can change sides and become an opponent at any point
in time. The opposite can also occur.
2. A real-time systems research group in a university discovers a new highly
efficient scheduling algorithm and wishes to form an alliance with a private
automobile manufacturer and an embedded chip company for evaluating
the performance of the algorithm in the real world. Given the interest, all
three parties come together, form an alliance and share all research data
generated. After the coalition is set up, other organisations may decide to
join in or some of the initial members may decide to leave.
3. In the aftermath of an earthquake, the police department, the military forces
as well as voluntary organisations such as the Red Cross come together and
form a rescue operation alliance. The police moves refugees to a safe place,
whilst the Red Cross provides the medical and food aid. The military forces
provide transport to make the rescue operation more efficient. Eventually,
there is a recovery phase and basic infrastructure is rebuilt to get the region
back to normality.
4. MANETs are a type of network that can be rapidly deployed without relying
on existing infrastructure. The nodes in MANETs can dynamically join and
leave the network, often without warning, and possibly without disruption
to communication of other nodes, refer to Section 2.3.1.
Resource sharing is at the heart of every dynamic coalition. Each party in a
coalition hesitates to share its resources including information with other parties
in order to minimise its risk, yet sharing is necessary to achieve the common objec-
tive of the coalition. This problem is commonly known as the Dynamic Coalition
Problem [35]; having well designed access control policies and mechanisms are
vital in solving this problem.
2.3.1 MANETs
Wireless networks have grown and changed rapidly in the last decade. Wireless
networks can be categorised into two groups: infrastructure based networks and
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ad-hoc networks. In infrastructure based networks, there are some preinstalled
equipments, i.e., base stations to which all the mobile nodes are connected. All
communication between the nodes passes through base stations. A base station
may also serve as the gateway of a wireless network to a wired network. When a
mobile node moves out of the range of a base station into the range of another,
a hand off process is executed automatically and the mobile node continues its
connection seamlessly with the network [36]. Mobile phone service networks are
good examples of this type of network.
In ad-hoc (infrastructureless) networks, there is no preinstalled infrastructure
that the nodes can rely on to connect to each other. The nodes in an ad-hoc
network dynamically connect to form a multi-hop network. Each node plays the
role of a router, discovering the route and forwarding the data for other nodes
dynamically [36]. Ad-hoc networks are also self-configuring and self-organising
networks. Self-configuring in the sense that an ad-hoc network can be formed
on the fly; self-organising in the sense that the network can change based on
its needs, either by partitioning or merging the network with few administrative
actions. The two common types of ad-hoc networks are MANETs and sensor
networks.
MANETs are a subset of ad-hoc networks with highly dynamic network topolo-
gies [37]. Historically, MANETs have been pioneered by the military. The first
two projects on MANETs were the Public Radio Network (PRNet) [38] and
its follow up project, Survivable Radio Networks (SURAN) [39], both funded
by Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)1. Most existing non-
military MANETs have been developed in academic environments. The notion
of MANETs in the commercial world can be traced to the emergence and suc-
cess of the IEEE 802.11 Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) and Bluetooth
technologies in the 1990s. Due to the popularity of MANETs, the term “ad-hoc
networks” is often used interchangeably with “mobile ad-hoc networks” in the
literature.
Sensor networks are high density networks with a large number of sensor nodes
deployed in an area to monitor phenomena of interest. The discussion on sensor
1DARPA is an agency of the US Department of Defence that is responsible for the devel-
opment of new technology for use by the military.
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networks is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a comprehensive survey on sensor
networks, refer to [40].
2.3.2 Security challenges of MANETs
The flexibility that MANETs offer comes at a price. The infrastructureless nature
presents many security challenges that are specific to MANETs as follows [37, 41,
42]:
1. Lack of trusted entities — Lack of infrastructure is a fundamental charac-
teristic of MANETs. The lack of a trusted, centralised entity in MANETs
requires network administrative tasks to be distributed among the nodes
in the networks. This results in increased security risk as there are more
possible access points for intrusion. Moreover, many of the existing secu-
rity protocols, authentication and access control mechanisms rely on the
existence of a trusted, centralised entity, e.g., the public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) requires a centralised trusted certification authority (CA).
2. Routing attacks — Nodes in MANETs organise themselves to communicate
with their neighbours in such a way as to provide connectivity across the
networks. As the nodes are mobile and have the freedom to move in an
arbitrary manner, the network topology changes frequently in an unpre-
dictable fashion. Consequently, communication routes between nodes also
change and network partitioning may happen if there is no overlap in net-
work coverage of two or more sets of nodes. The routing algorithm has to be
highly adaptive and robust to accommodate these frequent changes. There
are many possible attacks on routing identified in the literature. In the
simplest case, the routing table in the nodes can be directly modified once
they are captured by adversaries. Packets can also be maliciously created,
modified or dropped to change the routing table. Additionally, attacks on
routing can be launched by making the nodes inactive or by making them
behave selfishly (using services but not cooperating in routing tasks).
3. Resource attacks — Mobile nodes have constraints on their resources, in
terms of power sources, processing power and network bandwidth. The effi-
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ciency in using these resources is an important factor in designing MANETs.
Often, the nodes in MANETs are allowed to switch themselves into a sleep
mode to conserve energy. However, this in turn leads to the routing prob-
lem mentioned earlier. In contrast, “sleep deprivation” is another type of
attack that aims to exhaust the power resource of the nodes by keeping
the nodes active at all times. Furthermore, the bandwidth of wireless links
is significantly less compared to wired links due to noise and interference.
Consequently, there is a constraint on the amount of data that can be
transmitted at one time in the networks.
4. Incompatibility of traditional cryptographic techniques — Many traditional
cryptographic techniques cannot be directly implemented in MANETs for
two main reasons. Firstly, many of these techniques require a centralised
entity, which is not present in MANETs. Indeed, it is often the case that no
node in the network may be assumed to be fully trustworthy because of the
hostile operational environment. Secondly, many traditional cryptographic
techniques may be computationally intensive, yet the nodes in MANETs
often only have limited computational and power resources.
5. Inherent problems in wireless communication —MANETs inherit all the se-
curity problems of wireless networks. The wireless communication medium
is less reliable than the wired medium. It is necessary for the networks to
be able to distinguish the variation in physical link performance and the
possible forms of malicious attacks, e.g., DoS attacks. These attacks can
happen at various network layers. Additionally, wireless communication is
broadcast in open air and no physical security protection can be used to
protect the communication channels. It is necessary to assume that ad-
versaries can eavesdrop and possibly perform some interpretations on the
transmitted signals, e.g., traffic analysis. The broadcast signal can also be
used by adversaries to determine the location of the networks/nodes.
6. Operational environments — MANETs are often deployed in risky and
hostile environments such as battlefields. Therefore, it is safe to assume that
the networks may face more challenging security attacks than conventional
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networks. Attackers can, for example, capture the nodes in MANETs and
use them to launch internal attacks.
7. Security policy issues — The dynamic nature of the networks can cause
the risk factors to be constantly changing. Current static security policies
that consist of static rules are unable to cope with this. For example, the
risk that a node is exposed to may change depending on the operational
environment (e.g., time and location) and the remaining resources (e.g.,
network bandwidth and battery power) of the node.
2.4 Conclusions
This chapter presents a brief overview of computer security. It discusses some
major security objectives, namely confidentiality, integrity, availability, authen-
ticity and accountability. It then discusses security risk analysis, which involves
the process of identifying assets and their vulnerabilities to threats, the risk as-
sessment process, and the selection of security controls. Next, it presents the
concept of dynamic coalitions and MANETs. Lastly, it presents a review on the
limitations of current security mechanisms in relation to MANETs.
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Chapter 3
Security Policy Models
A security policy is
a set of rules (or principles) that direct how a system (or an organisa-
tion) provides security services to protect sensitive and critical system
resources [43].
A security policy must therefore specify all necessary control measures for en-
suring system security, including how authentication should be done and what
responses should be made to a security violation, etc.
Access control specification is typically a major component of a security pol-
icy. Access control protects the resources of a system (objects) against unau-
thorised access by restricting the use of system resources only to the authorised
users (subjects) according to the security policy of the system [43]. Access can
be in many modes; the common ones include read, write, append and execute.
The access mode that a subject has on the objects in the system is known as
the “privilege” the subject has. The set of high-level rules that specifies which
accesses are to be authorised and which are not is known as the access control
policy [44]. The study of access control policies has resulted in various useful
models. Most of these models are formal, i.e., formal analysis can be carried out
to prove the models are secure with respect to the security objectives concerned.
There are also some models consisting of informal high-level principles such as
the Clark-Wilson model [21].
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This chapter first reviews some traditional influential security policies and
models in the literature. It then presents some recently proposed risk-budget
based models that aim to provide more flexibility. Next, it introduces the top-
down policy hierarchical model that enables policy composition and refinement,
with an emphasis on the problems encountered in the refinement and conflict
analysis processes. Lastly, it summarises the current state of the art in security
policy development and reiterates the research objectives of the thesis.
3.1 Mandatory access control policy models
The Multi-Level Security (MLS) system was first developed in the defence com-
munity as a means to manage information with different sensitivities. In the
system each object such as a file is given a classification label that represents
its sensitivity and each user is assigned a clearance level which is on the same
scale as the classification. The clearance level a user has depends on the user’s
background, e.g., rank and the results of checks into the user’s behaviour and
lifestyle. Essentially, these factors are used to establish the trustworthiness of the
user and the information the user needs to know. The clearance level of the user
is then subsequently determined and granted. Mandatory Access Control (MAC)
policies enforce access control to objects by comparing the classification labels of
the information (objects) with the clearance levels of the users (subjects) [22].
This is typified by the Bell-LaPadula Model [5].
3.1.1 Bell-LaPadula model
The Bell-LaPadula model is concerned with the confidentiality of objects in an
information system. In this model, each entity in the system is either a subject or
an object. Each entity is associated with a security label of the form 〈classification
level, category set〉. The set of classification levels consists of names that form
a dominance (>) relation based on the sensitivity or the clearance. An exam-
ple of classification levels can be {top secret, secret, confidential, unclassified},
where top secret > secret > confidential > unclassified. Here > means “is more
sensitive than”. The set of categories contains names that form compartments
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which provide a means to the creators of the objects to control and restrict the
distribution of the objects. An example of categories can be {investment banking,
equity, technology} in a financial institute.
With such setting, a dominance,  relation can be defined on security labels
as follows:
Dominance, . Let 〈sa, ca〉 and 〈sb, cb〉 be the security labels of a and b, label(a) 
label(b)⇔ (sa ≥ sb) ∧ (ca ⊇ cb).
This relation forms a partial order set (poset) on the security labels. Two
properties are defined to ensure the system remains secure with respect to the
confidentiality of the objects:
1. The simple security property (no read up) — no subject can read any object
with a higher security label than its own security label. This can be rewrit-
ten in a non-negated form as ∀s ∈ Subject, o ∈ Object : s can read o ⇔
label(s)  label(o).
2. The *-property (no write down) — no subject can write to any object
with a lower security label than its own. Formally, this can be written
as ∀s ∈ Subject, o ∈ Object : s can write o⇔ label(s)  label(o).
In other words, the Bell-LaPadula model restricts information to flow from low
confidentiality to equal or higher confidentiality. Later, a tranquillity property is
added to explicitly state that security labels of the entities in the system cannot
change during system operation to rebut some criticisms received in [45, 46]. (If
security labels can change arbitrarily under system operation, then clearly secu-
rity can be compromised. Consider a system in which the security labels of all
subjects are changed to the maximum possible levels allowing all files to be read
by everyone.)
Whilst MAC is often associated with the Bell-LaPadula model, they are not
the same. MAC really means that the security policy which governs the system is
enforced by the system itself, as implied by the term “mandatory”. The subjects
cannot manipulate access control attributes of the objects they own at their own
discretion. The Bell-LaPadula model is just an instance of MAC.
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3.1.2 Biba model
A model that is closely related to the Bell-LaPadula model is the Biba model [20],
which is concerned with the integrity of the objects in a system. It is essentially
the inverse model of the Bell-LaPadula model, i.e., the information is restricted
to flow from high integrity to equal or lower integrity. Two properties are defined
to ensure integrity of the system:
1. The simple security property (no write up) — ∀s ∈ Subject, o ∈ Object :
s can write o⇔ label(s)  label(o).
2. The *-property (no read down) — ∀s ∈ Subject, o ∈ Object : s can read o⇔
label(s)  label(o).
The Biba model also introduced two new concepts: the dynamic security label
and the invocation operation. The dynamic security label relaxes the constraint
of static security classification in the Bell-LaPadula model. An access to a low
integrity object by a subject operating at high integrity causes the operation of
the subject to be dynamically downgraded to low integrity. The new invocation
operation enables subjects to invoke other subjects (probably software processes)
to access objects. To remain consistent, the invocation property is defined such
that subjects are only allowed to invoke other subjects with lower or equal security
labels1.
3.1.3 Chinese wall model
The security models introduced so far are inspired from military applications.
The Chinese wall model [47] is a commercially inspired model which is concerned
with confidentiality by ensuring that information flow in the system does not
have any conflict of interest. A classic scenario example is the services offered
by a financial institution to different clients, some of which are competitors to
1The ring property is an alternative property defined such that there is no restriction set
for all read accesses, i.e., any subject can read any object regardless of their security labels,
but a subject s1 can write an object o1 ⇔ label(s1)  label(o1) and a subject s1 can invoke
a subject s2 ⇔ label(s1)  label(s2). However this property is inconsistent with the other
properties defined here. One must choose which is more appropriate to use depending on the
application.
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the others. A conflict of interest can arise when an analyst in the institution is
involved with two companies in the same market because the insider knowledge
that the analyst gains in one company may result in an unfair treatment of the
other and vice versa.
The Chinese wall model groups all objects related to a company in a com-
pany dataset. Datasets with conflicts of interest are grouped under the same
conflict class. If necessary, company datasets can be “sanitised” into a dataset
containing no critical information. No one should be authorised to access more
than one “unsanitised” dataset from the same conflict class. As the conflict de-
pends not only on the current object to be accessed but also all other previously
accessed objects, the access history of each subject must be kept.
Two properties are defined to ensure valid access control:
1. The simple security property — a subject can access an object only if the
object is within a currently held dataset, or an entirely different conflict
class. However, this property in itself does not prevent indirect information
leakage. A subject can read information from one dataset and write in
another dataset for other subjects to read. Therefore the *-property is
defined to prevent this kind of violation.
2. The *-property — a subject can write an object only if the subject does not
have read access to any other company datasets which are not “sanitised”.
This property ensures that the unsanitised information flow is restricted
within its own company dataset whereas the sanitised information flow is
not restricted throughout the system.
In contrast to the Bell-LaPadula model which assumes that access rights are
static, the Chinese wall model assumes that access rights are dynamic and there-
fore have to be reexamined during all state transitions. The identification of
the importance of access history also proliferates the research into history based
access control.
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3.1.4 Clark-Wilson model
The Clark-Wilson model [21] is a commercially inspired model which is concerned
with integrity. Unlike other models, the emphasis of this model is not on what
a subject can access, but how the access is done. The core of the model is
based on the two well established principles in the commercial world: well-formed
transactions and separation of duty.
A well-formed transaction is a series of operations which changes the data
in the system from one valid state to another. This is to preserve the internal
consistency of data in the system. The separation of duty principle requires that
the entity that certifies a transaction and the entity that executes the transaction
be different. Provided that these entities do not conspire, this principle should
preserve the external consistency of the system, i.e., the data in the system reflects
the data it represents in the real world.
The objects in the Clark-Wilson model are divided into either constrained
data items (CDIs) or unconstrained data items (UDIs). Five certification rules
and four enforcement rules are defined to constrain how to validate integrity of
CDIs, how and who can change CDIs and how to change UDIs to CDIs.
3.2 Discretionary access control policy models
Unlike MAC, Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies restrict access to ob-
jects based on the identity of the subjects and/or the groups to which the subjects
belong. The resource owners can delegate the access privileges to other subjects
at their own discretion; hence the name.
DAC policies can be represented using an access control matrix [48]. An
access control matrix is a two dimensional matrix, in which the rows correspond
to subjects and the columns correspond to objects. An element in the matrix
specifies the privileges a subject has on an object. Let r, w and x represent read,
write and execute access respectively. Then, an example access control matrix is
depicted in Figure 3.1.
Whilst the access matrix provides a convenient way of expressing DAC poli-
cies, it is likely to be too large and also too sparse to be stored efficiently in
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File 1 File 2 Device
Alice rwx rwx rwx
Bob r r rwx
Charles rw rw −
Figure 3.1: An access control matrix example.
practice. Consequently, it is usually stored either by columns or rows, resulting
in access control lists (ACLs) and capability lists respectively.
ACLs store the access matrix by columns. Each entry in an ACL stores the
access privileges a subject has on the objects in the system. This object-centred
decoupling makes ACLs suitable for operating environments where the protection
is central to the objects, e.g., operating systems. Conversely, if the number of
subjects in an operating environment is large and constantly changing, ACLs
become less suitable. The way ACLs store information is inefficient when one
needs to find all the objects that a particular subject has permission to access,
since a check on the ACLs of all objects in the system is required.
Capability lists store the access matrix by rows. The strengths and weaknesses
of capability lists are more or less the opposite of ACLs. The decoupling is
subject-centred; it is easy to check what privileges a subject has but it is tedious
to check the privileges granted on a particular object.
3.3 Role based access control policy models
DAC policy models, however, pose several challenges to the privilege adminis-
trations, especially when the information system becomes large. An interesting
observation is that the objects in the system are often not owned by the users
themselves, but the organisations they work for. The access control decisions
to the objects are often determined by the responsibilities of the roles the users
hold [49]. This gives rise to the role based access control (RBAC) in which the
access privileges in the system are defined in terms of the role a subject has,
rather than the identity of the subject itself [49].
The basic components of RBAC are: users, permissions, roles and sessions.
Two relations are defined: user assignment (UA) that associates users with roles,
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and permission assignment (PA) that associates roles with permissions. Both rela-
tionships are many-to-many mappings. Permissions are granted to users through
roles. At any time, a user can choose to activate a subset of roles that he has been
assigned; the permissions then available to the user are those associated with the
roles activated in that session.
There have been many extensions made to RBAC. The focus of discussion
here is on the American National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST)
RBAC reference model [50] which has later been revised to become the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard (ANSI/INCITS 359-2004) [51].
The ANSI RBAC reference model consists of four components: Core RBAC,
Hierarchical RBAC, Static Separation of Duty Relations and Dynamic Separa-
tion of Duty Relations. The Core RBAC defines the fundamental elements in a
RBAC system. These include all the functional capabilities of RBAC presented
so far, i.e., user assignment and permission assignment relations, session as well
as support for user-role review (the ability to determine which role is given to a
user and vice versa).
Hierarchical RBAC introduces the concept of role hierarchies, which allows
roles to inherit the permissions of other roles, e.g., a senior role inherits all the
permissions of a junior role. This often improves administrative efficiency through
the reduction in the number of permission mappings. However, the permission
inheritance based on the seniority hierarchy in the real world is not always suit-
able. In [52], Moffett presented some examples of how this can be in conflict with
some control principles such as the separation of duty principle, decentralisation,
supervision and review. Whilst various ad-hoc methods such as the use of private
roles [53] or exceptions [54] can be introduced to overcome this problem, these
methods defeat the original intent of improving the administrative efficiency.
Static Separation of Duty Relations introduces the concept of constraints on
user assignments. As this concept may conflict with the concept of role hier-
archies, it is specified in both the presence and absence of the concept of role
hierarchies. Dynamic Separation of Duty Relations introduce the concept of con-
straints on the role activation in a session for users.
A common alternative reviewed in the literature is the original NIST standard
which defines four conceptual models: Flat RBAC, Hierarchical RBAC, Con-
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strained RBAC and Symmetric RBAC. Flat RBAC is essentially the same as the
Core RBAC component; Hierarchical RBAC is Flat RBAC with role hierarchy
support; Constrained RBAC is Hierarchical RBAC with constraints on the user
assignments and role activation in a session for users; Symmetric RBAC is Con-
strained RBAC with support for permission-role review. In the ANSI standard
specification, the support for permission-role review is left as an optional feature
because it is intrinsically difficult to implement in large distributed systems [50].
The main advantage of RBAC is that it eases the administration task [49, 55].
Once the role-permission mapping is established, it is likely to remain constant.
The administrative task of assigning roles to users is very much easier and less
prone to error as compared to assigning permissions to the users directly.
There have been many other extensions proposed for RBAC. The extension
to the group or team concept is a common one. In the same way that roles are
used to group privileges, users can be grouped based upon the group or team
they belong to. Each team then is associated with roles. Team based access
control [56] and coalition based access control [57] are examples of this. Tem-
poral RBAC (TRBAC) is proposed in [58] to introduce the concept of temporal
constraints to RBAC. It allows the use of temporal constraints to specify the
periodic role activation and also the dependencies between the role activation via
role trigger mechanisms.
3.4 Flexible access control policy models
Whilst DAC and RBAC policy models provide better flexibility through per-
mission delegation and role abstraction, the permission assignments to the users
remain static. In practice, the permission assignments and the protection require-
ments of the objects may change over time. The task of administering the access
control policy can easily become unmanageable, especially when the operational
environment is highly dynamic.
Here we review some access control models that aim to provide more flexibil-
ity, namely the Fuzzy MLS model introduced in [2, 29] and the economics based
models introduced in [8]. The intuition of these models is based upon the ob-
servation that access control is governed by the risk incurred and the benefit an
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organisation can gain from the access. An access is authorised only if the benefit
outweighs the risk incurred. The risk-benefit tradeoff assessment of the models
presented so far is implicitly and statically encoded in the models. These two
models advocate the use of an explicit model to dynamically estimate the risk to
make better informed decisions.
3.4.1 Fuzzy MLS model
The Fuzzy MLS model is an adaptive extension of the read access aspect of the
Bell-LaPadula model. In the latter model, a subject can read an object if and
only if the security label of the subject dominates the security label of the object,
i.e., the sensitivity level of the subject (sl) is greater than the sensitivity level
of the object (ol) and the category set of the subject (sc) is a superset of the
category set of the object (oc). This can be interpreted informally as a subject
can read an object if and only if the subject is trustworthy enough and has the
legitimate “need-to-know” to access the object. The policy encoded in this model
essentially divides each access as either having an acceptable amount of risk or
an unacceptable amount of risk; only the accesses with acceptable amount of risk
are authorised [2].
The Fuzzy MLS model continues to employ this risk based rationale, but it
changes the access control from a risk avoidance system (inherent in the binary
decision-making process) to a risk management system by computing the “quan-
tified risk” estimated by the “gap” between the security labels of the subject and
object.
The model consists of a risk scale that is divided into three parts: top, middle
and bottom, as shown in Figure 3.2. Each access is mapped to a point on the scale.
An access that is mapped to a point in the top region is denied because the risk is
too high; an access that is mapped to a point in the bottom region is authorised.
The middle region is further divided into multiple risk bands such that each band
is associated with a risk mitigation measure; an access that is mapped to this
region is authorised only if the associated risk mitigation measure can be applied
to reduce the risk level to the bottom region. There is a change from a binary
model of risk (acceptable/unacceptable) to one that embraces a more refined and
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continuous assessment of risk. The new model explicitly acknowledges that a risk
decision need not be immediately clear-cut and the description “Fuzzy MLS” [2]
is intended in part to convey this. (There is a vague analogy with the way the
fuzzy logic replaces the classically clear-cut notion of set membership with one
based on probabilities or continuous distributions. However, anyone expecting a
more concrete inspiration from fuzzy logic will be disappointed.)
Figure 3.2: The Fuzzy MLS model [2].
Two alternative risk management systems, the credit card system and eco-
nomics based system, are also discussed in [2]. In the credit card system, each
subject is given a risk credit. When a subject makes an exceptional access, the
difference between the risk and the soft boundary will be charged to the risk credit
of the user. Periodically, the return on investment (ROI) of each user is evaluated
to determine the future risk credit of the user, based on the risk credit charged
36
3.4 Flexible access control policy models
and the results delivered by the user. Activities can also be logged to periodically
refine the access control policy. This provides a way of governing the long-term
behaviours of users, yet still maintaining sufficient flexibility as provided by the
use of risk credit. In the economics based system, the notion of pseudo-currency
is introduced in place of risk credit. Each user is given an amount of pseudo-
currency which can be used to purchase information accesses. Riskier accesses
cost more. Similar to the credit card system, the amount of pseudo-currency
allocated to a user in the future depends on the ROI of the user. This is very
similar to the economics based models that will be reviewed in Section 3.4.2.
Risk computation
The Fuzzy MLS model defines risk of a read access as the expected value of
damage caused by unauthorised disclosure of information:
risk = (value of damage, V )× (probability of incurring the damage, P ) (3.1)
The value of V can be estimated from ol. As ol typically corresponds to the order
of damage, V is defined as an exponential function of ol:
V = aol, a > 1 (3.2)
The value of P can be estimated by quantifying two “gaps”: one between the
sensitivity levels of the subject and the object, and the other between the category
sets of the subject and the object. In the Bell-LaPadula model, P can be viewed
as:
P = P1 + P2 − P1P2 (3.3)
where P1 and P2 are:
P1 =

0 if sl ≥ ol1 otherwise
P2 =

0 if sc ⊇ oc1 otherwise
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The Fuzzy MLS model continues to use (3.3) to estimate these probabilities,
but allows these probabilities to take real values in [0, 1] instead of only being
expressed as binary values.
To determine the probabilities P , P1 and P2 precisely is impossible as no one
knows the future for certain. However, risk indices can be formulated by having an
assessment on the likelihood of misuse in different access operations. The higher
the likelihood of misuse, the higher the risk index. Thereafter, these risk indices
can be mapped onto probabilities based on previous experiences and intuitions.
The use of risk indices is doubly useful. Firstly, it removes the constraints imposed
by the probability theory, e.g., the sum of probabilities of all possible outcomes
must be equal to one. This provides a more fine-grained view on risk. Secondly,
it makes the fine tuning task easier in the future. Risk indices, once determined,
can be kept fixed; only the mapping function is required to be tuned over time.
P1 is defined as the probability of a subject failing to resist the temptation of
unauthorised information disclosure. The Bell-LaPadula model can be viewed as
taking a binary view on temptation: temptation happens if the sensitivity level
of subject (sl) is less than the sensitivity level of the object (ol) and information
disclosure always happens (P1 = 1) if temptation exists.
To formulate P1 for Fuzzy MLS Model, the temptation index TI is first de-
rived. There are many different ways to relate TI to sl and ol, but it would seem
intuitive that the relation must satisfy the following properties [29]:
• As the sensitivity level of an object increases, the temptation increases.
• As the sensitivity level of a subject increases, the temptation decreases.
• Every subject faces temptation, i.e., there is no 100% trustworthy subject.
• TI is biased towards more sensitive objects.
A simple formula [2] that satisfies these properties is:
TI(sl, ol) =
a−(sl−ol)
m− ol
(3.4)
where a, m ∈ R, a > 1.0, m > max{ol | ol ∈ OL}, where OL is the set consisting
of each possible ol in the system. Here aol represents the estimated value of
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an object and asl represents the trustworthiness of a subject. TI approaches
infinity (temptation becomes very large and difficult to resist) as ol approachesm.
To relate P1 to TI, a sigmoid function:
P1 =
1
1 + exp((−k)× (TI − n))
(3.5)
is derived. Here n is the value of TI that makes P1 = 0.5; k controls the slope of
the P1 curve with regard to TI. This function is chosen because of its similarity
with the step function in the Bell-LaPadula model.
P2 corresponds to the difference between the probability of unintentional dis-
closure and the probability of disclosure which the organisation is willing to accept
for an access of a subject to an object. In the case that an object being accessed
belongs to multiple categories, a simplified assumption is made such that the ob-
ject is a monolithic entity, in which the differences among all the categories are
computed and the maximum difference is used as P2. Instead of a binary value,
a fuzzy membership value is assigned to each subject to represent the “need-to-
know” level of a subject for the object in each category.
The willingness index, WI can be computed using (3.4) with the fuzzy mem-
berships in place of the sensitivity levels. Then the willingness of acceptance
for an organisation when a subject accesses an object, Wc can be computed us-
ing (3.5) with WI in place of TI. Let Pidc be the probability of unintentional
disclosure for category c. Then, P2 is defined as follows:
P2 = max{Pidc(1−Wc) | c is a category} (3.6)
Finally, the risk of a read access is computed using (3.1).
Review
The Fuzzy MLS model draws inspiration from fuzzy set theory to estimate and
quantify risk in the traditional Bell-LaPadula model. This model continues to
employ the risk based rationale, but it changes the access control model from a
risk avoidance system to a risk management system by estimating the risk of each
access with a risk scale.
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This risk scale allows the model to adapt to environmental changes in several
ways. Firstly, the boundaries between regions can be dynamically adjusted to
control the system’s global risk tolerance. Secondly, accesses that would have
been denied under the traditional model may now be allowed if the associated
mitigation measures can be provided. Thirdly, the risk function that maps each
access to a point on the risk scale can be updated periodically to reflect the
changes in the operational environment.
In practice, the security labels of the objects in a system are often set with a
tendency towards higher secrecy to minimise the operational risk. Consequently,
information sharing becomes more difficult. This over-classification problem can
be addressed by making the label take uncertainty into account [2]. This is not
possible in the traditional Bell-LaPadula model.
The Fuzzy MLS model however has some shortcomings; it only uses the se-
curity labels to estimate risk. As outlined in [8], there are many other factors
that can affect the risk of an access, e.g., the access method (softcopy vs. hard-
copy), the operational environment and the risk mitigation measures employed.
The best way to identify, quantify and aggregate these factors remains an open
research topic. Risk aggregation can be tricky as the sensitivity of a piece of
information provided to a subject does not solely depend on itself, but also on
other information that the subject can access [2]. Additionally, accesses to multi-
ple pieces of low sensitivity information may allow a subject to infer information
that is far more sensitive.
3.4.2 Economics based models
The idea of managing risk in access control using economic concepts is proposed
in [8]. Each user in an organisation is allocated a number of risk tokens, which
can be spent for operational needs. The number of risk tokens a user will get
in the future depends on the return of investment of the user. Essentially, risk
is viewed as a type of limited resource in an organisation and the access control
problem is transformed into a resource allocation problem. Two economics based
models are introduced: one based on the command economic system and the
other based on the market economic system.
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Definition of risk, damage and harm
New definitions for risk and two new terms, “damage” and “harm” are introduced
in [8]. Risk is defined as the unnormalised probability of an access which can cause
the loss of a secret, damage is defined as the cost of the loss, and harm is defined
as the expected cost of the loss. These terms are related as follows:
harm = damage× risk (3.7)
The definition of risk is different from the one in the Fuzzy MLS model (3.1),
which is restated as follows for ease of reference:
risk = (value of damage, V )× (probability of incurring the damage, P )
A careful examination of both equations allows us to establish a mapping
between the terms: the term “harm” here corresponds to the term “risk” in the
Fuzzy MLS model; the term “damage” holds the same meaning in both cases; and
the term “risk” here corresponds to the term “probability of incurring a damage”
in the Fuzzy MLS model. In this thesis, the terms are used in the sense of the
original report for ease of reference.
Three guiding principles
The author suggests that the new information protection systems should be risk
based and outlines three principles that should be followed in building them.
These principles are as follows:
1. Measure risk — The amount of risk associated with each access should be
measured or at least estimated.
2. Mark an acceptable risk level — Risk avoidance (setting the acceptable risk
level to zero) effectively stops all the information accesses because every
access has an inherent amount of risk associated with it. The acceptable
risk level should be set to a value that optimises the long-term benefit.
3. Maximise the information flow up to the acceptable level — In contrast to
current systems which attempt to minimise the total risk, information in the
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system should flow to the greatest extent compatible with the acceptable
risk level in order to optimise gain.
Risk model
A risk model is required to estimate the risk of each access. The following factors
should be considered in building this model:
Individual factors — User roles, security clearances, previous positions, etc.
Situational factors — Operational environment, access time, etc.
Technical factors — Hardware/software security measures, etc.
Types of accesses — Access method (softcopy vs. hardcopy), access duration,
whether access is auditable, whether information can be redistributed, etc.
Temporal effects of consequences — Leaking the information on the budget
allocated for a small project may result in a short-term risk but leaking the
information on a national secret weapon may result in a long-term risk.
These factors have to be combined in a mathematical way to yield a formula that
can be used to assign a risk value to each information access.
Model based on command economic system
In this model, the value of a token is pegged to risk [8]. For example,
1 token is pegged to the risk associated with softcopy access for a day
to a document by an individual who is cleared to the secret level.
The value of the token is associated with the estimated risk incurred in the access,
including the type and duration of the access and the security clearance of the
individual. Yet, it does not consider the value of the document (the damage
factor).
Using the risk model presented in Section 3.4.2, each access can be associated
with a certain number of risk tokens. Higher risk accesses cost more. For example,
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• Softcopy access for a day to a document by an individual who is cleared to
top secret level costs 0.2 token.
• Hardcopy access to a document with a restriction on further distribution
by an individual who is cleared to secret level costs 50 tokens.
When a piece of information is being produced, the producer will create the
number of tokens that is commensurate with the acceptable risk level of the piece
of information. For example, the production of a document that may be viewed
in softcopy for 500 times by an individual who is cleared to secret level is always
accompanied by the creation of 500 tokens. If the 500 tokens are spent by an
individual who is cleared to secret level to print the document in hardcopy format
for 10 times with a restriction of no further distribution, the acceptable risk level
of the document would still be considered reached.
Additionally, the use of different types of tokens is necessary for different types
of information. This is because all tokens are pegged using the same baseline.
More sensitive information has less tolerable risk level and therefore has fewer
tokens created with it.
To increase the liquidity of the market, a secondary market can be introduced
to allow token exchange. This does not require any change of the model because
the tolerable risk of the information has been controlled by the number of tokens
created with it and other risk factors have been taken care of in the cost associated
to each information access.
To distribute the risk tokens, the information producers create and distribute
the risk tokens to different organisations based on their needs. Within an organ-
isation, risk tokens are pushed down through the management hierarchy. Peri-
odically, the distribution is reviewed based on the return on investment function.
Other metrics can also be used to adjust the distribution of the risk tokens. An
example of such metric is the utilisation function that measures the fraction of
tokens that have been spent to purchase information accesses. This function can
also serve as a measure on the merits of the information producers. If the utili-
sation fraction is near 100%, it means the organisation is almost reaping the full
benefit of the information produced and vice versa.
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Model based on market economic system
The main aspect that differentiates this model from the model based on the
command economic system is the collapse of information specific tokens into two
general types. This removes the controls that the producers have in setting the
tolerable risk associated with the information (via manipulation of the number
of tokens created). The reason for having more than one type of token is that
different types of information require different protection profiles over time. This
change requires the value of a risk token and the token distribution mechanism
to be redefined.
In the model based on the command economic system, accessing to any infor-
mation, regardless of its sensitivity level, would cost the same number of token
for all individuals with the same clearance level. This is because the risk of an
information access is only associated with the probability of causing unauthorised
disclosure of the information. However, the amount of damage caused by unau-
thorised disclosure of information with different sensitivity levels are likely to be
different. More sensitive information is likely to cause more damage. To control
the amount of damage, the information producer can limit the number of tokens
created along with an information. With the change from information-specific
tokens to generic tokens, this is no longer possible.
To overcome this problem, the value of a token in this new model is changed
to be associated with harm (damage×risk) as defined in (3.7). To calculate harm,
an additional damage model is required. For risk token creation and distribution,
a new central authority that plays a similar role to the central bank in the real
world is introduced. This central authority is also responsible for monitoring
the health of the tokens by balancing demand and supply, and controlling the
inflation and deflation rates.
Review
Although the author believes that the model based on the market economic sys-
tem is superior to the model based on the command economic system, there are
interesting features and tradeoffs in both models. As shown in Table 3.1, the
value of a token is defined in different ways. The model based on the command
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Command economic system Market economics system
Token value pegged with risk pegged with harm
Token type information-specific two generic types: short-
term and long-term
Token creator information producer central authority (central
bank)
Model required a risk model only a risk model and a damage
model
Information risk managed by limiting the
number of tokens created
with information
managed by maintaining the
equilibrium of the informa-
tion market
Table 3.1: The differences between the model based on the command economic
system and the model based on the market economic system.
economic system has been deliberately simplified to introduce the new concept
and to make way for the model based on the market economic system.
To have a fair comparison, the value of a token in the model based on the
command economic system is associated with the amount of damage. The only
remaining difference now is the controls the producers have in setting the toler-
able damage associated with information in the model based on the command
economic system. The information producers can be dishonest in their claims of
the sensitivity levels of information by manipulating the number of tokens cre-
ated with them. This may result in market dislocation. The model based on the
market economic system is proposed to alleviate this problem by the introduction
of a central bank, thus making the credibility of the central bank a key factor
for this new model to operate properly. In other words, the author assumes that
the risk of the central bank in being compromised is smaller than the risk of
market dislocation caused by the dishonest behaviours of the information pro-
ducers. This assumption may not hold true in certain operational environments,
e.g., MANETs do not have a central trusted node and all nodes are exposed to
security attacks.
Having said that, the three guiding principles in building a protection sys-
tem as outlined in Section 3.4.2 are inspiring. Current protection systems always
attempt to minimise the risk incurred in each access in the hope that the total
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risk of all accesses is below the acceptable risk threshold limit. These principles
recognise that risk is inevitably incurred in each access and thus advocate man-
aging the global risk. The acceptable risk threshold limit is first determined and
information flow is encouraged all the way up to the acceptable limit to max-
imise the gain. This provides greater short-term flexibility in the access control.
Information is made available to any user who is willing to pay the cost, yet the
long-term behaviours of users remain under control as the token distribution is
subject to the return on investment of each user.
Additionally, the distribution of risk tokens based on the return on invest-
ment encourages users to opt to access information in safer ways so as to reduce
expenses. Thus, the levels of risk tolerance can be controlled in the number of
tokens given to individuals; the fewer tokens, the more conservative the risk toler-
ance is. If the tokens are spent in the usage of a riskier (expensive) way to access
information, individuals may not have sufficient tokens to accomplish other duties
assigned to them.
There is a natural reluctance for human users to make decisions that have
far reaching consequences, e.g., revoking the clearance of a user. The risk model
helps by redefining the responsibilities of a human user in terms of security and
operational duties. The security duty encompasses ensuring the integrity of the
information entered to the risk model. This incremental information input to
the risk model, which gradually changes the trust levels of a user, becomes less
daunting in comparison to the immediate revocation of the clearance of a user.
The operational duty is to ensure that the tokens are used or distributed wisely
in the organisation/team, e.g., a manager may make an economic decision in
distributing the tasks to his employees. However, the use of the risk model leads
to an accountability issue: who is going to be responsible when something goes
wrong? The risk model, the user or the higher level organisation? There is
no obvious answer. Without accountability, the number of misuses is likely to
increase.
In economics based models, the availability of information access is tightly
linked to the risk tokens. A user who has spent all his budget is rendered useless
until the next token distribution cycle. This can happen due to the use of an
imperfect risk model, an imbalanced distribution of risk tokens or misbehaviours
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of users. In the former two cases, continual refinements have to be employed in
a timely manner to avoid causing market dislocation. If it is due to the misbe-
haviours of users, simply denying the user’s access request can be a logical answer
but inappropriate in certain scenarios. For example, denying an information ac-
cess to a front-line commander in a battlefield who has no budget left may result
in fatalities.
Both models also assume that entities are rational and therefore will make the
best decision among given choices. However, psychological and social research
suggests otherwise; the human decision-making process is often suboptimal and
irrational. For example, the “heuristics and biases” programme was started to
investigate the idea of whether the decision-making process under uncertainty
often rests on a limited number of simplified heuristics1 or a complicated algo-
rithm [59]. One of the results was the framing effect, which showed that the way
a problem is formulated can have influence on the decision-making process [60].
A problem can emphasize a gain (30% of the people will pass the examination)
or a loss (70% of the people will fail the examination). The former case generally
leads to risk aversion behaviour while the latter case generally leads to risk seek-
ing behaviour. Relationships among people can also affect the decision-making
process. For example, a captain may choose not to report the misuse of authority
among his soldiers to protect his soldiers from punishment or to preserve the rep-
utation of his team. Other factors such as emotion, bias, mistake or incapability
in judgement [61] can also creep into the decision-making process and cause chaos
in the system.
Additionally, the report does not present any implementation example of core
components, e.g., the models to calculate risk and damage. These models are
inherently complicated to design and build. The contributing factors are difficult
to measure, quantify, calculate and aggregate, e.g., how secure is an operating
system? Should an access to a secret document be considered a short-term risk,
a long-term risk or both? If both, what is the proportion of each risk? Even
if building such models is possible, the task of fine tuning these models in a
timely manner can be challenging. Furthermore, other security prerequisites on
the infrastructures required to implement the system, as discussed in [8], ranging
1Heuristics are the simple yet efficient informal rules that humans use to make decisions.
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from network protocol to technologies on tamper proof hardware, are difficult to
engineer. The security of a system is only as strong as its weakest component.
In summary, the use of economic concepts may provide greater flexibility to
protect information systems. However, there are doubts arising from its imple-
mentation and also with regard to some practical issues of the system. Indeed,
the author also commented that “(they) fully expect that much of what (they)
suggest can be proved unworkable, or no better than some different approach”
and “(this) model may seem too extreme” [8]. Further research is required to
further investigate this idea. Having said that, the 3M principles of building an
information protection system: measure risk, mark the acceptable risk and max-
imise the information distribution to the acceptable level are inspiring thoughts.
3.4.3 Top-down hierarchical models
The models presented so far have access control policies which are specified in
terms of the low-level corresponding enforcement mechanisms, e.g., protection
bits, capabilities and access control lists. Each model implements a single speci-
fied policy but does not often capture all the protection requirements of a system.
The requirements of the policy languages
In [62], Woo et al. proposed two ideas: a logic based language that allows access
control policies to be specified independently from the implementation mech-
anisms; and two composition operators that can be used to combine multiple
access control policies. They also outlined a list of requirements for a language
to be suitable for specifying access control policy. The language should:
1. be declarative and semantically independent from the implementation mech-
anisms.
2. be efficiently computable, hence allowing efficient authorisation evaluation.
3. allow the intended security properties to be easily specified.
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4. allow the ways to handle authorisation to be easily specified when poli-
cies are non-monotonic, inconsistent, incomplete (coverage) or combined
together.
Although it has been found later in [63] that the language proposed does not
impose sufficient constraints to ensure that the specified policy is Turing decidable
and therefore may not be implementable, their work has pioneered the use of high-
level languages to specify abstract policies independently from the implementa-
tion mechanisms. In [64, 65], the Authorisation Specification Language (ASL),
which is based on the stratified first order logic, became the first complete and
computable policy specification language. There exist also other policy specifi-
cation languages in the literature, e.g., Security Policy Language (SPL) [66] and
XACML [67]. Refer to [68] for detail.
Policy hierarchy
In network management research, policies have become increasingly popular as
a means of managing distributed systems. Here the term “policies” carries a
much broader meaning; policies are “rules governing the choices in behaviour of a
system (in general)” [69]. Therefore, policies encompass not only security-related
rules, but also general management rules. For example, obligation policies which
have the form of event triggered condition-action rules can be used to define
adaptive management actions, e.g., change in the quality of service provided,
resource allocation and backup policy and software installation. This difference
is not important in the discussion of this thesis.
To cope with the growth in size and complexity of large distributed systems,
there is a trend towards automating many aspects of management across dis-
tributed components. The concepts of viewing policy as an object and of policy
hierarchy are first proposed in [6] and refined further in [7, 70]. The concept of
viewing a policy as an object is about decoupling the policy from the compo-
nents that are responsible for enforcing it (the implementation mechanisms) and
viewing the policy as an independent reusable component [6]. This enables the
behaviour of the system to change by simply changing the rules in the policy.
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The concept of policy hierarchy recognises that policies exist at different levels
of abstraction. It suggests that high-level policies can be derived from business
goals and form the basis of multiple low-level policies [6, 7]. The ultimate ob-
jective is to develop a mechanism that allows the specification of a high-level
policy to be analysed and translated automatically to low-level policies which
can then be executed by the system. The number of policy hierarchy levels may
vary among different models, yet the intuition remains the same. The high-level
policies are refined to form low-level policies.
As an example, the policy model proposed in the International Technology
Alliance (ITA) project is shown in Figure 3.3 [3]. The model consists of four lay-
ers: specification layer, abstract layer, concrete layer and executable layer. The
specification layer consists of authoring and analysis tools that support the spec-
ification of high-level security policies in constrained natural languages. These
policies are then refined into abstract policies. At the next layer, various formal
methods are used to check the correctness and consistency of these abstract poli-
cies. The concrete layer is then responsible for refining the analysed policies into
concrete policies which are then upheld by different components to meet the pol-
icy goals. The executable layer transforms these concrete policies into executable
policies and distributes them to the implementation devices that are responsible
for enforcing the policies. This bottom layer is also responsible for reporting the
status and device discovery information back up to the concrete policy layer.
Policy refinement and policy conflict analysis
Policy refinement is the process of transforming high-level security goals into
low-level policies that can be enforced by a system [6]. The refinement process
involves the analysis of policy conflict, policy coverage and the determination of
resources required to implement the policies [6].
One widely accepted policy refinement approach is the goal refinement ap-
proach proposed in [71]. The goal refinement approach consists of the process
of identifying, recognising and instantiating refinement patterns. Once a refine-
ment pattern has been identified and analysed for completeness and conflict, any
policy that matches this pattern is certain to be complete and correct. Whilst it
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Figure 3.3: The ITA policy model [3].
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is desirable to have a fully automated refinement process, Moffett et al. argued
that it is often infeasible to do this in many situations other than the most trivial
scenarios [70].
Policy conflict analysis is the process of verifying whether the security policy is
consistent and complete [69]. By consistent we mean that there is no conflict be-
tween the rules in the policies and with the capabilities of the underlying system.
By complete we mean the policy implements all the high-level goals specified.
There are two categories of conflicts: modality conflicts and semantic conflicts.
Modality conflicts arise when the rules in the security policies are inconsistent
with one another. Modality conflicts can be divided into the following three
categories based on the types of rules that are in conflict [72]:
1. Authorisation conflicts — conflicts that arise because both positive and
negative authorisation rules exist for the same action, subject and object
tuple. In other words, a subject is authorised (by the positive authorisation
rule) as well as forbidden (by the negative authorisation rule) to perform
the same action on an object.
2. Obligation conflicts — conflicts that arise because there is an obligation
rule and a refrain (negative obligation) rule defined for an action that a
subject is obligated to perform as well as refrained from performing on an
object.
3. Unauthorised obligation conflicts — conflicts that arise when there are an
obligation rule and a negative authorisation rule defined for an action that
a subject is obligated but forbidden to perform on an object.
Having a positive authorisation rule and a refrain rule defined for the same action
for a subject and an object is not considered as a conflict.
Poor policy specification is not the only cause of policy conflict. Organisation
goals may be ambiguous and conflicting in nature, e.g., maximising resource
utilisation vs. maximising resource availability. This will inevitably result in
conflicts among policies that are derived from it.
To detect these conflicts, syntactic analysis can be applied to the policies to
determine the overlap of subjects, targets and actions [72]. However, the existence
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of overlap only reveals the potential modality conflict because other constraints,
such as time, might limit the applicability of the rules. Moreover, syntactic
analysis is unable to detect application-specific conflicts, e.g., the separation of
duty principle described in Section 3.1.4. To detect these conflicts, the conditions
that may cause the conflicts are required to be specified as additional constraints
on the policies. The occurrence of the conflicts may also depend on the state
of the system. Analysing all these states to check for possible conflicts is often
infeasible and therefore run-time analysis is still necessary.
Once these conflicts are detected, it is necessary to resolve them. Jajodia et
al. suggested a few ways to handle the conflicts in [64]. The simplest way is to
do nothing but flag an error condition. A better solution is to allow the positive
authorisation policy to override the negative authorisation policy or vice versa.
Often, the priority is given to the negative authorisation policy based on the
assumption that preventing actions would incur less risk. Obviously this is not
always true. For example, a positive authorisation policy can be an exception to
a more general negative authorisation policy.
To alleviate this issue, priorities can be assigned to different policies explic-
itly [72]. When conflicts arise among policies, the highest priority policy is en-
forced. However, the task of priority assignment in itself is difficult. There is
also a problem of breaking a tie if there are two or more policies with the same
level of priority. This problem is exacerbated when there are multiple parties
involved in defining and assigning policies. Inconsistency can easily arise as each
party can have different preferences. An alternative approach is to define priority
based on the specificity of the policy [73]. At the other extreme, meta policies
are also being proposed as a way to define the precedence relationship among
policies [72]. Whilst these resolution mechanisms provide more flexibility, they
also make the task of ensuring policy consistency more complicated. There is still
no known general mechanism that is able to detect and resolve conflicts among
policies when arbitrary conditions are allowed.
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3.5 Summary
Recent research [8] suggests that current static security policy models are not
appropriate for many modern systems, especially when the operational environ-
ment is highly dynamic. Some models that provide more flexibility have been
proposed [2, 8, 29]. These models are different from the static ones in two im-
portant aspects. Firstly, the risk-benefit tradeoff assessment on an information
access request is not encoded in the security policy itself. Instead, an explicit risk
model is used in these models to dynamically estimate the risk of an information
access request to make better informed decisions. Secondly, the new model at-
tempts to manage the total risk of a system as a whole, as opposed to the risk
of each access individually in the traditional models. Users are allocated with
an initial budget of risk tokens, which they may use on their discretion to access
different information. The budget distribution is reviewed periodically based on
the benefit gained from information access of each user. However, the models
proposed are rather abstract. Many aspects of the models require further investi-
gation. These include the way to allocate initial budget, the type of the market,
the cost of the access, etc.
In the network management research, the top-down policy refinement ap-
proach has received much attention recently. The idea of this approach is to
refine business goals to high-level security policies, which in turn are refined into
low-level policies automatically. Whilst this conceptual idea is useful, the current
policy conflict resolution mechanisms are still rather primitive. There is no gen-
eral mechanism that is able to detect and resolve conflicts among policies when
arbitrary conditions are allowed. As modern systems become more distributed,
the distribution of the analysis procedures across the system can be problematic.
The system may have a complex structure, with subsystems owned by differ-
ent domains. This makes the policy refinement process much more complicated.
In MANETs, subsystems can join, leave and rejoin at any time. This dynamic
behaviour can easily cause conflicts among the policies.
The way we choose to approach the problem is a radical one. Here we investi-
gate how a specific set of decisions may be generalised into an applicable security
policy using Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs). A developed policy inference sys-
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tem could be doubly useful. The generated policy rules can be used on their
own or used to verify the correctness of existing policies. We also explore the
potential of EAs in dynamically updating security policies with the use of new
decision examples. This feature will be essential in a highly dynamic operational
environment like MANETs, where the risk factors are constantly changing.
Additionally, we observe that the risk-budget based policy models reviewed
in Section 3.4 are really families of policies. Each instance in a policy family
constrains the system and therefore affects the operational behaviour and effec-
tiveness of the system in its own way. We introduce the notion of mission-specific
policy and demonstrate how EAs can be used to search for the (near) optimal
policies that fit a specific set of missions using simulation runs (instead of a set
of decision examples).
3.6 Conclusions
This chapter summarises various influential security policies and models in the
literature. It then introduces the top-down hierarchical policy model in which
allows policies to be specified using high-level languages and then refined into
low-level policies. Various issues related to the policy refinement and conflict
analysis process are discussed. Lastly, it reviews the current state of the art in
security policy development and reiterates the research objectives of the thesis.
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Learning Techniques
This chapter details the learning techniques used in this thesis. It begins with
a brief introduction to evolutionary algorithms (EAs) and discusses two imple-
mentations of EAs, namely Genetic Programming (GP) [74] and Grammatical
Evolution (GE) [75]. It then discusses how EAs can be extended to solve multi-
objective optimisation (MOO) problems. The last section introduces fuzzy expert
systems. These are used as examples in Section 5.2.4 to show how other learning
techniques can be used in conjunction with EAs to improve the learning perfor-
mance.
4.1 Evolutionary algorithms (EAs)
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) are a set of heuristic search algorithms inspired
by natural selection1. An initial population of individuals, which represents can-
didate solutions to the problem in question, is generated. This is typically done
in a random fashion or, even better, seeded with some known good solutions
to provide better search guidance. The individuals in the population are then
repeatedly subjected to the evolutionary process that consists of the following
steps:
1Loosely speaking natural selection states that individuals that are best adapted to the
environment have better chances to survive and reproduce for the next generation [76].
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1. Evaluation — Each individual is associated with a fitness value that mea-
sures how well it solves the problem.
2. Selection — Individuals are selected for reproduction according to their
fitnesses (natural selection). This implements the notion of “survival of the
fittest” [77].
3. Reproduction — Selected individuals are used to breed the population of
the next generation using evolutionary operators.
This evolutionary process produces populations of individuals (candidate solu-
tions) that are increasingly better suited to the environment (problem). Com-
monly, the stopping criterion is either that the maximum number of generations
has been reached or a “good enough” solution has been found.
4.1.1 Evaluation
Each individual is associated with a fitness value that measures how well that
individual solves the problem. In many applications this is formed by the appli-
cation of some defined function to the candidate solution. In others, the “real
world” acts as the cost function. For example, it is far easier to see how much
power a program consumes by running the program and measuring its power
consumption than by deriving and using a predictive model of power consump-
tion (provided one has the electronics skills to carry out such measurements).
The fitness value assigned to each individual provides a bias that is used to guide
the search algorithm. Without this bias, the search is no better than random
search [78]. From a practical perspective, the computational complexity of the
fitness evaluation must be limited.
4.1.2 Selection
Individuals are selected based on their fitness values from the current popula-
tion to breed individuals of the next generations; fitter individuals are selected
preferentially over weaker ones. There are many selection techniques, the most
commonly used of which are:
57
4.1 Evolutionary algorithms (EAs)
Roulette wheel selection technique [79] — This technique is also known as
fitness proportional selection. The probability of an individual being se-
lected is proportional to its fitness value. This technique is simple but the
selection pressure is highly sensitive to the scaling effect of the fitness values.
Typically, the variance of fitness values in the population at the beginning
of a run is very high; there is only a small number of individuals that are
much fitter than others. This technique heavily selects these individuals.
Consequently, the diversity of the population decreases at a very high rate,
often resulting in premature convergence. Towards the end of a run, the
variance of fitness values in the population becomes very small as the indi-
viduals are very similar to one another. Thus, the selection becomes similar
to random selection.
Rank based selection technique [80] — This technique uses fitness ranks in-
stead of fitness values to determine the probability of an individual being
selected. A typical implementation would assign probabilities according to
an inverse linear relationship with rank. Thus, the probability of select-
ing the k-th fittest individual in a population of size n is given by (n+1−k)
N
,
where N = n(n+1)
2
. To determine the fitness rank, however, requires sorting
on the fitness values, which can be expensive if the population size is large.
Tournament selection technique [81] — This technique selects individuals
by holding multiple tournaments. In each tournament, n individuals from
the population are considered and the winner of the tournament (the one
with the best fitness value) is selected. n is a tunable parameter known as the
tournament size. The selection pressure increases with the tournament size.
Binary tournament selection is the name given to this technique when n = 2.
Elitist selection technique [82, 83] — The selection method is not necessar-
ily probabilistic. Elitist selection is an example of deterministic selection
in which n of the fittest individuals in the current population are selected.
Often, this technique is incorporated with other techniques so that a small
portion of top performing individuals are guaranteed to be selected and
58
4.1 Evolutionary algorithms (EAs)
copied to the population of the next generation. Other good performing
individuals are selected probabilistically.
4.1.3 Reproduction
Evolutionary operators are applied on these selected individuals (commonly known
as parents) probabilistically to produce individuals of the next generation (com-
monly known as children). Some common evolutionary operators used are:
Crossover — Elements within two or more selected individuals are exchanged
to form new individuals.
Mutation — Elements within the selected individual are perturbed in some
way. This serves to diversify solution elements in the population. Given
an initial population, repeated applications of selection and crossover alone
might otherwise not be able to reach parts of the search space.
Clone (Reproduce) — The selected individual is passed on to the next gen-
eration unchanged. This serves to preserve the best performing individu-
als (since specific instances of applying evolutionary operators do not reli-
ably produce better individuals).
4.1.4 Implementations of EAs
Traditionally, EAs can be divided into the following four categories based on the
individual representation adopted [84]:
1. Genetic Algorithm that uses fixed length binary string individuals.
2. Genetic Programming that uses tree structured individuals.
3. Evolution Strategies that use real valued vector individuals.
4. Evolutionary Programming that uses finite state machine individuals.
However, the boundaries between these categories become increasingly blurred.
Often the properties from different categories are combined to suit the problem
in question. For example, Binary Genetic Programming (BGP) [85] uses binary
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string individuals that encode tree structures and Cartesian Genetic Program-
ming (CGP) [86] uses binary string individuals that encode graphs.
4.2 Genetic Programming (GP)
Genetic Programming (GP) is a form of EA in which an individual is typically
a program represented by a tree structure. An example that implements the
formula (X × Y ) + (4− (Y + 1)) is shown in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: A GP individual that represents a formula (X × Y ) + (4− (Y + 1)).
The tree nodes can be classified into two groups: the terminal set T and the
function set F . The terminal set T consists of constants and variables (the leaf
nodes) and the function set F consists of functions, operators and statements (the
non-leaf nodes). An example of terminal set T and function set F which is
sufficient to allow a description of the tree in Figure 4.1 is:
T = {X, Y } ∪ {1, 2 . . . 10}
F = {+,−,×,÷,min,max}
These sets must fulfil the sufficiency and closure properties. The sufficiency prop-
erty requires that the target solution for the problem in question can be repre-
sented with the elements in the sets. The closure property requires that the
elements in the function set F can accept any value they may receive as input,
including all the elements in terminal set T and any return values from other
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functions or operators. Practically, it is important to keep both sets small to
prevent the search space from becoming too large.
In GP, the crossover operator is performed on two trees. A subtree in each
tree is chosen randomly and swapped with the other. An example of crossover
operation is depicted in Figure 4.2a, where the marked subtrees in the two trees
are swapped with each other, resulting in two new trees. The mutation operator
is performed on one tree. A node in a tree is randomly chosen and replaced with
a randomly generated new node or subtree. An example of mutation operation is
depicted in Figure 4.2b, where the marked node is replaced with a new subtree.
Other operators also exist. For example, the reproduction operator copies the
selected individual to the population of the next generation without changes and
the permutation operator changes the node values of a subtree randomly.
4.2.1 Extensions on GP
In the standard form of GP, there is no way to ensure that all the functions
in each tree have inputs of the appropriate types (children). Strongly Typed
Genetic Programming (STGP) is introduced in [87]. STGP augments each node
with a type. A set of type rules is defined to specify how nodes in a tree can
be connected with one another. For example, we may require that the “≥” node
to take two floating point inputs and return a Boolean value. The population
initialisation and evolutionary operations must obey the type rules and only well
typed individuals are maintained in the population.
Another way to ensure type conformance is to use a grammar to control the
individual tree structure. However, the run-time grammar conformance checking
is very expensive. In Section 4.3, Grammatical Evolution (GE), a technique that
is able to evolve individuals in a grammar compliant way, is presented.
Automatically Defined Functions (ADFs) [88] are “building blocks” observed
during the evolution process. They can be recognised and subsequently made
available as units in the evolutionary process, effectively implementing an on-
the-fly modularisation process.
Alternative individual representations have also been proposed. For example,
Cartesian Genetic Programming (CGP) [86] uses integer strings as individuals
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(a) Crossover operation.
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(b) Mutation operation.
Figure 4.2: The crossover and mutation operations in GP.
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with each encoding a graph representation of a program. Constraints are placed
on how the integer strings can evolve in order to ensure the validity of the under-
lying artifacts. This concept is very similar to the use of integer strings, which
serve as indices to select which grammar rules are to be expanded in GE. Lin-
ear Genetic Programming [78, 89] uses individuals, which have variable length
sequences of simple instructions that operate on one or two indexed variables (reg-
isters) or constants from a predefined set. PushGP [90], on the other hand, is
proposed to evolve stack based execution instructions.
4.3 Grammatical Evolution (GE)
Grammatical Evolution (GE) uses variable length binary string individuals which
serve as indices that map a set of Backus Naur Form (BNF) language grammar
rules to programs [75]. These programs can be executed for fitness evaluation
purposes. To solve a problem using GE, the language grammar must first be
specified in BNF. The grammar of a language in BNF is represented as a tu-
ple {N , T , S, P} where N is the non-terminal set, T is the terminal set, S is a
special element of N called start symbol which is expanded first, P is the set of
production rules (also called derivation rules) that is used to guide the expansion
from N to T . A production rule has the following format:
<non-terminal> ::= <expr-of-symbols-1>
| <expr-of-symbols-2>
| ...
The production rule states how the non-terminal symbol on the left hand side
of the rule is to be substituted by one of the symbolic expressions on the right
hand side of the rule. The “|” symbol is used to indicate the choice of expressions.
An example of BNF grammar is as follows:
N = {<expr>, <op>, <var>}
T = {+,−,×,÷, X, Y, (, )}
S = <expr>
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and P consists of a set of production rules as follows:
<expr> ::= <expr> <op> <expr> (0)
| (<expr> <op> <expr>) (1)
| <var> (2)
<op> ::= + (0)
| − (1)
| × (2)
| ÷ (3)
<var> ::= X (0)
| Y (1)
This grammar defines a set of arithmetic expressions over the variables X and Y .
4.3.1 Genotype-phenotype mapping
The mapping process between the variable length binary string individuals and
programs using BNF grammar is known as genotype-phenotype mapping1. This
is best illustrated with an example. In each individual (genome), every eight
consecutive bits are viewed as an integer which is more commonly known as a
codon. Consider an individual with the following codons:
{10, 5, 51, 8, 16, 49, 30, 18}
As mentioned, the mapping process begins with the start symbol. The codon
value is read to determine the usage of a certain production rule to expand the
symbol using a modulus mapping function as follows:
rule = (codon value) mod (total number of applicable production rules)
1In the biological world, a genotype is the internally coded information (genes) that is
inherent in an individual. The phenotype is the “observable characteristics” of an individual
that can be influenced by the genotype and environment. For example, the genotype of human
being is the DNA and an example of the phenotype is his eye colour.
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Assuming the start symbol is <expr>, the first codon value is 10 and there are
three immediately applicable production rules for <expr>, therefore 10 mod 3 =
1. The production rule 1 is used to replace <expr> with (<expr> <op> <expr>).
Assuming leftmost derivation is used, the leftmost <expr> is first expanded as “(”
is a terminal. The second codon value is used to select the production rules.
As 5 mod 3 = 2, the production rule 2 is selected and the leftmost <expr> is
replaced by <var> resulting in (<var> <op> <expr>). The next non-terminal to
be expanded is <var>. As the next codon is 51 and the number of rule choices
now available is 2, <var> is replaced with Y .
The mapping process continues until a complete program is generated, i.e.,
when all the non-terminals have been transformed into terminals. However, some
problems may arise during this process. Firstly, there is a possibility that the
codon values may run out before the entire mapping process is complete. To
overcome this problem, an individual can be wrapped around to reuse the codon
value, i.e., the reading of the last codon (18 in the example) will be followed by
the first codon (10 in the example).
If the context free grammar used is recursive, the mapping process can also
be indefinitely long. Consider the production rules for <expr>. If the codon value
always maps onto the production rule 0 or 1, the mapping process is never ending.
The <expr> is replaced by either <expr> <op> <expr> or (<expr> <op> <expr>).
In both cases, the next leftmost non-terminal is again <expr> itself. This problem
can be resolved by setting an upper bound on the number of times the production
rules can be performed. In the original algorithm, this is achieved indirectly by
setting a limit on the number of times the individual can be wrapped around and
thus a limit on the number of codons available. If a complete program is not
fully generated (the non-terminals have not been transformed to terminals) when
the wrap around threshold is reached, this individual is given the lowest possi-
ble fitness value to decrease the probability of this individual being subsequently
selected.
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4.3.2 Extensions on GE
The greatest advantage of GE is that it allows artifacts to be evolved in a gram-
mar compliant way and many solution spaces can be defined using a grammar.
Mechanisms for explicit prevention or repair of invalid artifacts are therefore not
required.
The use of a grammar also makes the languages and search algorithms be-
come independent components. The program generation in arbitrary languages
is possible by simply changing the BNF grammar. The search algorithm can be
replaced with other algorithms. Instead of using Genetic Algorithm, it is possi-
ble to use other search techniques. For example, Grammatical Swarm [91] uses
Particle Swarm Optimisation to carry out the search. This feature allows GE to
reap the advantages of improvements in any evolutionary algorithm.
Although the lengths of individuals can be set within a predefined range, this
does not mean that the sizes of the generated programs will be similar. In many
problems, it has been found that many of the randomly generated individuals fail
to complete the genotype-phenotype mapping in the initial population generation,
even when the individuals are allowed to wrap around up to thirty times [92].
To overcome this problem, a sensible method [92] is proposed to take the
grammar into account in the initialisation process. It is modelled after the popular
ramp-half-and-half initialisation method [88], which is able to generate an initial
population that consists of 50% full trees and the other 50% partial trees with
various heights and shapes within a predefined height range. This is achieved
by first assigning each rule in the grammar with two properties: the minimum
number of mappings required for the non-terminal on the left hand side of the
rule to be completely mapped to terminals and whether the rule is recursive. As
each derivative tree is built, only rules that can fit the remaining height of the
tree are selected. To generate a full tree, the recursive rules are always chosen
whenever possible. To generate a partial tree, the recursive and non-recursive
rules are chosen with equal probabilities. The final step in the initialisation is to
reverse map the nodes of the tree to the corresponding codons.
Additionally, the traditional one-point crossover, which randomly chooses a
point on each of the two selected individuals and swaps all data beyond that
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point, may not be very effective in GE. This is because the chosen crossover
point may be at a position that is after the effective length of an individual (the
portion of the individual that is actually used to select the rules) and render the
crossover operation ineffective. To overcome this problem, effective crossover is
introduced. This operation restricts the crossover points chosen to be within the
effective length of the selected individuals.
4.4 Multi-objective evolutionary algorithms
In many practical problems, a desire to optimise more than one objective is
common, some of which can be in conflict with others. Instead of having a single
fitness score, each possible solution has a vector of fitness scores, one per objective.
This is typically referred to as a multi-objective optimisation (MOO) problem.
To visualise this, the concepts of the solution space S and objective space O are
used. An example of S and O for a minimisation with two objectives is shown
in Figure 4.3. Each point s ∈ S represents a possible solution to the problem in
question1. The fitness function f maps a point s ∈ S to a point o ∈ O such that
the location of the point o represents how well s meets the objectives. The fitness
function f is surjective (onto) but not injective (one-to-one); each point in S is
mapped to one point in O and multiple points in S can be mapped to the same
point in O. The region in which all the implementable solutions reside is known
as the feasible solution region.
The aim of multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) is to discover
the set of solutions with the optimal tradeoffs between all the objectives. Re-
ferring to the above example, these solutions are on the dotted lines in O in
Figure 4.3.
4.4.1 Weighted sum of fitness functions
One widely used approach to solve MOO problems is to use a weighted sum of
the individual fitness functions as the overall fitness function for the problem, as
1For ease of illustration, our solution space comprises individuals with two factor values.
However, the solution and objective spaces need not have the same number of dimensions.
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Figure 4.3: A mapping between solution space S to objective space O.
indicated below:
f(x) =
n∑
m=1
wmfm(x) (4.1)
where wm is a positive scalar weight for fm. However, this approach requires the
relative weights of all the objectives to be predefined. This is often difficult. For
example, how many times higher/lower is the risk of an unauthorised disclosure
of one information element in comparison to the risk of a soldier being killed?
This is like comparing apples with oranges; there is inevitably some degree of
subjectivity and arbitrariness in the weight assignments. A more principled and
conceptually clearer approach would be advantageous.
Each chosen set of weights essentially defines a problem landscape via the
single fitness function defined in (4.1). The space can then be searched using
any appropriate technique. If the tradeoffs among objectives change, the tech-
nique has to be rerun to search for the new optimum solution. This can be very
inefficient.
Additionally, for a certain set of problems, this approach is unable to discover
all solutions with different levels of tradeoffs. Consider a two objective minimi-
sation problem with its objective space shown in Figure 4.4. For a chosen set
of weights (w1, w2), a line with gradient −w2/w1 can be drawn to represent the
set of solutions that have the same fitness value. Geometrically, the process of
68
4.4 Multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs)
minimising the fitness value can been seen as shifting this line towards the origin
as shown in Figure 4.4. The optimal solution for any given set of weights would
be the point that lies at the tangent to the feasible region. By changing the
relative weights of the objectives, different solutions may be considered as the
optimal. However, as there is no such line which can be defined such that the
line passes through the points in the concave region, the set of solutions that lie
at the concave part of the feasible region can never be discovered.
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Figure 4.4: The set of solutions that lie at the concave part of the feasible region
can never be discovered.
4.4.2 Pareto front based approaches
Pareto front based approaches search for multiple optimal solutions in one single
evolutionary run using the Pareto dominance concept in the fitness evaluation of
each solution (individual). A Pareto dominance, ≻ relation between two solu-
tions, x and y is defined as follows:
Pareto dominance, ≻. Let fx and fy be the fitness vectors of x and y, > denote
“is fitter than” relation, x ≻ y ⇔ (∀i · fx[i] ≥ fy[i])∧ (∃i · fx[i] > fy[i]) where f [i]
is the fitness score of the i-th objective.
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In other words, x dominates y if and only if x is better than y in at least one
aspect and is at least equally good in all other aspects. This defines a partial
order relation on the solution space. There always exists a subset of solutions
that are not dominated by any other solutions. This subset represents the best
solutions possible and is known as the Pareto front or the Pareto optimal set.
The aim of Pareto front based approaches is to converge the individuals in
the population to the Pareto optimal set of solutions. Within the population of
each generation, there is always a subset in which solutions are not dominated
by any other solution in the population. The aim is to make this non-dominated
subset a better approximation of the Pareto optimal set than the one in the
previous generation. To have a good approximation to the Pareto optimal set,
these approaches also attempt to maximise the diversity among the solutions in
the non-dominated subset. Consider an optimisation problem with two objectives
such as in Figure 4.5. Let the curved line represent all the solutions with the best
possible achievable tradeoffs between the two objectives, i.e., the real Pareto front.
Then, MOEAs attempt to converge the individuals (points) in the population to
be as near to the Pareto front as possible and also as diversely spread on the
Pareto front as possible.
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Figure 4.5: The objective of a Pareto front based approach is to approximate the
Pareto front of the solutions with the individuals in the population.
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4.4.3 Advantages of Pareto front based approaches
Pareto front based approaches have several advantages over the traditional weighted
sum of fitness functions approach:
• The weights that define the tradeoffs among different objectives are no
longer required to be determined a priori. Such a determination is difficult
as it requires a deep understanding of the problem domain.
• The Pareto front can reveal the relationship between different objectives,
which may be difficult to obtain otherwise. Such information is helpful in
guiding a decision maker to choose the optimal solution for the problem
from the Pareto optimal set.
• The set of Pareto optimal solutions can be saved and be retrieved later.
Such a retrieval may be necessary if a change in circumstance requires a
different set of tradeoffs and therefore a different solution.
• Optimising for multiple fitness scores tends to preserve the diversity of the
population, which prevents the population from being trapped in a local
optima and increases the chance of finding better solutions.
4.4.4 Implementations of Pareto front based approaches
There are many different implementations. Two of the most popular implemen-
tations, SPEA2 [93] and NSGA2 [94], are presented here. As EAs are stochastic
in nature, there is no guarantee that the population will converge to the real
Pareto front, i.e., the output is only an approximation of the real Pareto front.
Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm 2 (SPEA2)
As suggested by its name, SPEA2 is an improvement over its previous implemen-
tation, SPEA [95]. SPEA2 is an elitist approach which uses a fixed size archive
to maintain non-dominated individuals found in each generation. Binary tourna-
ment selection is then used to select individuals to produce offspring population
using evolutionary operators. The best n individuals from the union of the archive
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and offspring population become the population of the next generation, where n
is the population size.
As the archive size is fixed, three possible cases can arise: the number of non-
dominated individuals is equal to, less than, or more than the archive size. In
the first case, there is no additional work required.
If the number of non-dominated solutions is less than the archive size, the
remaining vacancies are filled with non-dominated solutions. The selection is
based on the fitness values of the individuals. The fitness value of an individual
is determined by two factors:
1. Raw fitness — the sum of the strength of individuals it is dominated by.
The strength of an individual is the number of individuals it dominates.
2. Density estimation — the inverse of the Euclidean distance of the individual
to the k-th nearest neighbour in the objective space, where k is usually set
to be the square root of the sum of population size and archive size.
In SPEA2, a smaller fitness value means fitter.
If the number of non-dominated solutions is more than the archive size, the
non-dominated solution that has the shortest Euclidean distance to another indi-
vidual in the objective space is dropped. If two solutions have the same distance
to their nearest neighbours, the tie is broken by comparing their distances to
their second nearest neighbours and so forth. This process is iterated until the
non-dominated solutions can fit into the archive. Essentially, the goal is to fill the
archive with non-dominated solutions as uniformly and widely distributed over
the objective space as possible. Referring to Figure 4.6, an example of the formed
Pareto front and the solutions that are to be kept in the archive is depicted.
Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm 2 (NSGA2)
Similarly to SPEA2, NSGA2 is an improvement algorithm over its previous im-
plementation, NSGA [96]. NSGA2 is also an elitist algorithm that uses an archive
to preserve the non-dominated solutions. The main distinction between these two
algorithms is in the way they preserve the elites.
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Figure 4.6: The archive truncation process in SPEA2 removes the non-dominated
individuals that are closest to others iteratively until these individuals can fit into
the archive. Assuming the archive size is 10, the truncation process removes the
individuals that are crossed out.
In each generation, NSGA2 uses the Pareto dominance relation to divide the
population into partitions with different rank levels. The non-dominated solu-
tions in the population are first assigned to partition rank 1; the non-dominated
solutions in the remaining population are assigned to partition rank 2, and so
forth. This process is continued until all solutions are assigned to a partition.
The rank of the partition is then used as the order to admit solutions into the
archive; partitions with better (lower) rank are admitted first. Solutions are ad-
mitted on a partition by partition basis until the archive is filled or has exceeded
its maximum capacity.
If the archive size has exceeded its maximum capacity, some of the solutions
from the last admitted partition are removed based on the crowding distance. The
crowding distance of a solution is the average distance of two adjacent solutions
on either side of the solution along each of the objectives in the objective space.
The individual with the smallest crowding distance is removed iteratively until
the solutions can fit the archive.
Individuals are then selected from the archive using crowded binary tour-
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nament to produce an offspring population of the same size using evolutionary
operators. The crowded binary tournament selects the better of two randomly
selected individuals, where better means the individual with lower rank or the
one with lower density measure (higher crowding distance) in cases where both
of them have equal rank. The union of the archive and the offspring population
forms the population of the next generation.
4.5 Relevant applications of GP and GE
This section reviews some of the applications of GP and GE in security related do-
mains including rule inference system, intrusion and anomaly detection systems,
security protocols and cryptography.
4.5.1 Rule inference system
Rule inferencing is the process of extracting a set of rules from a set of obser-
vations. In [97] a GP based rule inference system called LOGENPRO (LOGic
grammar based GENetic PROgramming rule inference system) is proposed. In
the experiment, the results show that LOGENPRO is able to outperform some
Induction Logic Programming (ILP) systems in inferring rule sets. In [98] an
experiment on coevolution between rules and fuzzy membership variables using
GP is designed. The experimental results show that the output set of rules and
variables are well adapted to one another. In [99] an attempt is made to invent
a generic rule induction algorithm using grammar based GP. The results are
found to be competitive with some well known manually designed rule induction
algorithms.
GE is used to learn investment strategy (trading rules) using the market stock
indices in [100–102]. The results show the investment strategy inferred yields
profitable performance for the trading periods analysed. In [103, 104] GE is used
to evolve rules for foreign exchanges. The rules learnt outperform the benchmark
buy and hold strategy over all the trading periods analysed.
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4.5.2 Intrusion and anomaly detection systems
EAs have also been used to discover useful patterns of system features that de-
scribe the behaviour of a system. These discovered features are then used to
recognise anomalies and intrusions.
In [105] GP is used to evolve an intrusion detection program. In comparison
with the results obtained using other machine learning techniques (more precisely,
support vector machine (SVM) and decision tree techniques), GP is found to
be able to generate a program that is more compact, efficient and selective in
choosing the relevant input features. In [106] GP is shown to be able to evolve
a set of autonomous agents that are used to implement an intrusion detection
system. In [107] GE is also shown to be effective in generating an intrusion
detection program.
Evolving an intrusion detection system or a computer program for MANETs
using EAs is a relatively new domain. Often, MOEAs are used to search for
programs that are not only optimal in accomplishing functional objectives, but
are also optimal against other non-functional objectives, e.g., the program size,
memory requirement and power consumption. These objectives are important
considering that the operational environment may have very limited resources.
In [108] an MOEA based framework that is able to evolve efficient distributed
programs for sensor networks is presented. The node election problem (selecting
one node from a group of nodes in the network) with the aim of minimising
the number of message transmissions is used to demonstrate the feasibility of
the framework. In [109] GE is used to evolve an intrusion detection system for
MANETs. The results show that the approach is promising.
4.5.3 Security protocols
Genetic Algorithm has been used to synthesise abstract security protocols in a
small subset of the Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic automatically [110].
This work has been extended to cover more complicated protocols in the BAN
logic [111] as well as in the more sophisticated Syverson-van-Oorschot (SvO)
logic [112]. The results show that Genetic Algorithm is able to synthesise abstract
security protocols that are provably correct with respect to the logic used.
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The use of binary string individuals which are treated as integer strings, the
use of modulus operator to convert these integers to multiple indices within
bounded ranges, and the use of these indices to select which element it repre-
sents in each protocol component are very similar to GE.
4.5.4 Cryptography
In [113] GP is applied to evolve a block cipher. In [114] an extremely lightweight
and fast block cipher is successfully evolved using GP. This block cipher is
competitive with the well respected Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) [115] in
terms of security strength and speed.
In [116] GE is shown to be able to evolve Boolean functions with crypto-
graphic significance. The design of Boolean functions for cryptographic schemes
is difficult because the desired properties of the functions are complicated and
often conflicting with one another.
In [117] GP is shown to be able to evolve a circuit for the Quantum Fourier
Transform, which is an important building block in Shor’s algorithm [118, 119].
The discovery of this algorithm is significant as it is able to solve factorisation
and discrete logarithms in polynomial time. Many widely respected encryption
algorithms rely on these problems being computationally intractable.
4.6 Fuzzy expert systems
Unlike in the computer world where all the operations are essentially binary, our
world is full of ambiguities. The concept of fuzzy logic was conceived by Zadeh
as a way to deal with this ambiguity [120]. Instead of determining a statement as
being either true or false, a degree of truth is associated with the statement using
a real value in the range [0, 1] where 0 means absolute falsehood and 1 means
absolute truth.
4.6.1 Fuzzy set theory
In classical set theory, an element x can either be in a set S, or in the complement
of the set S ′, but not both. Fuzzy set theory extends the classical set theory to
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allow partial membership. A value in the range [0, 1] is introduced to describe the
membership of x, with 0 representing complete non-membership, 1 representing
absolute complete membership and values in between representing the degree of
partial membership [121]. Often, this membership assignment is achieved using
a function called the membership function.
Three basic fuzzy set operators, namely union (∪), intersection (∩) and com-
plement (′) are defined. These are the analogues of the classical set operators.
Let µA(x) and µB(x) be the fuzzy membership functions of the fuzzy sets A
and B. Then, these operators are defined as follows [120]:
µA∪B(x) = max(µA(x), µB(x)) (4.2)
µA∩B(x) = min(µA(x), µB(x)) (4.3)
µA′(x) = 1− µA(x) (4.4)
There is a shortcoming with these definitions: the result of the operations
depends only on one of the potentially many operands [122]. There are other
definitions proposed for these operators. Many of these proposals attempt to
redefine the union and intersection operators, but leave the complement operator
unchanged.
In the same paper, two additional operators, namely algebraic sum (⊕) and
algebraic product (⊗), are introduced and defined as:
µA⊕B(x) = µA(x) + µB(x)− µA(x)µB(x) (4.5)
µA⊗B(x) = µA(x)µB(x) (4.6)
As the ⊕ and ⊗ are equivalent operators to ∪ and ∩ in classical set theory
respectively, these operators are sometimes viewed as alternative definitions for ∪
and ∩ operators. Indeed, these definitions are used in the Fuzzy MLS model
introduced in Section 3.4.1. These operators are different in fuzzy set theory
as µ(x) is no longer a binary value.
Yager proposed an alternative set of interpretations for ∪ and ∩ operators
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in [123] as follows:
µA∪B(x) = min(1, (µA(x)
w + µB(x)
w)
1
w ) (4.7)
µA∩B(x) = 1−min(1, ((1− µA(x))
w + (1− µB(x))
w)
1
w ) (4.8)
with w ≥ 1. A comparison of the behaviours of these interpretations is shown in
the Figure 4.7 [122]. Refer to [124, 125] for other interpretations.
Figure 4.7: Various interpretations of the fuzzy operations.
In all these interpretations, the behaviours of the operators are the same as
in the classical set theory if the membership value is restricted to only binary
value (0 or 1). Therefore, fuzzy set theory and logic can be thought of as a gen-
eralisation of classical set theory and logic. Many of the interpretations proposed
attempt to preserve the laws defined in classical set theory, e.g., commutative
law, distributivity law and de Morgan’s law. However, the law of contradic-
tion A ∪A′ ≡ U (a set and its complement must establish the universe) and law
of excluded middle, A∩A′ ≡ ∅ (an element can either be in a set or not, but not
both) are not established in fuzzy set theory. Indeed, fuzzy set theory can exist
only if these two laws do not hold.
Lastly, fuzzy set theory ought not to be confused with probability theory.
While they are similar mainly because of the use of values in the range [0, 1],
there is no restriction on fuzzy set theory to enforce the concept that the sum of
all memberships has to be equal to 1, as in probability theory.
78
4.6 Fuzzy expert systems
4.6.2 Inference process
One major application of fuzzy logic is to build fuzzy expert systems. A fuzzy
expert system consists of a set of fuzzy membership functions and inference rules
that are used to reason about data [121]. These systems have achieved many suc-
cesses in different fields, including automatic control systems, pattern recognition
and data analysis. The inference rules take the following form:
IF X is low and Y is medium THEN Z is high
where X, Y are the input variables and Z is the output variable. The low, medium
and high are the membership functions defined on X, Y and Z respectively. The
antecedent (the part between IF and THEN) is the condition that describes the
degree of truth and the degree of application of this rule. The conclusion (the
part after THEN) assigns membership functions to the output variables.
Applying these inference rules to the data, we can infer the values of output
variables for any given specific values of input variables. This inference process
consists of the following steps [4, 121]:
1. Fuzzification — The input values are mapped to fuzzy membership values
using the membership functions. In each rule, if the antecedent consists
of more than one input variable, the input fuzzy membership values are
aggregated using fuzzy set operators. The interpretation of these operators
is a design issue for the system.
2. Inference — The aggregated fuzzy membership value is used to determine
the degree of application of each rule. The fuzzy membership value is
applied to each output variable for each rule. There are two commonly
used inference methods: min and product, which are equivalent to Zadeh’s
intersection and algebraic product fuzzy operators respectively.
3. Composition — The fuzzy membership values assigned to the output vari-
ables in all the rules are combined to form a single fuzzy membership
value. There are two commonly used composition methods, max and sum.
The choice of composition method used often depends on which inference
method is employed in the previous step. If the min inference method
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is used, the max composition method, which is essentially equivalent to
Zadeh’s union operator, is typically used. If the product inference method
is used, the sum composition method, which is essentially equivalent to
Zadeh’s algebraic sum operator, is typically used. An alternative interpre-
tation of the sum composition method is the sum of the fuzzy membership
values of the output variables in all the rules. This interpretation has the
advantage of a simpler computation at the price of a lower accuracy.
4. Defuzzification — This is simply the reverse process of fuzzification. The
fuzzy output membership value is converted into a discrete output value.
There are many defuzzification methods; the common ones are centroid,
max and average of max methods. In the centroid method, the output
value is the centre of gravity of the fuzzy output membership value. In
the max method, the output value is one of the variable values in which
the fuzzy output membership value is maximum. In the average of max
method, the output value is the average of all the variable values in which
the fuzzy output membership value is maximum.
An example of the inference process is shown in Figure 4.8.
4.7 Conclusions
This chapter presents a survey on the learning techniques that are used in this
thesis. It begins with a discussion on EAs with an emphasis on the two imple-
mentations: GP and GE. It then discusses how EAs can be extended to solve the
multi-objective optimisation problems. The last section discusses fuzzy expert
systems that are built on the ground of fuzzy inference rules. The fuzzy set con-
cept is used as an example in Section 5.2.4 to show how other learning techniques
can be used in conjunction with EAs to improve the learning performance.
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Figure 4.8: The inference process of a fuzzy expert system [4].
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Chapter 5
Static Policy Inference
In computer systems a security policy is essentially a set of rules specifying the
way to secure a system for the present and the future. Forming a security policy is
a challenging task: the system may be inherently complex with many potentially
conflicting factors. Traditionally, security policies have had a strong tendency
to encode a static view of risk and how it should be managed (most typically
in a pessimistic or conservative way) [8]. Such an approach will not suffice for
many dynamic systems which operate in highly uncertain, inherently risky envi-
ronments. In many military operations, for example, we cannot expect to predict
all possible situations.
Much security work is couched in terms of risk but in the real world there is
benefit to be had from the use of such system. In military operations you may be
prepared to risk a compromise of confidentiality if not doing so could cost lives.
There is a need for operational flexibility in the decision-making processes, yet we
cannot allow recklessness. Decisions need to be defensible and so must be made
on some principled basis. It is very useful to be able to codify what a “principled
basis” consists of since this serves to document “good practice” and facilitates its
propagation.
The above discussion has been couched in terms of human decision-making
processes. In some environments the required speed of system response may
force an automated decision. Such automated decisions must also be made on
a “principled basis”, and some of these decisions may be very tricky. Automated
support must be provided with decision strategies or rules to apply.
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We investigate in this chapter how EAs can be used to extract security policy
rules automatically from examples of decisions made in specified circumstances.
This is an exercise in policy inference. The automation aspect of the inference
is doubly useful: automated inference techniques can discover rules that humans
would miss; and policies can be dynamically inferred as new examples of tricky
decisions become available. Thus, the current policy can evolve to reflect the
experience with the system. For example, if a human determines what the proper
response should be based upon the information available, either in real-time or
post facto, a conclusion is drawn that similar responses should be given under
similar circumstances. Essentially, we attempt to partition the decision space
such that each partition is associated with a response that is commensurate with
the risk-benefit tradeoff for that partition.
In practice, different decision makers may come to different decisions in the
same circumstances, particularly when the circumstances are tricky. They may
use data that is not available to the inference engine to reach a decision, or else one
may simply have a different appetite for risk. Therefore, the inference technique
used must be able to handle sets of decision examples that do not seem entirely
consistent.
This chapter documents some proof of concept experiments in using EAs to
infer security policy models. All results suggest that the idea of inferring security
policy using EAs is feasible. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows:
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 present various experimentation details and results on using
EAs to infer various security policy models from decision examples, namely the
MLS Bell-LaPadula model, the budgetised MLS model and the Fuzzy MLS model.
Section 5.4 summarises the main contributions and points out some potential
avenues for future research. Finally, Section 5.5 concludes this chapter with a
summary of results.
5.1 Experimentation on binary decision policies
Many security policies can be represented as a set of IF <condition> THEN
<decision> rules. For example, the MLS Bell-LaPadula policy model presented
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in Section 3.1.1 can be represented as:
IF (access = read ∧ sl ≥ ol ∧ sc ⊇ oc)∨
(access = write ∧ sl ≤ ol ∧ sc ⊆ oc)
THEN decision = allow
IF (access = read ∧ (sl < ol ∨ sc 6⊇ oc))∨
(access = write ∧ (sl > ol ∨ sc 6⊆ oc))
THEN decision = deny (5.1)
where sl and ol are subject and object sensitivity levels and sc and oc are subject
and object category sets.
Here we choose to use Strongly Typed Genetic Programming (STGP) to dis-
cover an expression for the condition corresponding to each possible decision.
Each tree based individual represents a candidate condition for an action. The
leaf nodes of a tree are elements of the terminal set. These nodes can be ei-
ther a variable that represents one of the decision-making factors or a constant.
These nodes are joined together with operators which themselves are joined to-
gether with other operators recursively. The operators generally can be divided
into three layers. The operators at the lowest layer evaluate the child nodes and
return a value of the same type as them. Those of the next layer are logic rela-
tional operators such as < or ∈; these operators compare two typed values and
return a Boolean value. These Boolean values are combined at the highest layer
by means of logical operators such as ∧ (AND), ∨ (OR) or ¬ (NOT). The root
node in a tree must evaluate to a Boolean. Some well typed individuals that
represent the conditions in the MLS Bell-LaPadula policy model are depicted in
Figure 5.1. The leftmost individual resembles the condition of read access in the
policy, i.e., (sl > ol ∨ sl = ol) ∧ (sc ⊃ oc ∨ sc ≡ oc). The other two are logically
equivalent individuals and deal only with the sensitivity aspect of the read access
condition, i.e., (sl > ol ∨ sl = ol).
Using this representation, the security policy inference problem can be trans-
formed into an n-class classification problem, in which n is the number of possible
decisions in the policy. STGP is used to search for the <condition> part of each
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Figure 5.1: Some well typed individuals that represent the conditions in the MLS Bell-LaPadula policy model.
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rule. Therefore, the number of STGP runs increases linearly with the policy size.
Having said that, all runs can be carried out in parallel as they are indepen-
dent from one another. In a single processor scenario, the binary decomposition
method1 can be employed to solve this problem in n− 1 STGP runs.
The initial population is generated randomly using the ramp-half-and-half
method popularised by Koza [88]. The individual fitness is computed using de-
cision examples in a training set. Each example is represented by a vector of
variables which corresponds to a set of decision-making factors and the decision
itself. The fitness of the individual is based on the number of decision exam-
ples that it agrees with. In an ideal world, it might be desirable to match all
examples. However, it is often the case in practice that there are a few poor
decisions and many good decisions. The system might be expected to evolve a
policy that agrees with the majority. 100% agreement is not essential. A lower
degree of agreement may simply turn the spotlight on those specific individuals
with decisions inconsistent with the inferred policy. In a sense, the fitness pro-
vides a measure of how well a candidate policy agrees with examined decisions,
but also acts as anomaly detector. The accumulated total score after evaluating
all examples becomes the fitness score of an individual.
After the fitness calculation stage, a new generation of individuals is produced
with the use of evolutionary operators. Individuals with higher fitness scores have
better chances to be selected to pass their “genes” (subtrees) to the next gen-
eration. Further crossover and mutation operators are applied probabilistically.
The evolution process continues until an individual with a “high enough” fitness
score is found or a preset number of generations have elapsed.
All GP based experiments in this chapter are carried out using ECJ2 18 [126].
The default parameter file in ECJ, i.e., koza.params, is used, unless otherwise
specified. The GE based experiment presented in Section 4.3 is carried out using
1Binary decomposition method decomposes the n-class classification problem into n − 1
binary classification problems. Let cn represent class n. Then, the first classification problem is
between c1 and c1
′ (c1
′ is the complement class of c1), the second one is between c2 and c2
′ (c2
′ =
c1
′ − c2) and so on with the last one is between cn−1 and cn−1′ (cn−1′ = cn−2′ − cn−1 = cn).
The algorithm is inherently sequential such that the n-th binary classification problem can only
be solved after the n− 1 previous problems are solved.
2ECJ is a popular evolutionary computation framework that includes the implementations
of many popular EAs written in Java.
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libGE1 0.26 [127] and GAlib2 2.4.7 [128] with all the parameter settings remaining
as the default values unless specified otherwise.
5.1.1 Experiment 5.1: Partial MLS Bell-LaPadula policy
In the first experiment, we concentrate only on the “no read up” property (often
known as the simple security property) of the MLS Bell-LaPadula model. This
model is simple, unambiguous, and serves to demonstrate some interesting prop-
erties of our method of inference. For a read access, the model can be summarised
as:
IF sl ≥ ol ∧ sc ⊇ oc THEN decision = allow
IF sl < ol ∨ sc 6⊇ oc THEN decision = deny (5.2)
where sl and ol are subject and object sensitivity levels and sc and oc are subject
and object category sets. Since the decision is binary (either allow or deny),
the GP algorithm only needs to be run once to search for the condition and the
other condition can be simply obtained by logical negation. Here the condition
for allow is chosen to be the learning target in this experiment.
The terminal set consists of four variables, namely sl, ol, sc and oc but no
constant value. The sl and ol are positive integers and tagged with the type “sen-
sitivity”, for which three operators are defined: =, < and >. The sc and oc are
sets and given the type “category”, for which three operators are defined: ≡, ⊂
and ⊃. The ¬, ≤, ≥, ⊆ and ⊇ operators are intentionally omitted to make the
search more difficult. Each category in sc or oc is represented by a positive in-
teger. The target condition, TC(sl, ol, sc, oc), to be learnt in this experiment is:
(sl > ol ∨ sl = ol) ∧ (sc ⊃ oc ∨ sc ≡ oc) (5.3)
In each run of the experiment, the maximum value of sensitivity levels for sl
and ol, SNSmax, and the total number of categories, CATmax, are defined. Here
1libGE is a GE library written in C++. It was the only GE library available at the time
the GE based experiment presented in Section 5.2.3 was carried out.
2GAlib is a popular GA library written in C++. It is used as the search algorithm in GE.
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SNSmax and CATmax are both set to be 5. We then randomly generate 100
examples to form the training set. Each example is a tuple consists of five
attributes: sl, ol, sc, oc and decision. The values of sl and ol are randomly
chosen from {1 .. SNSmax}; the elements of sc and oc are randomly chosen
from {1 .. CATmax} such that the probability that any particular category is
included in a specific set is 1/2; and the decision is set to be either 1 (allow)
or 0 (deny) in accordance with (5.2). Thus, all decision examples here are correct
as far as the MLS Bell-LaPadula policy model is concerned.
The fitness of an individual (candidate policy) is simply the sum of the
matches between the decision made by the individual policy and the decision
recorded in each example in the entire training set. Formally, let di,x be the de-
cision an individual i made for an example x with True as 1 and False as 0. The
fitness of an individual i is then defined as follows:
f(i) =
∑
∀ example x
(di,x ≡ decisionx) (5.4)
Experimental results and evaluation
GP (and EAs in general) is stochastic in nature. The resulting policies depend on
the random seed used. Thus, for each experimental setup here, 10 independent
runs are carried out. Each run is initialised with a different random seed.
In all runs, logically equivalent conditions of TC in (5.3) can be learnt. Some
examples of the evolved individuals are shown in Figure 5.2. The leftmost indi-
vidual resembles TC with minimal possible tree size (number of nodes) whereas
the other two individuals consist of some components that can be logically simpli-
fied, e.g., ol > ol that appears in the rightmost individual is logically equivalent
to False.
To investigate the robustness of this technique, the following changes are made
to the experimental setup:
• Scaling up SNSmax and CATmax;
• Inclusion of “wrong” examples in the training set, i.e., inconsistent decision
examples;
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Figure 5.2: Some examples of inferred policies in Experiments 5.1.
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• Changing other parameters including training set size, population size and
tree height.
Scaling up SNSmax and CATmax This experiment is repeated with six dif-
ferent settings of (SNSmax, CATmax). These settings are (10, 5), (20, 5), (30, 5),
(5, 10), (5, 20) and (5, 30). In the first three settings, in which SNSmax is scaled
up to 30, logical equivalent conditions of TC can still be found. However, in the
latter three settings, in which CATmax is scaled to 30, only weaker conditions TC
′
are found. More precisely, the conditions learnt using the (5, 10) setting are log-
ically equivalent to (sc ⊃ oc ∨ sc ≡ oc); the conditions learnt using the (5, 20)
setting are either logically equivalent to (sc ⊃ oc∨sc ≡ oc) or simply sc ⊃ oc; and
the conditions learnt using the (5, 30) setting are logically equivalent to sc ⊃ oc.
Randomly generated category sets pose interesting problems from a training
point of view. In our example generation process, the probability of randomly
generating a pair (sc, oc) where sc ≡ oc is small, 1/(2CATmax) in fact. Thus, the ex-
pected number of category equality examples in a sample of size n is n/(2CATmax).
Unless the system sees examples of how equality should be handled, it cannot be
expected to infer how to handle it. Inference summarises rather than speculates.
As usual, the training set characteristics are important. To validate this intuition,
examples are manually created to cover the equality case and the experiment is
repeated. The results agree with this intuition; logically equivalent conditions
of TC are learnt for settings with CATmax equal to 10, 20 and 30.
To further investigate the effect of training set coverage, Three runs with
extreme settings are carried out. A training set with nine examples that cover all
nine possible relationships between (sl, ol) and (sc, oc) in TC, namely (>,=, <)×
(⊃,≡,⊂), is used. The learnt condition is logically equivalent to TC. At the other
extreme, an experimental setup using all examples with deny decision (decision =
0) yields a logically equivalent condition of False. Conversely, if all examples in
the training set are examples with allow decisions, then a logically equivalent
condition of True is learnt. Thus, a mixture of correct allow and deny examples
is required to evolve credible policies.
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Inclusion of “wrong” examples This experiment is repeated with the in-
troduction of wrong examples in the training set. We first started to intro-
duce 1% “wrong” examples and then 10%, 20%, 25% and 30%. In all cases, the
conditions learnt are similar to those learnt with all correct examples. This is
because the search for the condition is guided by the fitness function which is
defined as the number of matches between decisions made by an individual and
the ones encoded in examples. In order to have maximum fitness, the search will
tend to model the correct examples (which are in the majority) and choose to be
inconsistent with the others. This is encouraging because 100% agreement is not
the actual goal as mentioned earlier. Highlighting anomalous behaviours is also
important1.
Parameter changes This experiment is repeated with different parameter val-
ues. Firstly, the size of the training set is set to be 500 and 1000. In both cases,
the conditions learnt are very similar to the ones learnt with only 100 examples.
Secondly, the experiment is repeated with various population sizes: 50, 100,
500 and 5000. When the population size is 500 or larger, logically equivalent
conditions of TC are learnt, and there is no significant difference in terms of
the number of generations required. However, the execution time per generation
increases significantly because of the increase in the number of evolutionary op-
erations and fitness evaluations performed. When the population size is set to
be 50 or 100, the desired condition cannot be learnt in all cases. Manual inves-
tigation on the population reveals that the diversity in the population is lost in
early generations, i.e., premature convergence in the population occurs. Many of
these individuals get stuck at local optima such as ((sl > ol∨sl = ol)∧(sc ⊃ oc))
or simply (sc ⊃ oc).
Lastly, we investigate the effect of tree size of each individual. The experiment
is repeated with different maximum tree heights allowed. In each experiment, the
maximum tree height is set to be one less than that of the previous experiment;
the first experiment has maximum tree height of 17. We observe that the target
1The identification of anomalies is not the focus of the research, but the ability to identify
such cases as a consequence of attempting inference is clearly of some potential use. They
either point to errant behaviour, or else identify difficult situations where information outside
the model might have been useful in the decision-making process.
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condition cannot be learnt if the tree height is less than 4, which is the minimum
height to represent TC.
5.1.2 Experiment 5.2: Full MLS Bell-LaPadula policy
We extend Experiment 5.1 to evolve the MLS Bell-LaPadula policy model as a
whole for both read access and write access. The rules that represent this policy
model is shown in (5.1) and are restated as follows for ease of reference:
IF (access = read ∧ sl ≥ ol ∧ sc ⊇ oc)∨
(access = write ∧ sl ≤ ol ∧ sc ⊆ oc)
THEN decision = allow
IF (access = read ∧ (sl < ol ∨ sc 6⊇ oc))∨
(access = write ∧ (sl > ol ∨ sc 6⊆ oc))
THEN decision = deny
where sl and ol are subject and object sensitivity levels and sc and oc are subject
and object category sets.
The experimental setup remains to be the same except for the following.
Firstly, a new type “access” is introduced to the type set and the terminal set is
expanded to include three new terminals of this type: access , read and write. Sec-
ondly, the function set is extended to include ≤, ≥, ⊆ and ⊇ operators. Thirdly,
the training set size is increased to 500 randomly generated examples with the
equality cases guaranteed as described in Section 5.1.1. All other parameter set-
tings including the fitness function remain the same as before.
Here the target condition, TC(access, sl, ol, sc, oc), to be learnt in this exper-
iment is:
(access = read ∧ sl ≥ ol ∧ sc ⊇ oc)∨
(access = write ∧ sl ≤ ol ∧ sc ⊆ oc) (5.5)
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Experimental results and evaluation
As in Experiment 5.1, 10 independent runs of this experiment are carried out.
Each is initialised with a different random seed. In all runs, logically equivalent
conditions of TC in (5.5) can be learnt. The evolved individuals do not always
resemble TC with minimal tree size. Some of the subtrees in the evolved indi-
viduals are redundant and may be simplified to simpler logical expressions. We
then investigate the robustness of this inference technique as before by scaling
up SNSmax and CATmax, inclusion of “wrong” examples in the training set and
changing of parameter values.
Scaling up SNSmax and CATmax The SNSmax and CATmax are scaled up
as in Experiment 5.1 using six different settings of (SNSmax, CATmax): (10, 5),
(20, 5), (30, 5), (5, 10), (5, 20) and (5, 30). As the training set used covers the
category equality cases, logically equivalent conditions of TC in (5.5) are learnt
in all cases.
Inclusion of “wrong” examples Here we introduced 1%, 10%, 20%, 25%
and 30% “wrong” examples. In all but the 30% cases, the conditions learnt are
similar to those learnt with all correct examples. In the 30% case, the number of
successful runs decreases to 7 out of 10 runs. Investigation of the best individuals
in unsuccessful runs shows that these individuals generally represent conditions
that are slightly weaker or stronger than TC. Some of these individuals after
manual logical simplification are shown as follows:
(access = read ∧ sl ≥ ol ∧ sc ⊇ oc)∨
(access = write ∧ sl ≤ ol ∧ sc ⊆ oc)∨
(sc = oc) (5.6)
(access = read ∧ sl > ol ∧ sc ⊃ oc)∨
(access = write ∧ sl < ol ∧ sc ⊆ oc) (5.7)
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Although these conditions are not logically equivalent to TC, these conditions
agree with more than 90% of the examples in the training set. In other words,
the models that these individuals represent are very good approximations to the
MLS Bell-LaPadula policy model.
Parameter changes This experiment is repeated with different parameter val-
ues as described in Section 5.1.1. In all cases, similar results are found. The
change of training set size does not affect the results. If the population size is set
to be too small, i.e., 50 or 100, the population may prematurely converge and get
stuck at local optima. The only difference here is that the minimum tree heights
required is increased to 5, which is the minimum tree height required to represent
the more complicated TC defined in this experiment.
5.1.3 Experiment 5.3: Budgetised MLS policy
Overall, it would seem that the approach taken is easily capable of summarising or
distilling a policy from a given set of examples, even in the presence of “noise”.
However, the fitness function used (number of agreements) is very blunt. All
decisions are considered equal. This is not the case in practice. Granting an
uncleared user access to a top secret document is much riskier than granting him
access to a secret document. We need to investigate the approach from a more
genuinely risk based perspective. In this experiment, we designed a simple risk
based policy with intuition drawn from [2, 8]. For a read access, the budgetised
MLS policy is as follows:
IF (pos(ol − sl) + #(oc \ sc)) ≤ offer THEN decision = allow
IF (pos(ol − sl) + #(oc \ sc)) > offer THEN decision = deny (5.8)
where pos(x) returns max(x, 0); x \ y is the set difference between set x and
set y; #(x) is the cardinality of the set x and offer is the amount the requester
is willing to pay for the requested access. For this experiment, the target condi-
tion, TC(sl, ol, sc, oc, offer), becomes:
pos(ol − sl) + #(oc \ sc) ≤ offer (5.9)
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Note that there are two cost components here. We have decided, for the sake
of simplicity, to equate the cost of a single band difference in sensitivity level
with the cost of a single set difference in category. (Other weightings are clearly
possible.)
The experimental setup is similar to Experiment 5.2 except for the following.
All the terminals of the “access” type are removed from terminal set. A new
type, “numeric”, is added to the type set. A new terminal offer of this type is
added to terminal set and eight new operators that return values of this type are
added to function set. These operators are pos(x), #(x), \(x, y), +, −, ×, ÷1,
exp(x).
Experimental results and evaluation
As in previous experiments, 10 independent runs of the experiment are carried
out. Each run is initialised with a different random seed. In all cases, the results
show that the logically equivalent conditions of TC in (5.9) can be learnt in all
cases. The investigation on the robustness of this inference technique by scaling
up SNSmax and CATmax, inclusion of “wrong” examples in the training set and
changing of parameter values produce similar results. The only difference is
that the minimum tree size required now is increased to 8 because of the higher
complexity of the TC.
5.2 Experimentation on multi-decision policies
Up to this point, we have only considered binary decision policies. In this exper-
iment, we attempt to infer policies that have more than two decisions. Here the
Fuzzy MLS security policy model presented in Section 3.4.1 is used as the refer-
ence model. This policy uses the risk based rationale of the MLS Bell-LaPadula
policy to compute a quantified risk estimate by quantifying the “gap” between a
subject’s label and an object’s label in an MLS system. Quantified risk estimates
are numbers and therefore can be used to build a risk scale (refer to Figure 3.2).
1x÷ y =
{
x/y if y 6= 0
1 otherwise
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This risk scale is divided into multiple bands. Each band is associated with a
decision. The risk in the bottom band is considered low enough so the access
decision is simply allow whereas the risk in the top band is considered too high
so the decision is deny. Each band between the top and bottom is associated
with a allow decision with different risk mitigation measures.
The Fuzzy MLS model defines risk as the expected value of damage caused
by unauthorised disclosure of information in (3.1). This definition is restated as
follows for ease of reference:
risk = (value of damage, V )× (probability of incurring the damage, P )
The value of damage is estimated from the sensitivity level of the object and
is defined to be aol. The probability of incurring the damage is estimated by
quantifying two “gaps”: one between the sensitivity levels of the subject and the
object, and the other between the category sets of the subject and the object.
For simplicity, this experiment only looks at the sensitivity levels and assumes
the category sets are the same1. The probability of incurring the damage is thus
defined as a sigmoid function in (3.5). This is restated as follows:
P (sl, ol) =
1
1 + exp((−k)× (TI(sl, ol)− n))
where TI(sl, ol) is called the temptation index which indicates how much the
subject with sensitivity of sl is tempted to leak information with sensitivity level
of ol. It is defined in (3.4) and is restated as follows:
TI(sl, ol) =
a−(sl−ol)
m− ol
The intuition for P (sl, ol) and TI(sl, ol) can be found in Section 3.4.1. In our
experiments, the settings of a = 10, k = 3, n = 4 and m = 11 are used here.
These are the values used in [2].
Long standing convention groups risk by “order of magnitude”. Thus, if we
want to avail ourselves of a linear banding scale, taking the logarithm of the risk
1Therefore the gap between category sets is 0.
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values seems in order. The following formula is defined to map a risk number to
a risk band:
band(risk(sl, ol)) = max(min(⌊loga(risk(sl, ol))⌋, a− 1), 0) (5.10)
where the function risk(sl, ol) is defined in (3.1). Base-a logarithm is used to
compute the order of magnitude of risk as the band number. Since each band is
associated with a decision, a risk band number computed using (5.10) represents
a possible decision in the policy.
To generate the data required for training and testing purposes, SNSmax is
set to be 10. A data set is generated, consisting of the 100 possible (sl, ol, band)
examples, where sl and ol are integers in [0, 9] and band is calculated using (5.10).
In other words, all the examples used are assumed to be correct. As the data are
limited, the leave-one-out cross validation evaluation method (LOOCV) is used
to evaluate the performance.
In the traditional hold-out evaluation method, the data set is separated into
two subsets: the training set and the testing set. The model is learnt using the
data in the training set and then is evaluated using the data in the testing set.
This method has the merit of being computationally cheap. However, it wastes
a lot of data and its evaluation can have a high variance depending on how the
data are split.
k-fold cross validation can be used to improve the hold-out method. Instead
of two subsets, the data set is split into k subsets. The hold-out method is then
repeated k times, each using data in k − 1 subsets as the training set and the
data in the remaining one as the testing set. The evaluation is done using the
average performance across all k trials. The method is less sensitive to the way
the data are split and therefore results in a smaller variance in the evaluation.
However, the training process has to be repeated k times, which can be costly.
LOOCV takes k-fold cross validation to its extreme, with k equal to the number
of examples in the data set. The evaluation obtained using LOOCV is very good
but extremely expensive to compute, especially in EAs.
To evaluate the performance of the policies inferred, each experiment is re-
peated 100 times with a different random seed. The performance is evaluated by
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two criteria:
1. The median LOOCV error rate of the best individuals in the 100 runs.
The best individual in a run is the one with the lowest error rate in the
last generation of the run. The median is used instead of the mean as it
does not assume that the error rate distribution will have a suitably normal
distribution. Confidence intervals based on the standard deviation of the
mean are no longer valid. The 95% confidence interval of the median is
calculated using the Thompson-Savur formula presented in [129] instead.
2. The median of the average distances between all the predicted bands of the
best individuals and the target bands encoded in all the examples in the
data set in the 100 runs.
These measurements indicate the quality of the security policy that can be learnt
in each experiment.
5.2.1 Experiment 5.4: Rule based approach
In this experiment, we continue to employ the same view as in previous exper-
iments: a security policy is a set of IF-THEN rules. As the risk scale is divided
into 10 bands, each band is associated with a decision action, 10 STGP runs are
required to search for conditions for all the bands. We will seek for each risk
band j, a target condition TCj(sl, ol) that returns allow for examples in risk
band j and deny for those not in risk band j. Thus, TCj(sl, ol) is a membership
classifier for band j.
We observe that the reference model for calculating the risk is actually rather
complicated. We might reasonably seek to evolve sets of membership classifiers
that are nearly correct, e.g., very good at classifying examples in the appropriate
band, but which occasionally consider examples from near-by bands as being
within the band. Examples from bands significantly different to the one at hand
should be rejected from membership by the membership classifier.
To give a good chance of classifying appropriately, we adopt a “high water-
mark” approach. The final band classification is the highest band j for which the
corresponding membership classifier TCj returns allow . Formally, if TCj ≡ allow
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and TCk ≡ allow and j > k, then band j instead of band k is used. Additionally,
if there is no TC evaluated to allow , the highest band is used again for security
concerns. In a future run-time deployment of our inference approach, it would
be possible to involve human interaction. An alert can be given to the security
administrator and the administrator can decide which band an input should be
mapped to. This decision can then be used as a new training example.
Here we use only float typed nodes to avoid the overhead in checking the
type conformance of the nodes in STGP. We assume that an individual rep-
resents allow if its evaluated value is 1 and deny if its evaluated value is 0.
Individuals with any other evaluated value are assumed to be invalid and there-
fore are assigned with the lowest possible fitness to increase their chances of
being eliminated in the evolution process. The terminal set consists of sl, ol
and Ephemeral Random Constants (ERCs)1, which take real values in [−10, 10].
The function set consists of +, −, ×, ÷, protectedlog10(x)
2, exp(x), pow(x, y),
max(x, y), min(x, y), ceil(x), floor(x), sin(x) and cos(x).
Two principles are used to determine the fitness score for a decision made by
an individual. For an example x and an individual i, if i evaluates x to be in
band j, then:
• For a correct decision, reward more the higher the risk band, i.e., reward
higher j more than lower j. (We care more about higher risk bands.)
• For an incorrect decision, punish more the more the decision deviates from
the target; i.e., punish more as |bandx−j| becomes larger, where bandx is the
decision encoded in the example x. Additionally, punish under-estimation
of a risk band more than over-estimation of it; i.e., punish more if bandx > j.
Based on these principles, let di,x be the decision made by an individual i for
example x. Then, the fitness function of an individual in the run that search for
1An ERC is a constant that its value is randomly generated during its creation.
2protectedlog10(x) =
{
log10(|x|) if x 6= 0
0 otherwise
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the condition of band j, TCj, is defined as follows:
fj(i) =
∑
{x|bandx≡j}
wtp{di,x ≡ allow}+
∑
{x|bandx 6≡j}
wtn{di,x ≡ deny}
−
∑
{x|bandx 6≡j}
wfp{di,x ≡ allow} −
∑
{x|bandx≡j}
wfn{di,x ≡ deny} (5.11)
where
wtp = j + 1,
wtn = (j + 1)/10,
wfp =

bandx − j if bandx > j,(j − bandx)/2 if bandx < j,
wfn = j + 1
5.2.2 Experiment 5.5: Regression based approach
In this experiment, we take an alternative view on a policy. We view a policy as
a function that maps a set of decision-making factors to a decision. In the Fuzzy
MLS model, this mapping function is the composition band and risk function
in (5.10). GP is used to search for an equivalent function of this composition
function. This is essentially an exercise of symbolic regression based upon decision
examples.
The experimental setup is very similar to Experiment 5.4 except for the fitness
function used. Here the fitness function is defined to be the reciprocal of one plus
the sum of squared errors between the value an individual is evaluated to and
each of the correct band encoded in the example set1. Formally, let jx be the
value an individual i evaluates an example x to, the fitness of an individual i, is
defined as follows:
f(i) =
1
1 +
∑
∀ example x(bandx − jx)
2
(5.12)
1One is added to the sum of squared errors before inversion to avoid division by zero.
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To determine the band of a particular (sl, ol) pair, the output value of the
learnt policy is rounded to the nearest integer value. The learnt policy might not
be perfect; sometimes the policy may map a particular (sl, ol) pair to a value that
is out of band range. To overcome this, we assume that all out-of-range values
represent the highest band, i.e., any output value that is not in the range [0, 9]
is assumed to be 9. This is consistent with the usual attitude to security which
favours over-estimation of risk rather than under-estimation.
5.2.3 Experiment 5.6: Grammatical evolution
In this experiment, Grammatical Evolution (GE) is used as an example to show
that other EAs can also be used to search for security policies. Experiment 5.5
presented in Section 5.2.2 is repeated here with minimal changes. A policy is
viewed as a function that maps a set of decision-making factors to a decision and
GE is used to search for this function. The BNF grammar that describes the
search space is defined as follows:
N = {<expr>, <sub expr>, <unary op>, <binary op>, <var>, <const>, <digit>}
T = {sin, cos, exp, protectedlog10, ceil, floor,min,max,−,+,−,×,÷,−, sl, ol,
., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}
S = <expr>
and P consists of a set of production rules as follows:
<expr> ::= <unary_op>(<expr>) | <binary_op>(<expr>, <expr>)
| <sub_expr>
<sub_expr> ::= <var> | <const>
<unary_op> ::= sin | cos | exp | protectedlog | ceil | floor | −
<binary_op> ::= + | − | × | ÷ | min | max
<var> ::= sl | ol
<const> ::= <digit>.<digit><digit>
<digit> ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9
The primitive operators are wrapped as a function call to prevent any bias
from being introduced among the operators. Instead of using ERCs, the <const>
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and <digit> rules are used to generate random constants in the range (−10, 10).
Generating random constants in such a fashion enables random numbers to par-
take in the evolutionary process.
The evolutionary operators used are crossover and mutation with probabil-
ities of 0.9 and 0.01 respectively. Two different implementations of crossover,
namely one-point crossover and effective crossover, are investigated. One-point
crossover randomly chooses a point on each of the two selected individuals and
swaps all data beyond that point, whereas effective crossover restricts the chosen
crossover point in the range of effective length of each individual (the portion of
an individual that is actually used to select the rules).
Two different ways of initialising the population of individuals are investi-
gated: random initialisation and sensible initialisation [92]. The former takes
two parameters, lengthmin and lengthmax, and produces a population of indi-
viduals with lengths evenly distributed over a range [lengthmin, lengthmax]. The
settings of lengthmin = 15 and lengthmax = 25 are used here. The latter method
takes two parameters, heightmin and heightmax, and produces a population of in-
dividuals that correspond to programs with derivative trees of the size between
a range [heightmin, heightmax]. The settings of heightmin = 1 and heightmax = 10
are used here.
The steady state genetic algorithm is used as the search algorithm with 25%
replacement rate (the percentage of the population that is replaced at each iter-
ation). The roulette wheel selection scheme is used as the selection scheme.
As in Experiment 5.5, to determine the band of a particular (sl, ol) pair, the
output value of the learnt policy is rounded to the nearest integer value and all
out-of-range output values of the learnt policy are assumed to be 9.
5.2.4 Experiment 5.7: Fuzzy set ensemble
In this experiment, we aim to provide some degree of smoothing to our search
space by adopting a fuzzy inspired approach. As opposed to traditional ap-
proaches whereby EAs are often used in searching for the optimal weighting
among some predefined fuzzy rules, we view each possible risk band as a fuzzy
set and use EAs to learn the fuzzy membership function for each of the bands.
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Once these functions have been learnt, the most appropriate risk band for a
given input (sl, ol) can be determined by feeding the input to all learnt functions
and aggregating all the outputs using a predefined voting based defuzzification
mechanism.
This approach has several advantages. The estimation of a risk band is likely
to be more accurate with the use of multiple functions. For example, if each
membership value indicates that an input should be mapped to band 5, then with
very high confidence we can say the input belongs to band 5. This is analogous
to drawing the final conclusion by examining the input from various different
perspectives, which is more likely to be accurate than examining the input from
one perspective. Additionally, as will become clear in Section 5.2.4, the learning
process of each fuzzy membership function is essentially a curve fitting exercise,
which is naturally more tolerant to incomplete coverage in the training set because
it uses interpolation and extrapolation to compensate for the “missing points”. It
is also more resilient to the outliers in the training set.
Fuzzification
To learn the fuzzy membership function for band j, Mj(sl, ol), we first define
several values, each represents the value Mj should map to for an input with a
particular band. In our case, 10 values are defined (because a = 10). Essentially,
these values define the shape and location of the Mj function. We then use EAs
to search for a curve that best fits the 10 values, using all the examples in the
training set.
To define the 10 values for each Mj , we choose to use values between [−1, 1]
with 0 representing the value for band j. For example, the values for M5(sl, ol)
that correspond to each band, starting from band 0, can be defined as:
[−0.5,−0.4,−0.3,−0.2,−0.1, 0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4]
The sign of the value allows information about the direction of the band it rep-
resents to be encoded (positive implies it is greater than band j while negative
implies it is less than band j) and the magnitude of the value increases with the
distance between the band it represents and band j. Note that risk band j al-
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ways has the value of 0. This information is useful in designing the defuzzification
mechanism. The 10 values for other Mj 6=5 can be defined similarly.
Two different predefined sets of values are setup to validate this concept. In
the first setup, the 10 values are defined using the following function:
Mj [k] ≡ (k − j)/10 (5.13)
where k is the index of each element, having an integer value in the range [0, 9].
This is like mapping a traditional triangular fuzzy membership function, which
has the range [0, 1] and Mj [j] ≡ 1 as the tip of the triangle, to a straight-line
membership function with the range [−1, 1] and Mj [j] ≡ 0. Figure 5.3 shows
the values for all 10 bands using (5.13). In the second setup, the bell-shaped
Gaussian distribution curve is used in a similar fashion and the values for all 10
bands are shown in Figure 5.4.
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Figure 5.3: The predefined values for each Mj based on the triangular fuzzy
membership function.
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Figure 5.4: The predefined values for eachMj based on the Gaussian distribution
curve.
Individual representation and fitness evaluation
The same terminal and function sets in Experiment 5.4 are used here. It follows
that the structure of the individuals remains similar. However, what each indi-
vidual represents varies from one experiment to another. Here each individual
resembles the membership function of a particular band whereas each individual
in Experiment 5.4 resembles the Boolean condition of a particular band and each
individual in Experiments 5.5 and 5.6 resembles a function corresponding to the
policy as a whole.
The fitness function is the sum of squared differences between the predicted
membership and the predefined value for each band. More formally, let M ′j,i
represent an individual i in the search for the membership function for band j,
the individual fitness is defined as follows:
fj(i) =
1
1 +
∑
∀ example x
(
M ′j,i(slx, olx)−Mj [bandx]
)2 (5.14)
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Defuzzification
After all 10 membership functions are learnt and feeding an input x ≡ (slx, olx)
to these functions, we need a defuzzification mechanism to map all 10 values
returned by these functions to a risk band number. Three voting based defuzzifi-
cation algorithms which use the information about the direction and distance to
determine the target band have been designed. The target band is predicted by
adding the estimated distance (calculated from the output value and rounded to
an integer) to the band of the membership function. Votes are then given to a
small range of bands around the predicted target band. The difference between
these algorithms lies in the weighting of the votes.
Algorithm 5.1 forces the predicted target band to be in the range [0, 9]. Votes
are then given in the following ways: 3 votes to the predicted target band, 2 votes
to the nearest neighbour band and 1 vote to the second nearest neighbour band,
i.e., the nearest neighbour band on the other side of the predicted target band.
Algorithm 5.2 is very similar to Algorithm 5.1, except for the following.
Firstly, the predicted target band is no longer forced to be in the range [0, 9].
Secondly, votes with equal weight are given to the nearest neighbour bands on
both sides of the predicted target band. Thirdly, the weighting of the votes is in-
spired from the standard Gaussian Distribution, in which 0.3829250 vote is given
to the predicted target band, 0.2417300 vote is given to the nearest neighbour
band on each side and 0.0605975 vote is given to the second nearest neighbour
band on each side.
Algorithm 5.3 attempts to simplify these algorithms. The estimated distance
is first calculated as before but it is not rounded to an integer. This algorithm
then gives votes to the upper bound and lower bound of the predicted target
band, with the weighting of these votes inversely proportional to the distance.
5.2.5 Experimental results and evaluation
The results of Experiments 5.4– 5.7 are summarised in Table 5.1. In all GP based
experiments (except for the rule based approach in Experiment 5.4), the results
suggest that the target policy can be learnt reasonably well. (In a multi-class
classification problem, assuming the examples used are evenly distributed across
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initialise an array v[10] with all elements set to 0;
forall example x do
forall band j do
if Mj(slx, olx) > 0.05 then
p← j +Mj(x) ∗ 10;
k ← min(⌊p + 0.5⌋, 9);
v[k]← v[k] + 3;
if k > p then
v[k − 1]← v[k − 1] + 2;
v[k + 1]← v[k + 1] + 1;
else
v[k − 1]← v[k − 1] + 1;
v[k + 1]← v[k + 1] + 2;
else if Mj(slx, olx) < −0.05 then
p← j +Mj(x) ∗ 10;
k ← max(⌈p− 0.5⌉, 0);
v[k]← v[k] + 3;
if k < p then
v[k + 1]← v[k + 1] + 2;
v[k − 1]← v[k − 1] + 1;
else
v[k + 1]← v[k + 1] + 1;
v[k − 1]← v[k − 1] + 2;
else
v[j]← v[j] + 3;
v[j + 1]← v[j + 1] + 1;
v[j − 1]← v[j − 1] + 1;
choose v[i] with the maximum value;
output i as the risk band number ;
Algorithm 5.1: A direction and distance based defuzzification.
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initialise an array v[10] with all elements set to 0;
GaussianConst = {0.382925, 0.241730, 0.0605975};
forall example x do
forall band j do
p← j +Mj(slx, olx) ∗ 10;
k ← ⌊p+ 0.5⌋;
v[k]← v[k] + 3;
if 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 then
v[k]← v[k] +GaussianConst[0];
if 0 ≤ k + 1 ≤ 9 then
v[k + 1]← v[k + 1] +GaussianConst[1];
else if 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 then
v[k]← v[k] +GaussianConst[1];
if 0 ≤ k − 1 ≤ 9 then
v[k − 1]← v[k − 1] +GaussianConst[1];
else if 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 then
v[k]← v[k] +GaussianConst[1];
if 0 ≤ k + 2 ≤ 9 then
v[k + 2]← v[k + 2] +GaussianConst[2];
else if 0 ≤ k + 1 ≤ 9 then
v[k + 1]← v[k + 1] +GaussianConst[2];
else if 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 then
v[k]← v[k] +GaussianConst[2];
if 0 ≤ k − 2 ≤ 9 then
v[k − 2]← v[k − 2] +GaussianConst[2];
else if 0 ≤ k − 1 ≤ 9 then
v[k − 1]← v[k − 1] +GaussianConst[2];
else if 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 then
v[k]← v[k] +GaussianConst[2];
choose v[i] with the maximum value;
output i as the risk band number ;
Algorithm 5.2: A direction and distance based defuzzification.
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initialise an array v[10] with all elements set to 0;
forall example x do
forall band j do
p← j +Mj(slx, olx) ∗ 10;
j ← ⌊p⌋;
k ← ⌈p⌉;
if 0 ≤ j ≤ 9 and 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 then
v[j]← v[j] + k − p;
v[k]← v[k] + p− j;
else if 0 ≤ k ≤ 9 then
v[k]← v[k] + 1;
else if 0 ≤ j ≤ 9 then
v[j]← v[j] + 1;
choose v[i] with the maximum value;
output i as the risk band number ;
Algorithm 5.3: A direction and distance based defuzzification.
all classes, the error rate of a random classifier is n−1
n
, where n is the number of
classes. In this case, n = 10 and therefore the error rate of a random classifier
is 0.9.) Moreover, the medians of the average distances between all the predicted
bands and the target bands encoded in all the examples in these experiments are
kept to be around 0.2 band.
To investigate why the policies inferred using the rule based approach per-
form poorly, we manually investigate the outputs of these policies. We observe
that there are many unusual cases such that some (sl, ol) pairs with (high, low)
values are mapped to band 9. This is found to be caused by the use of “high
watermark” approach in resolving the policy outputs. This pessimistic policy
resolution mechanism degrades the performance significantly.
The experiments using the fuzzy set ensemble based approaches consistently
perform very well in all six settings. The triangular fuzzification algorithm per-
forms slightly better than the Gaussian fuzzification algorithm in all cases. This
could be due to the fact that the defuzzification algorithm makes the assumption
that the distance from the target increases linearly with respect to the mem-
bership value. This is not the case in Gaussian fuzzification algorithm. Possible
further work here would be to design a compatible defuzzification algorithm using
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EA Experiment
Median Error Rate with 95% Median Distance with 95%
Confidence Interval / % Confidence Interval / band
IF-THEN Rules 0.320 (0.310, 0.330) 1.420 (1.350, 1.470)
GP
Regression with mean square error 0.160 (0.150, 0.170) 0.210 (0.199, 0.240)
Triangular fuzzification with defuzzifier 1 0.160 (0.149, 0.160) 0.180 (0.170, 0.190)
Gaussian fuzzification with defuzzifier 1 0.160 (0.160, 0.170) 0.260 (0.249, 0.280)
Triangular fuzzification with defuzzifier 2 0.140 (0.130, 0.150) 0.170 (0.160, 0.180)
Gaussian fuzzification with defuzzifier 2 0.150 (0.140, 0.151) 0.230 (0.210, 0.240)
Triangular fuzzification with defuzzifier 3 0.150 (0.140, 0.160) 0.190 (0.180, 0.190)
Gaussian fuzzification with defuzzifier 3 0.150 (0.139, 0.160) 0.240 (0.230, 0.260)
GE
Random initialisation and one-point crossover 0.440 (0.430, 0.451) 0.850 (0.819, 0.881)
Random initialisation and effective crossover 0.440 (0.430, 0.450) 0.775 (0.740, 0.820)
Sensible initialisation and one-point crossover 0.425 (0.410, 0.440) 0.830 (0.787, 0.860)
Sensible initialisation and effective crossover 0.420 (0.410, 0.440) 0.780 (0.760, 0.800)
Table 5.1: The experimental result summary of the inferred policies using GP and GE.
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Approach Example of the optimal policy inferred
GP max(sin(−(max(min(max(−(sl,ol),−(sl,ol)),−(ol,3.397377)),
ol),max(ol,min(×(−(ol,3.397377),ol),ol)))),ceil(−(−(ol,
3.397377),max(min(sl,−2.5250282),−(sl,+(max(−(ol,
3.397377),ceil(−(−(−(ol,3.397377),max(÷(sin(sin(ol)),
−(sl,ol)),−(sl,ol))),max(−5.323125,−(sl,ol))))),
÷(+(min(max(×(−(ol,3.397377),ol),ol),max(sl,
max(−5.323125,×(protectedlog10(floor(7.62898)),ol)))),
max(max(−(ol,3.397377),−(−(−(ol,3.397377),
protectedlog10(ol)),max(÷(×(−(ol,3.397377),ol),−(sl,ol)),
−(sl,ol)))),sin(max(÷(floor(7.62898),−(sl,ol)),
÷(sin(−(sl,ol)),−(sl,ol)))))),ceil(ol))))))))
GE min(pow(3.49,−(ol,−(sl,min(−(÷(−(6.45,ol),2.04)),sl)))),ol)
Table 5.2: Some of the optimal security policies inferred with GP and GE.
both distance and direction for Gaussian fuzzification algorithm.
For GE based experiments, we observe that the use of effective crossover and
sensible initialisation provide very limited performance gain. In comparison to
the results obtained using GP with similar parameter settings, the performance
of GE is much worse. An analysis of the results reveals that the populations in
many runs prematurely converge and get stuck at local optima at a very early
stage. The two common local optima are the function that maps every possible
input pair to ol and a constant function that maps every possible input pair to
band 0.
5.3 Example Security Policies Inferred
The optimal policies evolved with the regression based approach using GP and GE
are shown in Table 5.2. Each of these policies is the one with the best performance
in all the 100 runs of each approach. The policies discovered using the rule based
approach and ensemble approach are too complicated to be analysed manually.
Other optimal policies inferred using either approach have very similar structure
and size.
An immediate observation is that the size of the policies inferred using GE is
much smaller compared to the ones inferred using GP in terms of the number of
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nodes. This can be explained by the fact that the evolution operators randomly
select and change different parts of the individuals and producing individuals
conforming to a grammar defined in GE with these operators is much more dif-
ficult than producing individuals conforming to the type correctness constraint
imposed in GP. Additionally, the policies discovered with GP contain a deal of
self-similarity. This suggests that some of these subcomponents have survived
through multiple generations and crossover among the individuals.
In order to visualise the performance of these policies, we use a three dimen-
sional plot where the x-axis and z-axis correspond to the input values of sl and ol,
and the y-axis corresponds to the output values of the policies, i.e., the risk bands.
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the output values of the target policy defined in (5.10)
and these inferred policies respectively. It is interesting to note that the output
values of the inferred policies change in a smoother fashion when the sl and ol
values are high (especially the one inferred with GE). This seems to suggest that
these inferred policies are more capable in assigning the appropriate risk band to
a given access request than the manually designed target policy. This supports
our initial claims that security policy inference from previous decision examples
is in fact possible and these inferred policies can be a potential means to verify (if
not refine) the currently implemented policy.
5.4 Evidence for the thesis and future work
Formulating an optimal security policy is difficult. Current research work at-
tempts to alleviate this issue by looking for ways to analyse and refine security
policies in a top-down manner. We propose an alternative view on this issue:
inferring security policies from decision examples. This idea is entirely novel.
There is no previous work to my knowledge in the application of EAs or machine
learning techniques in inferring security policies.
In this chapter, we present some experiments that have been carried out to
validate this proposal using EAs. Three different ways of representing security
policies and the use of two different EAs are demonstrated. The results show
that the inference process is largely independent of many parameters. We also
show how the fuzzy set ensemble based approaches can be easily integrated into
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Figure 5.5: The output risk bands of the target reference model defined in (5.10).
the policy inference framework to enhance the inference ability, yet it remains an
interesting research topic to search for the optimal ways of defining the underlying
target fuzzy membership functions.
EAs have shown great potential in determining the security policies in the
experiments. In particular, EAs are found to be able to quickly infer security
policies with considerable complexity. The performance of these inferred policies
is comparable to the original reference models that are used to generate the
training sets. These techniques are also able to scale well with the range of
input/output variables and to tolerate “wrong” examples in a training set. An
obvious way forward is to validate this concept with other inference approaches
and make a recommendation on which approach is better for what circumstance.
Being a data driven approach, the representativeness of the training set is
crucial. Indeed, the experiments show that even the inference of the simple MLS
Bell-LaPadula model may fail because of this. Inference summarises rather than
speculates; the techniques do not know how to handle an unseen case.
As in other applications of EAs, the fitness function used is vital in guiding
the search. A poor fitness function may result in policies that are suboptimal.
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(b) GE.
Figure 5.6: The output risk bands of the inferred policies shown in Table 5.2.
114
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Interesting future work would be to examine how to design a fitness function in
a principled manner that is suitable for cost sensitive learning, in which different
types of prediction errors are not equally costly. This is likely to be appropriate
for a security policy in which leaking of high sensitivity information is obviously
far more severe than leaking of low sensitivity information.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter presents some proof-of-concept experiments that have been carried
out to validate our proposal: inferring security policies from decision examples
using EAs. It first presents the experiments on inferring some simple binary
decision policies and continues with the experiments on inferring the Fuzzy MLS
model, which is a more complicated multi-decision policy model. In all cases,
the results show that EAs are able to infer policies that can approximate (if not
refine) the original reference models that are used to generate the training sets.
The technique is also shown to be able to scale with the range of input/output
variables and to tolerate “wrong” examples in the training set.
For a dynamic environment, the ability to infer policy from examples alone is
not sufficient. The inferred and learnt policies will eventually become suboptimal
over time as the operational requirements change. The policy needs to be updated
continually to maintain its optimality. The next chapter demonstrates how multi-
objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) can be used to achieve this goal.
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Chapter 6
Dynamic Policy Inference
Recent research [8] has suggested that traditional top-down security policy models
are too rigid to cope with the changes that inevitably occur in dynamic opera-
tional environments. There is a need for greater flexibility in security policies to
protect information appropriately and yet still satisfy operational needs. In the
previous chapter, we have shown that security policies can be learnt from exam-
ples using EAs. Given a set of criteria of concern, one can apply these techniques
to learn the policy that best fits the criteria. These criteria can be expressed
in terms of high-level objectives, or characterised by the set of previously seen
decision examples. Nevertheless, this is not sufficient for dynamic operational en-
vironments where the risk factors are constantly changing. The learnt policy will
eventually become suboptimal over time as the operational requirements change.
A new requirement is thus needed: the security policy has to be able to continu-
ally change and adapt to the operational needs to maintain its optimality or else
it will inevitably be circumvented in creative ways.
This chapter details the experiments on dynamic security policy inference.
As there is no dynamic security policy model available and therefore no decision
example available for us to work with, we designed a dynamic security policy
model. This model is used to generate time varying decision examples for training
and evaluation purposes. Then, we present two MOEA based dynamic security
policy learning frameworks. The first one is based on Fan’s intuition [130] and the
other one is Diversity via Opposite Objectives (DOO) that is able to maintain
the diversity in the population during the optimisation process. This protects
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the population from premature convergence and allows the concept drift in the
policy to be continually relearnt. The results show that these frameworks are very
promising. Reasonably good approximators to the model are able to be inferred
from the examples using these frameworks.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 6.1 reviews some data
stream classification algorithms that provided the inspiration for the development
of our dynamic policy learning frameworks. Section 6.2 presents a dynamic risk-
budget based policy that is used as the reference model throughout the chapter.
Section 6.3 presents the experiment details and results on inferring the dynamic
policy from decision examples. It also details the analysis of various ways to
select the best solution from a set of candidate solutions. Section 6.4 summarises
the main contributions and gives some possible future work. Finally, Section 6.5
concludes this chapter.
6.1 Data stream classification
We briefly review some data stream classification algorithms that provide the in-
spiration for the development of our dynamic policy learning framework. See [131,
132] for more details on data stream classification.
Data stream classification is the process of constructing classification models
from continuous data records. Data stream classification poses two challenges to
traditional data classification algorithms: continuous data flow and concept drift.
Continuous data flow prohibits a classification algorithm from making multiple
passes on the data set. Over time, the distribution of the data may change.
This change is typically referred to as concept drift. The classification training
algorithms must be able to cope with this.
To train the required classification model, it is often assumed that that some
of the records in the data stream are labelled and therefore can be separated to
form the training stream. Initially, research work has been focussed on revising
the traditional algorithms to include fading effects for the older examples. A
previously learnt classifier is required to undergo revision and to relearn the new
concept constantly. Using the decision tree classifier as an example, the decision
tree/subtree is pruned, regrown or discarded as necessary [133]. The resulting
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algorithms are often complicated. Making matters worse, as these algorithms
typically discard old examples at a fixed rate, the learnt classifier is only supported
by the latest data. This usually results in large prediction variances [130].
The ensemble of classifiers is another approach that has become very popular
in data stream classification. This approach offers several advantages over single
model classifiers. Firstly, it offers an efficient way to improve accuracy. Secondly,
its parallel nature is easy to scale. Data in the stream are divided into chunks; a
classifier ensemble (which itself can also be a set of classifier ensembles) is built
from each data chunk. These classifier ensembles are combined using different
weights to form the ultimate classifier. Some of the criteria used to determine
the weights include the time (sliding window), estimated accuracy using the latest
data chunk and variation in the class distribution.
In [130] Fan presents a simple example to illustrate that old data which are
consistent with the new concept can help learning. Instead of throwing away
all the old data, he proposed a framework that dynamically selects one of the
following four classifiers as the final classifier:
1. The optimal classifier trained so far without using the latest chunk of data.
2. The classifier trained by updating the optimal classifier in 1 with the latest
chunk of data.
3. The classifier trained only with the latest chunk of data.
4. The classifier trained from scratch with the latest chunk of data and some
old data samples that are (assumed to be) consistent with the latest chunk
of data.
The final classifier chosen is the one with the highest accuracy on the latest chunk
of data using cross validation. This classifier is then set to be the optimal classifier
trained so far (classifier in 1) in the next classifier selection process.
Fan’s intuition is that no one knows if the latest data chunk on its own is
sufficient to train a better classifier than the previous one learnt. Instead of
statically defining how much old data is to be used, Fan’s framework lets the
data make the decision dynamically.
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Dynamic security policy learning is very similar to data stream classification.
Each possible decision in the policy can be viewed as a class; the learning objective
is to search for the classifier that best agrees with the examples in the data stream
in a timely manner. In both cases, the amount of data will inevitably increase over
time; the algorithm must be able to learn incrementally and cope with changes.
Yet there is still a small distinction in terms of the learning time requirement. In
dynamic security policy learning, the learning time requirement is much relaxed.
Acceptable time frames range from a few minutes to hours. This frees us from the
one pass data set constraint in data stream mining, i.e., old data can be revisited
if necessary.
The design of our dynamic security policy learning framework begins with this
intuition and shows how MOGP can serve as an elegant framework for dynamic
learning. A novel idea is then proposed to further reduce the error rate and
response time to concept drift.
6.2 A dynamic security policy model
Since there is no known dynamic security policy model, we introduce a new
time-varying, risk-budget based security policy model here. This model is used
for generating the training decision examples and serves as the reference model
against which the security policies learnt are evaluated.
In a system using a risk-budget based security policy, each user is given a
number of risk tokens that represents how much risk the system is willing to take
with that user. To access a piece of information, a user offers the number of risk
tokens he is willing to spend from his budget to pay for the access. The system
evaluates the risk incurred in granting the access and allows it only if the user’s
offer is greater than or equal to the risk. Unlike the models introduced previously,
the risk evaluation of an access in this new dynamic model may vary with time,
hence the name of the policy.
In order to evaluate risk for an access, the definition of risk in the Fuzzy MLS
model in (3.1) is reused here and is restated as follows for ease of reference:
risk = (value of damage, V )× (probability of incurring the damage, P )
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The probability of incurring any damage, P , is the union of the following four
independent probabilities:
1. PCH : The probability that the communication channel between the user
and the system is compromised.
2. PIS: The probability that the information system is compromised.
3. PHU : The probability that the human user is compromised for whatever
reasons, e.g., being tempted, malicious, careless, etc.
4. PPH: The probability that the physical security of the user or the system
is compromised.
It should be noted that PCH , PIS and PHU exclude the probability of physical
compromises that are covered by PPH . The independence assumption among
these probabilities may not hold and result in P being over-estimated. This is fine
from the security perspective, especially given the fact that all these probabilities
are only estimates to begin with.
To estimate PCH , we consider the security levels of communication chan-
nel, SCH , may be either secure (SCH = 1) or not (SCH = 0). PCH = 0 only
if SCH = 1 and PCH = 1 otherwise.
To estimate PIS, we use the five information system security rating levels, SIS,
as outlined in Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [22]. We
assume that SIS is an integer in the range [0, 4]; the higher SIS, the more secure
the system is. SIS is mapped to PIS using an inverse exponential function such
that PIS = 1/ exp(SIS).
To estimate PHU , we consider the sensitivity levels of the subject (user), sl,
and the object (information), ol. The sensitivity level of a subject represents the
level of trustworthiness of the subject whereas the sensitivity level of an object
indicates the level of damage incurred if the object is lost or misused. To map
these sensitivity levels to PHU , the sigmoid function in (3.5) is reused and restated
here as follows:
PHU =
1
1 + exp((−k)× (TI(sl, ol)− n))
120
6.2 A dynamic security policy model
where TI(sl, ol) is the temptation index that indicates how much the subject
with sensitivity level sl is tempted to leak information with sensitivity level ol. TI
in (3.4) is reused and restated here as follows:
TI(sl, ol) =
a−(sl−ol)
m− ol
The intuition for PHU and TI can be found in Section 3.4.1. In our experi-
ments, the same settings in the experiments presented in the previous chapter
are reused: sl and ol are integers in [0, 9], a = 10, k = 3, n = 4 and m = 11.
To estimate PPH , we assume there are 10 physical security rating levels, SPH ,
which of each is represented by an integer in [0, 9]. Higher rating level indicates
that better physical security protection mechanisms are in place. The mapping
function from SPH to PPH is PPH = (9− SPH)/9.
To estimate V , an exponential function such that V = aol used in the experi-
ments presented in the previous chapter is reused here.
To introduce dynamic changes to the security policy, the risk calculated is
multiplied by a safety margin factor, α, which has a value that varies over time
in accordance with the changing environment. The evaluated risk for an access
to a piece of information therefore becomes α × P × V . The value of α is set to
be a real value in the range [1, 3). This setting allows the risk value to vary in
a reasonably large range, so that the evaluation on the frameworks used may be
done in a more rigorous manner. In practice, the changes in the policy are likely
to happen in a much smaller and smoother fashion.
To generate a reasonable set of decision examples, we make the assumption
that a user is rational in making each access request to information in the following
ways. Firstly, a user is able to estimate the risk associated with the access to a
certain degree of accuracy. Secondly, the user always attempts to minimise the
number of risk tokens spent on the access without generating too many responses
that result in a denial of access.
To model this, we assume each user always makes an offer of (βmin+γ)×P×V ,
where γ is a random variable with a beta distribution, B, which has a mean
value of 0.5 and a variance value of 0.05, i.e., corresponding to B(2, 2). A beta
distribution is used here because it has a finite range between 0 and 1 and the
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parameters are chosen so that the distribution is symmetric. The user adjusts
its βmin over time based on the allow/deny responses he receives by using a
counter. The counter is incremented if an access request is granted or decremented
otherwise. After every 5 decisions, the user increases βmin by 0.1 if the counter
value is negative or decreases βmin by 0.1 otherwise. The counter is then reset to
zero. The value of βmin is initialised to be 0.5 less than the initial value of α.
Using the settings described above, the security policy is defined as:
A real-valued function SP(riskFactor) where riskFactor is a tuple
of 〈SCH , SIS, sl, ol, SPH〉 with the interpretation that an information
access request x is granted to a user y if and only if the offer of the
user made for this access, offery ≥ SP(riskFactorx ,y).
Examples of access control decisions are generated using this policy. Each
example is a tuple of SCH , SIS, sl, ol, SPH, offer and decision. A set of 10000
examples is generated, the value of α is changed randomly within its range after
every 1000 examples. GP/MOGP is used to learn the underlying security policy
model from these examples.
6.3 Experimentation
We observe that the specification of the reference security policy model presented
in Section 6.2 is actually quite involved. Here we seek largely to approximate the
model with GP/MOGP.
To do this, we view the security policy model as a function that maps six
decision-making factors, SCH , SIS, sl, ol, SPH and offer to a binary decision.
Each individual tree in the population is used to represent a candidate function
(policy). The terminal (leaf) nodes can be one of the decision-making factors or an
ERC, which takes a real value in [−10, 10]. The non-terminal (non-leaf) nodes are
mathematical functions. The functions chosen are +, −, ×, ÷, protectedln(x)1,
1protectedln(x) =
{
ln(|x|) if x 6= 0
0 otherwise
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exp(x), pow(x, y), protectedlogx(y)
1, max(x, y), min(x, y), sin(x) and cos(x).
In each experiment, a security policy is learnt and refined continually using
a set of decision examples. Ideally, the learnt policy should generate the same
decisions prescribed by all the training examples. In practice, the objective is to
minimise the percentage of output decisions that are different from the ones gen-
erated by the true model. This percentage is the error rate of the learnt security
policy. Here this error rate is estimated using the 1000 examples generated from
the same model.
All the experiments described in this chapter are carried out using ECJ 18 [126]
with the SPEA2 module obtained from ECJ 192. The default parameter files in
ECJ are used, i.e., koza.params for GP based experiments and spea2.params
for MOGP based experiments, unless otherwise specified.
GP (and EAs in general) is stochastic in nature; the evolution process in
each run may vary depending on the random seed used. To evaluate the perfor-
mance, each experiment is repeated 100 times with a different random seed. The
performance is evaluated by two criteria:
1. The median error rate of the best individuals in the 100 runs. This mea-
surement indicates the quality of the security policy that can be learnt.
2. The number of the best individuals with error rates ≤ 0.25. This measure-
ment indicates the likelihood of the learning in resulting a reasonably good
security policy.
6.3.1 Static policy learning
To prepare for the experiments on dynamic policy learning, we started with three
experiments to learn a static policy from decision examples (in a similar fashion
to the experiments presented in the previous chapter). The target policy is, in a
sense, static because all the training examples are generated from the reference
policy model as presented in Section 6.2 with the same value of α.
1protectedlog
x
(y) =
{
log(|x|)(|y|) if (x 6= 0 or 1) or (y 6= 0 or 1)
0 otherwise
2The reason of using ECJ 19 is that the SPEA2 module in this release has been revised
heavily to remove some bugs and to be fully compliant with Zitzler’s specification [93].
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Each experiment runs for 200 generations and the training set consists of 1000
of such decision examples. Experiment 6.1 uses GP with the default genetic
operators and parameters specified in ECJ. Experiments 6.2 and 6.3 use MOGP
to address the problems encountered in Experiment 6.1.
Experiment 6.1: Single objective GP
This experiment uses GP with the default genetic operators and parameters spec-
ified in ECJ. The binary tournament selection scheme [81] is used to select the
individuals from the current population to breed the next generation of individ-
uals. This scheme holds several tournaments, with each tournament randomly
choosing two individuals from the current population and then selecting the fitter
one of the two. Each selected individual (policy) has a probability of 0.9 of being
subjected to a crossover operation and a probability of 0.1 of being reproduced.
The individual fitness is its error rate. Let ri be the six decision-making fac-
tors, decisioni be the decision encoded in example i and SP(ri) be the decision
of an evaluated policy SP on ri. Then, the fitness function of SP is:
fall(SP) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
(SP(ri) 6= decisioni) (6.1)
In this case, n = 1000 and the values 1 and 0 are used to represent True and False
respectively. Therefore, this fitness function is essentially the fraction of decisions
that the evaluated policy gets wrong.
The median error rate of the 100 best individuals is 0.3555 with a 95% con-
fidence interval of [0.3487, 0.3640]. The best of the 100 best individuals has an
error rate = 0.107. However, only 12 out of the 100 best individuals have error
rates ≤ 0.25 and more than half of them have error rates > 0.35. This suggests
that many runs get stuck at local optima.
Analysis of the structures of the individuals in the population reveals some
common problems in GP. The average individual size (number of nodes) in the
population grows quickly and becomes very large. This can be a phenomenon
of bloat (uncontrolled growth of the average size of the individuals), overfitting
problems or both. No attempt is made to distinguish them here as both make
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the learning process more difficult, use more memory and require more evaluation
time.
Experiment 6.2: Bloat control with SPEA2
In this experiment, the SPEA2 bloat control method [134] is used to alleviate
these problems. This method introduces a new objective: minimising the indi-
vidual size (the number of nodes in the individual tree). Let size(SP) be the size
of an individual SP . Then, the fitness function for this new objective is:
fsize(SP) =


size(SP)/512 if 32 ≤ size(SP) ≤ 512
32/512 if size(SP) < 32
1 otherwise
(6.2)
In other words, individuals with less than 32 nodes have the same fsize value as
an individual with 32 nodes and individuals with more than 512 nodes have the
same value as an individual with 512 nodes. This is to avoid both over-simplified
and over-complicated solutions.
SPEA2 is an elitist approach. An archive is maintained so that the non-
dominated individuals of a generation can be preserved in the archive and passed
on to the following generation. The reproduction operator is removed, i.e., the
crossover operator is applied with probability of 1.
The experiment is carried out with only these changes. The results show
that the bloat control method is effective. The average individual size, mem-
ory required and evaluation time taken are reduced significantly. However, the
performance improvement in terms of error rate is marginal. The median er-
ror rate of the 100 best individuals is 0.3545 with its 95% confidence interval
of [0.3419, 0.3591]. The best of the 100 best individuals has an error rate = 0.126
and there are 22 best individuals that have error rates ≤ 0.25.
Result analysis also reveals that the diversity among constants appearing in
the individuals decreases with each new generation. This is expected as some form
of convergence is necessary if a population is to produce a solution for the problem
in question. It is often that the desired constants will not appear in the initial
population that are randomly generated; but the evolutionary process is expected
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to synthesise the required constants by joining the existing ones through the
operators. If the constants converge prematurely before finding the appropriate
ones, the evolutionary process may get stuck at a local optima.
This lack of diversity among constants is the key to our problem. This is
revealed by an analysis of the reference policy model presented in Section 6.2.
This model grants an information access request if and only if:
offer ≥ SP(riskFactor)
= offer ≥ α× P × V
= offer ≥ α× P × aol (6.3)
As P is in [0, 1] and α is in [0, 3) and offer is programmed to track SP(riskFactor),
the value of constant a which is raised exponentially dominates (6.3). The error
rate of an individual will remain high even if it implements the same inequality
except with a different value of a. As the diversity of the constants decreases over
generations, the chance of finding the correct value of a becomes even smaller. To
conclude, this reference policy model although appears to be simple, it is actually
not that easy for GP to find it.
Moreover, the rate of convergence among constants in our experiments is
further accelerated by the following factors:
• Small chance of using a constant as a leaf node — In ECJ [126], each
ERC (constant) of a range is implemented as a terminal class and each
variable is implemented as a terminal class. Each terminal class has an equal
probability of being selected to be a leaf node. As our experiments involve
six variable terminal classes and 1 ERC terminal class, the probability of
an ERC being chosen as a leaf node is only 1/7. Moreover, the relatively
large ERC range also exacerbated the problem in finding an appropriate
constant.
• No mutation operator — The default configuration does not use mutation.
Without mutation, there is no new constant introduced to the population.
The diversity among constants in the population decreases with each new
generation.
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• The use of an archive in SPEA2 — SPEA2 restricts the binary tournament
selection to the individuals in the archive and therefore only the constants
that appear in these individuals have the opportunity to be passed on to
the next generation.
Further analysis also reveals that a substantial portion of the individuals in the
archive share the same or similar higher level structures of their trees (assuming
the root of the tree is the highest node). The diversity among the individuals is
lost. We think the primary cause of this problem is again the absence of mutation
and the use of an archive in SPEA2.
Experiment 6.3: Enhanced constant evolution
To overcome these problems, this experiment is setup with the following changes.
Firstly, six identical ERC classes are used to make the probabilities of choosing a
variable and a constant equal. Secondly, a mutation-only setting is used instead
of the typical high crossover and low mutation setting. There are four reasons to
do so. Firstly, mutation introduces new genes and therefore diversifies the popu-
lation. Secondly, much empirical evidence shows crossover provides no advantage
over mutation in GP. Thirdly, this setting frees us from tuning the probability
parameters of applying crossover and mutation. Finally, mutation provides a
means to introduce new individuals by simply allowing mutation to happen at
the root node of an individual. The probabilities of applying mutation at the root
node, at a terminal node and at a non-terminal nodes are changed from 0, 0.1
and 0.9 (default) to 0.125, 0.125 and 0.75 respectively. This new setting has an
effect in increasing the diversity in the population as well as focussing more on
the search for the right constants.
The results improve significantly. The median error rate of the 100 best
individuals is reduced to 0.2225 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.1595, 0.2789].
The best of the 100 best individuals has an error rate = 0.099 and the number of
best individuals with error rate ≤ 0.25 is 54.
Figure 6.1 shows the distributions of the best individuals in all three experi-
ments at different error rate intervals. The distribution of the best individuals in
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this experiment has shifted significantly to the left, i.e., situated at lower error
rate intervals, in comparison to the ones in Experiments 6.1 and 6.2.
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Figure 6.1: The distributions of the best individuals in all three experiments at
different error rate intervals.
Example security policies inferred
Some optimal policies inferred in Experiments 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3 are shown in
Figures 6.2a, 6.2b and 6.2c respectively. Due to the space constraint, type is used
to represent the factor Stype, ln(x) and logx(y) operators are used to represent
protectedln(x) and protectedlogx(y) operators, and all the constants are rounded
to two decimal places. Other optimal policies inferred in these experiments also
have very similar structure and size.
An immediate observation is that there is a huge reduction in the size and
number of duplicate subcomponents in the policies inferred in Experiments 6.2
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(a) Experiment 6.1.
Figure 6.2: Some examples of the security policies learnt.
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Figure 6.2: Some examples of the security policies learnt.
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and 6.3. This serves as strong evidence that the use of SPEA2 to battle against
bloat is effective.
Unlike the experiments presented in Chapter 5, it is impossible to show the
mapping in these policies using a simple three dimensional plot as there are more
than two risk factors. To answer the question if the target policy has been learnt
in these experiments, the structure of the inferred policies is compared manu-
ally against the structure of the target policy. It is easy to observe that they
are in fact not the same because some input factors are missing in the inferred
policies. For example, sl is not found in the optimal policy inferred in Experi-
ment 6.1, and sl, SIS and SPH are not found in the optimal policy inferred in
Experiment 6.2. Nevertheless, with an error rate in the range [0.099, 0.126], these
inferred policies are likely to serve as good approximators of the target policy.
This can be useful under certain operational environments such as MANETs, in
which the evaluation of a complicated policy can be very expensive for a node.
6.3.2 Dynamic policy learning
So far, it is assumed that all the decision examples are available prior to the start
of the learning process. This section investigates how to learn security policies
dynamically when new decision examples become available gradually during the
course of learning, some of which can be inconsistent with the ones that are
previously seen. The learnt model is continuously refined, or even redefined if
necessary, by these new examples.
Unlike before, these decision examples are organised into a sequence of data
chunks. Each chunk consists of 200 examples to ensure that it has sufficiently
good coverage and representation of the underlying policy. The policy changes
every 5 chunks (1000 examples) by changing its value of α. In each experiment,
the sequence is fed into the learning framework one chunk at a time. The first
policy is learnt using the first chunk after 100 generations of evolution. Then, each
subsequent chunk is used to refine the policy learnt from the previous chunks.
Each refinement starts with the population of the last generation learnt from the
previous chunks, and uses the examples in the latest chunk to learn a refined
policy for a further 100 generations of evolution.
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We first focus only on how to infer the optimal policy model from decision ex-
amples. At any time, the output model (from the learning algorithm used) is the
individual (policy) with the lowest error rate on the latest chunk of examples in
the evolving population. Three experiments are presented: Experiment 6.4 shows
how dynamic learning can be performed by extending the current framework using
Fan’s intuition and Experiments 6.5 and 6.6 use Diversity via Opposite Objec-
tive (DOO) framework. We then show how ensemble approaches can be used to
improve the optimal model selection problem at the end of this section.
Experiment 6.4: Fan’s Intuition
In this experiment, the policy inference framework built in Experiment 6.3 is
extended in two ways. Firstly, the number of examples, n, in the fitness func-
tion fall is no longer fixed at 1000 but set to be the total number of examples
received and therefore increases as more chunks are received. Secondly, a new
fitness function is introduced to measure the error rate of a policy with respect
to the latest chunk of data. Let ri be the six decision-making factors, decisioni
be the decision in example i, s be the size of a data chunk and SP(ri) be the
decision made by policy SP on ri. Then, this new fitness function is:
flast(SP) =
1
s
n∑
i=n−s+1
(SP(ri) 6= decisioni) (6.4)
Along with this new fitness function, this experiment has three fitness functions
in total, namely fall, flast and fsize.
The intuition employed here is similar to Fan’s one (refer to Section 6.1).
Each chunk of examples is used to refine the policy learnt from the previous
chunks. The refinement process happens through 100 generations of evolution.
In each generation, the policies with the lowest fall or flast values in the previ-
ous generation are preserved in the SPEA2 archive. These policies correspond
to Fan’s classifier 1. These policies are then refined with examples in the latest
chunk through the evolutionary process. These refined policies correspond to
Fan’s classifier 2. New policies are generated (using mutation). Some may have
the lowest flast values within the population and correspond to Fan’s classifier 3.
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Others may have the lowest fall values and correspond to Fan’s classifier 4. Af-
ter 100 generations, the policy with the lowest flast value is chosen to be the new
learnt policy.
The results are shown in two resolution levels. Figure 6.3a shows the median
error rate of the best policies learnt after every 100 generations of training time.
With the exception of the initial 500 generations, the median error rate is kept
to be ≤ 0.220 at all times. For more details of the learning process, Figure 6.3b
shows the median error rate of the best policies learnt in each generation.
When a policy change happens every 5 chunks, i.e., 5×100 = 500 generations,
the median error rate spikes up sharply. After the spike, the error rate decreases
faster than in the initial 500 generations. This is a direct effect of using the
two fitness functions: fall and flast together. This setting protects the optimal
individuals with respect to the old policy from being eliminated too quickly and
therefore allows these individuals to have chances to pass on the knowledge they
have learnt to the new individuals. Consider the population in the generation
prior to the change, the individuals that have low flast values are also likely to
have low fall values. After the change, their flast will become worse (higher), but
their fall values would only be affected slightly. Thus, these individuals will still
have good chances of being kept in the archive and brought forward to the next
generation.
We also observe that there is a strong correlation between the height of the
spikes that happen every 500 generations and the change in value of α that is
used to simulate policy change. The height of a spike is higher when the change
in α is larger and vice versa. To see this, the values of α used to generate
training examples and its changes, δα, at every 500 generations are detailed in
Table 6.1. An immediate observation is that the heights of the spikes produced
at generation 3500 (δα = −1.6670) and 4000 (δα = 1.6050) are much higher
compared to the spikes produced at generation 4500 (δα = −0.0587). In practice,
this may not be a major issue as the changes in security policy are often small
and smooth.
Additionally, it is found that individuals in the archive converge and become
more alike to one another over generations. However, this is not a problematic
issue if the “structure” of the policy is learnt before the diversity is lost. The
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Figure 6.3: The median error rate of the best policies learnt in Experiment 6.4.
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Generation α δα
0 1.8648 1.8648
500 2.3314 0.4666
1000 1.4015 −0.9299
1500 2.2303 0.8288
2000 1.4048 −0.8255
2500 2.2718 0.8670
3000 2.8138 0.5420
3500 1.1468 −1.6670
4000 2.7518 1.6050
4500 2.6931 −0.0587
Table 6.1: The values of α and its changes, δα, at every 500 generations.
subsequent changes require only changes in the value of α, which mutation can
easily provide. Again, the loss of diversity also explains the very sharp upward
spikes in the error rate during policy change as shown in Figure 6.3b. As the
individuals are all alike, none of them matches the new policy well and thus the
error rate increases sharply. However, the new policy is relatively easy to learn
and thus the quick decrease in the error rate.
In summary, this approach can perform well under the assumption that the
policy changes are relatively small and the knowledge learnt previously aids the
learning process of the new policy. The use of two fitness functions: fall and flast
allows the knowledge learnt to be passed on from generation to generation. How-
ever, this approach still suffers from the loss of diversity among the individuals in
the population. This puts the general applicability of this approach in question.
Diversity via Opposite Objectives (DOO)
The loss of diversity problem is not uncommon in EAs. The “survival of the
fittest” principle in EAs provides the fitter individuals with higher chances to
survive and to pass on their genes on to the individuals in the next generations.
Consequently, the individuals in the population will inevitably become more alike
over generations. If significant diversity is lost prior to the optimal individual
being found, the population is said to have converged prematurely to a local
optimum. To prevent this, EAs use mutation operators to introduce new random
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genes and individuals. However, the chances that these new random genes and
individuals can provide improvement over the current individuals are very small.
Therefore, they are highly unlikely to be preserved. In other words, diversity is
generated and then lost from one generation to the next.
To overcome this problem, several dynamic learning algorithms based on EAs
have been proposed in the literature. Most, if not all of them first attempt to
produce individuals that are optimised for the problem-related objectives and
then attempt to maintain the diversity among individuals in the population as
much as possible [135]. Their settings are often ad-hoc and the algorithms are
often complicated. A new dynamic learning framework — Diversity via Opposite
Objectives (DOO) — is proposed here. DOO takes the opposing perspective;
it first attempts to maximise the diversity among individuals in the population
through generations and then uses the ever increasing diversity to help in finding
the optimised individuals.
In EAs, performing evolutionary operations on a single individual can be
viewed as searching for more optimised individuals from the position of the indi-
vidual in the solution space. Similarly, performing evolutionary operations on a
diverse population of individuals can be viewed as a parallel search in many dif-
ferent parts of the solution space. This parallel search has a much better chance
of finding more optimised individuals than a search starting from just one indi-
vidual. The ever increasing diversity in DOO results in a domino effect such that
not only is the search done in parallel, but the search space coverage increases
as the diversity increases. Consequently, the chances of finding a more optimal
individual become higher and higher as the evolution proceeds. This same effect
cannot be achieved by conducting many parallel single-objective EA runs because
each run is likely to be trapped in a local optima.
In DOO, each and every objective is changed into a pair of opposing ob-
jectives. For example, the objective of minimising error rate in our problem is
changed to minimising error rate and minimising accuracy (1− error rate). DOO
then optimises all objectives using MOEAs. The opposing objectives in DOO
ensure that an individual who is weaker for one objective is fitter for the opposite
objective. Therefore, no individual is dominated by others, i.e., all individuals
are at the Pareto front. Each and every individual has a fair chance of passing
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on its genes to the next generation. This prevents the population from conver-
gence, i.e., diversity is at least maintained. Since the true Pareto front is already
found at the start of the evolution process, the only job left for MOEAs is to
improve the spread of solutions on the Pareto front. As a result, the population
of a generation will have a wider coverage of the solution space than the previous
generations, i.e., diversity increases as MOEAs drive the evolution process.
To understand how DOO works via MOEAs, the concepts of the solution
space, S and objective space, O introduced in Section 4.4 are used. Referring to
Figure 4.3, diversity among individuals in a population is essentially a measure of
how uniformly solution points are distributed in S. Whilst f does not maintain
the distribution of solution points, it is often true in many problems that f is
a continuous function between these two topological spaces, i.e., a set of points
near a point s′ ∈ S is mapped to a set of points near the point f(s′) ∈ O.
As f is not injective, the inverse is not necessarily true, e.g., two solutions
can be very different yet both can solve the same problem equally well. However,
following the continuity assumption on f , it is reasonable to assume that a set of
points in O that is far apart corresponds to a set of points that is far apart in S.
DOO makes use of this assumption and attempts to maximise the diversity of
solution points in S via maximising the diversity of points in O using MOEAs.
In the SPEA2 implementation of MOEAs, if the number of non-dominated
points exceeds the archive size, the point that has the shortest Euclidean distance
to another individual in the objective space is dropped. If two solutions have the
same distance to their nearest neighbours, the tie is broken by comparing their
distances to their second nearest neighbours and so forth. This process is iterated
until the non-dominated solutions can fit into the archive. Essentially, the goal is
to fill the archive with non-dominated points as uniformly and widely distributed
over O as possible. Let error rate and accuracy be the pair of objectives, a
possible Pareto front and points that are to be kept in the archive are depicted in
Figure 6.4. As the optimal point with respect to each objective is located at the
corner of the Pareto front, i.e., they are furthest apart from other points, they
are guaranteed to be preserved in each generation until a better one is found. At
the same time, there is a higher likelihood for a better point to be found as the
diversity increases.
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Figure 6.4: In the DOO setting, all individuals are at the Pareto front. SPEA2
removes individuals that are closest to others iteratively until they can fit into
the archive. The individual at each corner is guaranteed to be in the archive.
Furthermore, all binary decision policies (all binary classifiers in general) can
be inverted to their complements by a simple negation on their output decisions.
Therefore, high error rate policies are just as good as those with a low error rate.
To gain benefit from this, DOO selects the policy with the highest absolute value
of bias which is defined as 0.5 − error rate. A negative bias value implies that
the policy is optimised on the opposite objective and thus all its output decisions
need to be negated if it is selected for use.
Experiment 6.5: Two pairs of opposing objectives
This experiment uses two pairs of opposing objectives: the first pair is fall and
1 − fall, and the other pair is flast and 1 − flast. We exclude fsize here as it
is not a problem-related objective. All other settings remain the same as in
Experiment 6.4.
Figure 6.5a shows the median error rate of the best policies learnt after ev-
ery 100 generations of training time. Figure 6.5b shows the median error rate of
the best policies learnt in each generation. The results of Experiment 6.4 that
uses three objectives are also included in pink for comparison purposes.
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Figure 6.5: The median error rates of the best policies learnt in Experiment 6.4
(light pink) and Experiment 6.5 (dark blue).
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In the initial 500 generations, the learning rate using DOO is significantly
faster. The median error rate of the best policies is reduced to 0.250 in 200
generations. This result is comparable to the best static policy learning approach
presented in Section 6.3.1, despite that the number of training examples used here
being significantly less (400 vs. 1000) and these examples are being presented to
the learning algorithm in sequential chunks.
Furthermore, the median error rate of the best policies learnt in each gener-
ation is lower than the one in Experiment 6.4. However, the error rates of the
best policies may rise suddenly even in the absence of a policy change. Analysis
of the results reveals that this is due to the way that the output policy is selected
in each generation. Currently, the output policy in each generation is the one
with lowest error rate/bias estimated using the latest 200 examples. As these 200
examples are generated randomly, they may not be sufficient to form a good rep-
resentation of the target policy. Moreover, policy changes sometimes may simply
mean revisiting a past policy. Therefore, the optimal policy in respect to the
latest chunk may not be the true optimal policy. This effect is not obvious in
Experiment 6.4 as all the policy candidates (individuals) in the population are
very similar. In Section 6.3.2, we will show how ensemble approaches can be used
to alleviate this problem. From the other perspective, this effect is a positive sign
of diversity maintenance.
Lastly, the heights of the spikes in the error rate due to policy changes are
much lower in DOO. Indeed, when a previously learnt policy is revisited, the
error rate does not spike up at all. For example, the error rate does not spike
up at all in generation 2000 as the target policy which has α = 1.4048 is very
similar to the target policy which has α = 1.4015 learnt between generation 1000
and generation 1500. This is further evidence of diversity maintenance. A policy
change can be viewed as a change in the fitness function, f . With a diverse set
of policies maintained in the population, it is likely that one of them will be near
the new target policy after the change.
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Experiment 6.6: One pair of opposite objectives
An obvious weakness in the setups in Experiments 6.4 and 6.5 is that they are not
very scalable. The evaluation of fall involves scanning through all the decision
examples seen. As the number of examples increases over time, the fitness eval-
uation time required for each individual increases. A possible way to overcome
this is to only use a subset of decision examples, randomly sampled from all the
decision examples seen. The likelihood of an example being sampled may also
be set to decay over time, i.e., the older an example is, the less likely it is to be
sampled.
Prior to the search for a suitable sampling technique, it is always a good idea
to check if the old examples are of any use. In this experiment, we drop the
first pair of objectives from Experiment 6.5 to see the effect of not evaluating
fitness against old decision examples. This experiment is carried out with only
this change.
Figure 6.6a shows the median error rate of the best policies learnt after ev-
ery 100 generations of training time and Figure 6.6b shows the median error rate
of the best policies in each generation. The results of Experiment 6.5 are also
included in pink for comparison purposes.
The results show that the performance of the best policies obtained in this
experiment lie somewhere between those obtained in Experiment 6.4 and those
obtained in Experiment 6.5. This suggests that the the old data (measured by
the pair of objectives dropped) is indeed useful in maintaining a more diverse set
of individuals in the evolving population.
Experiment 6.7: Selection of inferred policy models
This section examines various ensemble approaches to construct the ultimate
model by combining multiple models to achieve better performance. We use
a simple voting mechanism such that the output of the ultimate model is the
majority output of all the models. This ensemble construction comes at virtually
no cost in EAs; achieved simply by selecting the best n individuals from the final
population.
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Figure 6.6: The median error rates of the best policies learnt in Experiment 6.5
(light pink) and Experiment 6.6 (dark blue).
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However, the theoretical study of ensemble approaches has revealed two key
factors that determine the performance of an ensemble: the performance of indi-
vidual models and the diversity among all models in the ensemble [136]. As the
population of an EA run with non-DOO setting converges and loses the diversity
among individuals, the performance gain of using an ensemble is limited to the
first factor. However, this is not a problem with DOO. Yet, we still have two
questions to answer:
1. How many models should be used to construct the ensemble? Whilst the
negative bias models are as useful as the positive bias models, the models
with near zero bias are virtually useless. Should these models be included?
If not, what should be the minimum threshold on the value of bias one
model must have in order for it to be included?
2. Should the votes of all models have an equal weight? We choose to examine
here if weighting the vote of each model with its bias using the latest chunk
would provide better performance than a simple uniform weighted vote
approach. If so, how much is the performance improvement?
We attempt to answer these questions by comparing the performance of en-
sembles built with the following combinations of models:
• Using the single highest bias model in the archive.
• Using the 8 highest bias models in the archive.
• Using the 16 highest bias models in the archive.
• Using the 32 highest bias models in the archive.
• Using the 64 highest bias models in the archive.
• Using all the models (128 models) in the archive.
The bias of each model is estimated using the latest chunk of decision examples.
The models in each of these ensembles are combined with two different voting
mechanisms: uniform weighted (unweighted) and bias weighted. In the bias
weighted voting mechanism, the vote of each model is weighted with the absolute
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value of its bias on the latest data chunk. If the bias is negative, its vote goes to
the complement decision class.
When the ensemble models are constructed from the models in Experiment 6.4,
the error rates of the ensemble models do not decrease but increase with the num-
ber of models used as shown in Figure 6.7. This is because not all the models
used for ensemble construction are optimised with respect to the error rate, some
models in the archive are optimised with respect to other objectives, e.g., the
model size. When the number of models used is small (8 or 16 models), it is very
likely that the selected models are those optimised with respect to the error rate.
However, as these models have converged to become very similar to one another,
the formed ensembles do not result in any performance gain nor loss. As the
number of models used increases, the ensembles begin to include those models
that are not optimised with respect to the error rate. This causes the performance
of the ensembles to become worse. The deterioration in performances is worse in
the unweighted voting mechanism.
The performance of the ensembles formed using the models learnt in Exper-
iments 6.5 and 6.6 are shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 respectively. When the
number of models used is small (8 or 16 models), there is no significant change
in performance. However, the changes in error rate become smaller; the sudden
rises which tend to happen in the absence of policy changes seemingly disappear.
This smoothing effect is especially clear between generations 2500 to 3000 and
also between generations 3500 to 3700. As the number of models used increases,
the performance becomes only slightly worse. This suggests that the diversity
maintained in DOO provides a performance gain to counter the performance loss
due to the use of lower bias models in an ensemble.
6.4 Evidence for the thesis and future work
This chapter details experiments that show how GP/MOGP can be used to learn
as well as adapt security policy with changes. As there is no dynamic security
policy model available to work with, a dynamic security policy model that varies
over time is introduced here. This model is used to generate time varying decision
examples for training and evaluation purposes.
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(a) Unweighted voting mechanism.
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(b) Weighted voting mechanism.
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Figure 6.7: The median error rates of the ultimate ensemble models constructed
from the models learnt in Experiment 6.4.
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(b) Weighted voting mechanism.
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Figure 6.8: The median error rates of the ultimate ensemble models constructed
from the models learnt in Experiment 6.5.
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Figure 6.9: The median error rates of the ultimate ensemble models constructed
from the models learnt in Experiment 6.6.
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We first begin with three experiments on learning the designed security policy
model statically as in the previous chapter. The results show some of the limi-
tations with GP, in which the exact target policy can only be approximated at
the best. This has a subtle implication on the applicability of our approaches.
In practice, the security policies are likely to be much more complicated. It is
unrealistic to expect the whole policy may be inferred from the decision examples
using our approaches. A more realistic goal is to use our approaches in conjunc-
tion with the traditional top-down policy development approach. The high-level
policies may first be refined into several subpolicies and these subpolicies are
then used as the inference targets. Our inference approach can also be used as a
security policy verification tool for the manually designed policies.
We also have found and proposed solutions to some common problems encoun-
tered when using GP, e.g., constant degeneration over the evolution process. As
these are not the focus of this thesis, the solutions proposed here may be rather
ad-hoc and specific to this problem. An obvious way forward is to examine these
problems in detail and propose more rigorous solutions to them.
In the dynamic policy learning experiments, we proposed two novel dynamic
learning frameworks based upon MOEA: one based on Fan’s intuition [130] and
DOO. In DOO, an n-objective optimisation problem is treated as a 2n-objective
optimisation problem, by adding an opposing objective to each of the original
objectives. This allows the diversity in the population to be maintained whilst
optimising the intended objectives. This diversity can aid in preventing the pop-
ulation from premature convergence and allows the concept drift in the policy to
be continually relearnt. The results show that both frameworks are able to infer
reasonably good approximators to the reference model from decision examples in
an incremental manner. These frameworks also have better learning rate in com-
parison to the ones used for static learning. However, work remains to be done to
make these frameworks more extensible. For example, searching for appropriate
techniques to sample old decision examples.
Lastly, we also show how to build an ensemble policy model from multiple
models in a single run to achieve better performance. In the DOO setting, this
has the effect of reducing and smoothing the error rate of the inferred policies
during concept drift.
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6.5 Conclusions
We have argued earlier that some degree of adaptivity in policy is essential when
the risk landscape is constantly changing. In some respects this applies to almost
any system. However, the speed of evolution may vary very considerably. In
the challenging dynamic environments referred to in the thesis hypothesis one
might expect change to occur at a much faster pace than in fixed infrastructural
networks. In this chapter we have investigated automated techniques for con-
tinually learning (and relearning) security policies from decision examples. Two
dynamic security policy learning frameworks are proposed: one based on Fan’s
intuition and DOO. The results show that both frameworks are able to infer rea-
sonably good approximators to the reference model from the decision examples
in an incremental manner. Various ways of constructing ensemble policy model
to achieve better performance are also examined. These approaches are found
to be able to effectively reduce and smooth the error rate of the inferred policies
during concept drift in the DOO setting.
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Chapter 7
Mission-specific Policy Discovery
Recent research [8] has detailed why precanned one-size-fits-all security policies
and mechanisms are too rigid for modern systems. In this chapter, we shift
the emphasis away from specifying and refining a one-size-fits-all policy towards
searching for a policy, from a family of policies, that has beneficial and acceptable
outcomes. We believe this is entirely novel.
Here we will investigate if models of operational benefit and risk can be used
to learn the optimal, or at least excellent, policies for specific scenarios. We use a
risk-budget based policy family as an example only; it is a means to an end and
stands as a proxy for any policy family from which we seek an instance best suited
to the needs of a specific mission (or a specific family of missions). We employ
the same techniques, namely GP/MOGP and DOO, to search over the space
of policies, get feedback on the consequences of a particular policy, and home
in on the optimal policies. These techniques have been shown to be effective
in searching for optimal policies using decision examples in previous chapters.
Other constraint solving or heuristic guided search approaches are potentially
applicable.
The crux of the overall approach is that we need some notion of feedback
to indicate how well a particular policy instance performs. Feedback can be
obtained by labelled decision examples (used as training set in a similar way to the
experiments in previous chapters), by static analysis, by numerical analysis (e.g.,
if we were to couch aspects of system behaviour as properties of Markov state
transition graphs), or else by simulation. We choose to use simulation in this
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chapter to demonstrate the feasibility of our idea. Simulation is a highly flexible
way to obtain feedback. It is of a particular use when the complexity of the
system under examination prevents mathematical analysis.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.1 introduces an op-
erational scenario with a clear benefit and risk tradeoff in accessing information.
Section 7.2 presents various proof-of-concept experiments to support our claims.
Section 7.3 discusses the experimental results and Section 7.4 shows some in-
teresting policies inferred in the experiments. Section 7.5 summarises the main
contributions and points out some potential avenues for future research. Finally,
Section 7.6 concludes this chapter.
7.1 Scenario: travelling across a battlefield
We present a highly simplified operational scenario where there is clear benefit
from obtaining information and clear nasty consequences from allowing too much
free access to it. The scenario is a battlefield with two teams of agents, blue and
red. The battlefield is a 100×100 two dimensional grid. Blue agents aim to travel
from an initial location, Linit, to a destination location, Ldes, seeking to restrict
casualties but also aiming for a quick traversal. Certain elements of the grid are
in the hands of red forces and straying alone into an occupied grid position will
lead to the liquidation of the agent and the compromise of all information it has
had access to. At each time step, a blue agent can request further information
about its vicinity, e.g., the location of other agents. It is assumed here that the
amount of risk budget required for accessing the same piece of information under
the same circumstance by a blue agent is the same. In other words, all blue agents
are assumed to have the same levels of trustworthiness. Red agents attempt to
prevent blue agents from achieving their objective by chasing and destroying any
blue agent they see.
It is decidedly not the purpose of this task to determine how agents can
best use the information they obtain. Rather, we assume there is some chosen
mechanism for using it, and the goal is to find the policy that then provides the
best result. It is possible that many of the same techniques we propose here could,
mutatis mutandis, be used to search for an information use strategy, but we do
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not intend to address that issue here. We shall concentrate solely on the security
policy instance discovery.
7.1.1 Movement strategy
At each time step, an agent can choose to move in any of the eight different
directions to a neighbouring square: North (N), East (E), West (W), South (S),
North East (NE), North West (NW), South East (SE) and South West (SW), or
else remain at its current square (C). The decision-making process and movement
of all agents are synchronous. At each time step, each agent decides where to move
next based upon what he can perceive about the environment without knowing
what decisions others make. Then, all agents move simultaneously based upon
the decisions they have made. Two or more agents may end up occupying the
same grid position.
What an agent can perceive is defined in terms of its sight distance, i.e., the
distance an agent can see from its position. The notion of distance between two
points is defined as the least number of steps an agent needs to move between
the points. Initially, the sight distance is set to be one square for blue agents
and two squares for red agents respectively. Blue agents may increase their sight
distances to two squares by spending their risk budgets. Additionally, the grid
map does not wrap around at its edges and thus the number of movement choices
is more restrictive when an agent is at the edge of the map.
Local information of agents
Each agent is associated with several matrices in order to formally define its move-
ment strategy. These matrices are the gradient distance matrix, the knowledge
matrix and one or more direction selection matrices.
The gradient distance matrix, G, has the same size as the map, i.e., 100×100
two dimensional grid. It stores the distances of all squares in the map from the
destination square. Each element gx,y in G represents the distance of the square
with coordinate (x, y) from Ldes on the grid map. This matrix is commonly shared
by all agents.
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The knowledge matrix, K, stores the knowledge a blue agent has acquired
about the map so far. Each element kx,y in K represents the perceived risk
associated with the square with the coordinate (x, y). At each time step t, a blue
agent p updates its knowledge matrix, Kp,t to account for the risk arising due to
any red agent q that it can see from its current position. Formally, the update
of Kp,t can be written as:
Kp,t = αKp,t−1 + (1− α)Up,t (7.1)
where α is the relative weight of the previous knowledge acquired and U is the
update matrix. In this scenario, α is set to 0 for simplicity, i.e., blue agents have
no memory about their past. Thus, (7.1) is simplified to Kp,t = Up,t.
We have chosen a simple Up,t here such that each element ux,y in Up,t is as
follows:
ux,y =
#q∑
i=1
max(sightRange(i)− distance(x, y, xi, yi) + 1, 0) (7.2)
where q is each red agent in the sight of the blue agent p and (xi, yi) is the location
of the i-th red agent. In other words, a blue agent only considers the risk posed
by all the red agents within its sight range. Each of these red agents poses a risk
to any square within its sight range. The amount of risk posed to a square by a
red agent depends on the distance between them. The further a square is from
the red agent, the less risk is posed to that square. No risk is posed to any square
outside its sight range. Figure 7.1 shows the risk posed by a red agent located
at the centre of a 5× 5 grid. As the sight range of a red agent in this scenario is
fixed at 2, therefore the risk posed to the square where the red agent resides is 3,
the immediate abutting squares (forming an annulus of squares) have risk that is
equal to 2 and the next annulus of squares have risk that is equal to 1.
The direction selection matrices, DSM , is a 3 × 3 matrix. Each element
in DSM represents the likelihood of a movement direction an agent chooses at
each time step. For example, the central element, d0,0 represents the likelihood
of an agent choosing to remain at its current position whereas d1,0 represents
the likelihood of an agent choosing to move to the east. Figure 7.2 shows the
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1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 2 1
1 2 3 2 1
1 2 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 1
Figure 7.1: The risk posed to each square by a red agent located at the centre.
mapping between all the possible indices of DSM and the movement directions
they represent. Additionally, the elements corresponding to movement directions
that lead to invalid locations, i.e., locations that are not on the map, are always
set to 0.
−1, 1 0, 1 1, 1 NW N NE
−1, 0 0, 0 1, 0 W C E
−1,−1 0,−1 1,−1 SW S SE
Figure 7.2: The mapping between the indices of a DSM and the movement
directions they represent.
Movement strategy of red agents
As shown in Figure 7.3, the initial locations of all red agents are randomly dis-
tributed within a square-doughnut shaped patrol region defined in terms of three
parameters: the centre, c, the inner radius rin and the outer radius rout. In this
scenario, c = Ldes, rin = 10 and rout = 20 are used.
Initially, each red agent randomly moves within the patrol region. When a
red agent sees a blue agent, it begins to chase the blue agent. This pursuit ends
after a finite number of time steps or as soon as the blue agent is killed. The red
agent then returns again to the patrol region using the shortest possible path and
starts randomly moving within the region as before.
More formally, a red agent can be in one of the following three states: Pa-
trol (initial state), Chase or Return. The transition between states takes no time.
In the Patrol state, if a red agent does not see any blue agent, each element ed
in its DSM is set to 1/N , in which d is a movement direction that will result in it
remaining in the patrol region, and N is the total number of such directions. All
154
7.1 Scenario: travelling across a battlefield
Figure 7.3: The simulated battlefield grid map.
other elements are set to 0. Otherwise, the red agent randomly sets its chasing
target to one of the blue agents it sees, sets its chasing step to 10 and transits to
the Chase state.
In the Chase state, a red agent has each element ed in its DSM set to 1, d
being the direction of the target blue agent. All other elements in its DSM are
set to zero. Its chasing step is then decremented. It transits to the Return state
if its chasing step runs out or its chasing target is killed or has escaped.
In the Return state, a red agent has each element ed in its DSM set to 1, d
being the direction of the centre of the patrol region as seen from its current
location. All other elements are set to 0. In other words, an agent in this state
will return to the patrol region using the shortest path and ignore any blue agent
it sees on its way. Once a red agent arrives in the patrol region, it transits to the
Patrol state.
Movement strategy of blue agents
The initial locations of all blue agents are randomly distributed within a distance
between 0 and dstart from Linit. In this scenario, dstart is set to 7. At each
time step, every blue agent attempts to move towards its destination gradually
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while seeking to avoid being killed by the red agents on the way. Once a blue
agent arrives at the destination, the agent is considered to have achieved its goal
and “disappears” from the map.
Formally, a blue agent can be in one of the following two states: Progress (ini-
tial state) and Arrive.
In the Progress state, a blue agent makes its decision as to where to move
based upon the following factors:
1. The destination location, Ldes — it should move towards its destination
over time to accomplish its objective.
2. The location of red agents — it should try to move away from red agents
to reduce the risk of being killed.
These factors are independently calculated using two DSM s, namely DSM des
and DSM risk, and then aggregated using:
DSM final = βDSM des + (1− β)DSM risk (7.3)
where β is the relative weight of each DSM . In our scenario, both DSM s have
equal weight, i.e., β = 0.5. The direction that a blue agent will choose to move
is the one with the highest element value in DSM final. If there is more than one
direction which has this value, a random choice is made among them.
To build DSM des, we extract a 3 × 3 submatrix, Gsub from the gradient
distance matrix, G. The submatrix to be extracted by an agent j is formed by
the elements corresponding to the current square where j resides and its eight
neighbouring squares. If any of these squares are off the map (i.e., the agent is
at an edge of the map), the element is set to 0 and marked as invalid. For each
of the valid elements, x, the following operations are performed:
1. calculateRelativeDifference(x) — set x to be the absolute difference of its
current value from the largest value in Gsub. The closer a square is to Ldes,
the larger this value will be. The reachable squares furthest from Ldes now
have values of 0.
2. plusOne(x) — add 1 to x. This ensures that the values of all reachable
squares are positive.
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3. power(x, n) — raise x to the power of n. Larger values of n amplify the
difference and thus increase the selection bias toward element x with higher
value. Here, n = 1 is used, i.e., x is unchanged.
4. normalise(x) — x is normalised by dividing it by the sum of all the valid
elements. The net effect of the above is to produce a probability distribution
of moves to the valid squares; the closer square is to Ldes, the greater the
probability it is chosen.
DSM risk is built in a similar way to DSM des except that it uses knowledge
matrix, K, as its source matrix (the matrix it extracts the element values from)
and the parameter n in power(x, n) operation is set to 2.
An example of this scenario is depicted in Figure 7.3. The red agents randomly
move in the patrol region (the white square-doughnut shaped region) with the
destination (the red square in the middle of the region) as its centre. The blue
agents are moving from their initial positions (region around the small white
square at the left) to the destination. The intensity of the red background colour
corresponds to the value in the gradient distance matrix.
7.1.2 Risk-budget based security policy
To integrate the risk-budget based policy into the scenario, a fixed amount of risk
budget is assigned to each blue agent at the start. At any time step, a blue agent
can opt to purchase extra information about its vicinity in the hope of reducing
the risk of being killed. This leads to two questions: Firstly, what information is
available for a blue agent to request? Secondly, when can a blue agent raise an
information access request?
In the real world, information would be available at different levels of gran-
ularity. Higher granularity information costs more. Here the simulation is kept
simple. Only one type of information is available to request: the locations of all
agents at the distance of 2 squares from the current location of the agent. It
follows that the cost of the information is not a matter anymore and therefore is
simply set to 1 unit.
There is no straightforward answer to the second question. Instead of defining
a fixed strategy regarding when blue agents can raise the information access
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requests, we decide to let each of them raise a request at every time step and it is
the job of the policy to decide whether to grant or deny the request based upon
the status of the agent. If the policy grants a request of an agent, the cost of the
accessed information is charged against the budget of the agent, the information
is annotated onto the knowledge matrix of the agent, and then the DSM s of the
agent are recalculated. Otherwise, nothing happens.
To make an informed decision whether an information access request should
be granted or not, the security policy needs to take into account the following
risk factors:
1. The elapsed operation time, currentTime.
2. The price and granularity of the information requested. In this scenario,
as there is only one type of information and therefore this factor can be
omitted safely without loss of generality.
3. The remaining risk budget of the agent who raises the request, budgetLeft .
4. The current risk of the agent who raises the request, currentRisk . In this
scenario, this factor depends solely on the number of enemy agents in its
vicinity.
5. The estimated future risk of the agent who raises the request, futureRisk .
In this scenario, this factor is estimated using the distance from its current
location to the destination.
The security policy is thus defined here as:
a real-valued function SP(riskFactor) where riskFactor is a tuple of
〈currentTime, budgetLeft , currentRisk , futureRisk〉 with the interpre-
tation that an information access request is granted to an agent x if
and only if SP(riskFactorx) ≥ 0 and budgetLeftx ≥ 0.
With the security policy integrated, the complete movement strategy of a blue
agent in the Progress state is summarised in Algorithm 7.1.
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foreach agent in BLUE team do
calculate DSM des using gradient distance matrix
calculate DSM risk using knowledge matrix
calculate DSM final with (7.3)
requestInformation(agent, policy)
if request is granted then
update K with new information
recalculate DSM risk using updated knowledge matrix
recalculate DSM final with (7.3)
move to the direction with the highest value element in DSM final
Algorithm 7.1: The movement strategy of blue agents.
7.2 Experimentation
Given the scenario described above, we would like to search for an optimal in-
stance in the policy space parametrised by these factors for blue agents. Op-
timality can have different meanings. In this context, an optimal policy is one
that minimises the number of blue agent casualties as well and/or minimises the
operation completion time (the time that the last agent is killed or arrives at the
destination) given a fixed amount of risk budget. These two objectives can be
in conflict with one another, e.g., minimising the operation time can be achieved
by denying all information requests from the blue agents so as to increase their
chance of being killed. GP/MOGP and DOO are used to search for the optimal
policies here.
To search for the optimal policies using these approaches, each individual in
the evolving population encodes a policy candidate. The terminal set, T con-
sists of all the risk factors and a set of ERCs with values in the range [−1,−1).
The function set, F comprises +, −, ×, ÷, protectedln(x), pow(x, y), exp(x),
max(x, y), min(x, y), sin(x) and cos(x). To measure the fitness of a policy, the
policy is executed by all blue agents in 10 scenarios described in Section 7.1. Each
scenario is initialised with a different random seed and consists of 50 blue agents
and 150 red agents. The mean of the policy performance in all the scenarios is
used as the fitness value. The same set of scenarios is used repeatedly throughout
the evolution process.
All the experiments described in this chapter are carried out using ECJ 18 [126]
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with the SPEA2 module obtained from the ECJ 19. The default parameters de-
fined in koza.params and spea2.params that comes with ECJ are used, except
for the following:
1. Number of generations: 100.
2. Population size: 256.
3. SPEA2 archive size (if applicable): 32.
4. Evolutionary operators (probability): crossover (0.9) and mutation (0.1).
5. Selection: binary tournament selection.
7.2.1 Experiment 7.1: Minimising casualty toll with fdead
The objective of this experiment is to search for the optimal policy that minimises
the casualty toll of the blue agents. The fitness function can be formed in a pretty
straightforward way by setting it to be the normalised mean of the fraction of blue
agents killed in a scenario. Formally, let N be the number of scenarios used, M
be the initial number of blue agents in a scenario and ci be the casualty toll of
blue agent in scenario i. Then, the fitness of a policy, fdead, is defined as:
fdead =
1
NM
N∑
i=1
ci (7.4)
7.2.2 Experiment 7.2: Minimising casualty toll with fmsd
Sometimes, the fitness function might not be so easily formed, perhaps because of
cost or other difficulties in measuring it. In such cases, an indirect measurement
can be used instead. In this experiment, an alternative fitness function, fmsd,
which minimises the mean square distance between the final location of each
agent and the destination, is used to achieve the same objective. Let N be the
number of scenarios used, M be the initial number of blue agents and fi,j be the
final location of blue agent j in scenario i (the location of a killed blue agent is
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the square where it was killed). Then, the fitness of a policy, fmsd, is defined as:
fmsd =
1
NM
N∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
(
distance(fi,j, Ldes)
max(gridWidth, gridHeight)
)2
(7.5)
where the term “max(gridWidth, gridHeight)” represents the greatest possible
distance of any square from any possible Ldes. Together with the term “
1
NM
”, it
ensures that the value of fmsd is between 0 and 1. For most choices of Ldes (as
long as Ldes is not at the edge of the map), the achievable value of fmsd is strictly
less than 1.
7.2.3 Experiment 7.3: Minimising casualty toll with DOO
To further investigate the applicability and generality of the DOO framework
introduced in Section 6.3.2, we reuse it here to search for the optimal policy that
minimises the casualty toll of the blue agents. To search with DOO, we need
to add an opposing objective to each of the original objectives. We reuse fdead
defined in Experiment 7.1 here and define its “opposite” fitness function to be
the normalised mean of the fraction of blue agents who remain alive in a scenario.
Formally, let N be the number of scenarios used, M be the initial number of blue
agents in a scenario and ai be the blue agent that remains alive in the scenario i.
Then, this “opposite” fitness function, falive, is defined as:
falive =
1
NM
N∑
i=1
ai
= 1− fdead (7.6)
7.2.4 Experiment 7.4: Multi-objective optimisation
In this experiment, the objective is to search for the set of policies that is optimal
in two criteria: minimal casualty toll of blue agents and minimal mission comple-
tion time. The search is carried out using MOGP with SPEA2 implementation.
To use MOGP, the fitness function of each objective must be defined. To
measure casualty toll, fdead defined previously is used. To measure the mission
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completion time, ftime is defined as the normalised mean of completion time of
a run. Formally, let N be the number of scenario used, T be the maximum
completion time of a run and ti be the completion time of scenario i. Then, the
fitness of a policy, ftime, is defined as follows:
ftime =
1
NT
N∑
i=1
ti (7.7)
Here T is set to be 100.
7.3 Experimental results and evaluation
To evaluate the performance of the optimised policies found, three baseline pol-
icy models, NoAccess , FullAccess and RandomAccess are created. NoAccess and
FullAccess models are simple: they deny and grant, respectively, all access re-
quests. Assuming that having more information will always help an agent in
making a better informed decision in choosing the movement direction, these
models essentially define the lower and upper bounds of the achievable perfor-
mance. However, as will be shown later, the experimental results suggest that
this assumption is not true; agents can use the new information in a way that
can lead to a deterioration in their performance. In RandomAccess model, the
decision to grant an access request depends on the availability of the current
remaining budget held by the agent who raises the request. If the agent has suf-
ficient budget to pay for the access, the access request is granted or denied with
equal probability. Otherwise, the access request is simply denied. This model
serves as the baseline model for a given initial budget of each agent.
In each experiment, four different initial risk budget allocation settings are
attempted. 10, 20, 40 and ∞ units of risk are allocated to each blue agent for
each mission. Each setting is repeated 10 times using a different random seed
and the performance of each optimised policy is summarised in Table 7.1. In
the MOGP experiment, the results shown are the performances of the optimal
policies with minimal casualty toll of blue agents without taking into account
the mission completion time. The median is used here instead of the mean as
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the distribution of the performance metric used in each experiment is unknown.
In all cases, the results suggest that a policy can be optimised considerably for
the 10 specified missions.
The performance of the optimal policies found in Experiments 7.1 (using fdead),
7.3 (using DOO) and 7.4 (using MOGP) are significantly better than the unopti-
mised RandomAccess policies. This result serves as a strong evidence to support
the idea of searching for the optimal policies for a set of missions using EAs. Ad-
ditionally, the performance difference among these optimal policies is very small
such that it is statistically insignificant. In other words, the policies optimised
with DOO are as good as the ones optimised with the traditional GP/MOGP.
Optimisation in Experiment 7.2 (using fmsd) has a relatively small improve-
ment when the risk budgets available are limited. Further investigation reveals
that this is due to the bias in the fitness function used. The search using fmsd
gives preference to a policy that leads each agent to be as close as possible to the
destination without considering if the agent ever reaches its destination. This bias
effect is more obvious when the initial risk budget is low and insufficient. As the
initial budget increases, the performance difference between the policies learnt in
this experiment and those learnt in other experiments becomes less. Indeed, in
the case we set the initial budget to be ∞, the difference is very small and is
statistically insignificant.
The results also contradict our initial intuitive assumption that using extra
information is always beneficial. For example, the RandomAccess policy performs
worse than the NoAccess policy when the initial budget of each blue agent is set
to 10 or 20. Moreover, the optimised policies in all the experiments outperform
the FullAccess policy when the initial budgets allocated to each blue agent is set
to 40. In other words, the agent has to use the information at the right time to
gain benefit from it. This reinforces our claims that specifying policy is a very
difficult and counterintuitive task, and obvious solutions might be far from being
optimal.
In the multi-objective optimisation experiment (Experiment 7.4), the output
of each run is a set of non-dominated policies that attempt to approximate the
real Pareto optimal set of policies. The result from one experimental run of each
initial budget setting is shown in Figure 7.4. In each graph, the leftmost point
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Budget
Median blue agent casualty tolls with 95% confidence intervals / %
Random fdead fmsd DOO MOGP
NoAccess 55.6(55.6, 55.6) - - - -
10 59.7(58.0, 60.6) 42.0(41.0, 43.4) 47.5(44.0, 48.6) 42.5(41.0, 43.8) 42.5(41.6, 44.2)
20 57.7(56.6, 58.6) 33.5(31.0, 35.2) 40.0(38.2, 42.8) 35.0(34.2, 36.2) 35.9(34.0, 37.2)
40 50.7(49.8, 53.6) 23.3(21.8, 26.0) 27.3(26.0, 28.6) 25.2(23.6, 26.0) 25.0(24.0, 25.8)
∞ 51.4(50.2, 52.4) 23.7(22.8, 24.8) 24.1(22.0, 28.2) 22.9(22.0, 23.4) 23.6(23.0, 23.8)
FullAccess 31.6(31.6, 31.6) - - - -
Table 7.1: The experimental result summary on the performances of the optimal policies with respect to the casualty
toll of blue agents found using GP/MOGP and DOO.
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corresponds to the policy instance that results in the lowest blue agent casualties
while the lowest point corresponds to the policy instance that results in the
minimal mission completion time. The points in between represent all other non-
dominated policy instances. All other experimental runs produce similar results.
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Figure 7.4: The non-dominated solutions in one run using different initial budgets.
The results of 10 runs for all initial budget settings are shown in Figure 7.5.
The non-dominated policies found in one run can be dominated by the non-
dominated policies found in other runs as EAs are stochastic in nature. the
resulting policies depend on the random seeds used. However, policies found in
all runs are not very far away from the Pareto front approximation formed by
the non-dominated policies of all runs. This suggests that this approximation is
very likely to be the real achievable Pareto front.
By observing the Pareto fronts of the solutions formed, one can immediately
see that the increase in the amount of initial budget may be able to reduce the
blue agent casualties but not the mission completion time. This information can
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Figure 7.5: The Pareto optimal solution set.
be very useful in practice. For example, one might wish to have a policy that
can complete the mission within 50 time steps. Based on the results, this is
unachievable no matter what initial budget is given. On the other hand, given a
fixed initial budget and an acceptable mission completion time, one could select
the optimal policy from the front that results in the minimal casualty toll of the
blue agents.
Additionally, the results suggest that the setting of 40 units of risk per blue
agent for each mission is sufficient to accomplish 10 missions optimally with re-
spect to the casualty toll of blue agents; extra budget does not help. This provides
a way to estimate the optimal initial risk budget allocation. Alternatively, one
can search for the minimal risk budget required to achieve the same optimal
performance by simply setting this as an additional objective.
The results in the multi-objective optimisation experiment are also compared
to those obtained in single objective experiments. This is done by comparing
the median performances of the optimal policies with respect to the casualty toll
of blue agents in all initial budget settings. The results show that the optimal
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policies found in both approaches have similar performance.
7.4 Example security policies inferred
Some examples of the Pareto optimal policies inferred in the multi-objective op-
timisation experiment with 40 units of risk budget per agent are shown in Fig-
ures 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8. Because of space constraint, the individuals are shown such
that B, F , R, T and ln(x) operator are used to denote budgetLeft , futureRisk ,
currentRisk , currentTime and protectedln(x) operator, and all the ERCs are
rounded to two decimal places. The policy shown in Figure 7.6 is one of the op-
timal policy with respect to the casualty toll of blue agents (one of the leftmost
green crosses at the Pareto front in Figure 7.5), the policy shown in Figure 7.7 is
the optimal policy with respect to the mission completion time (the lowest green
cross at the Pareto front in Figure 7.5) and the policy shown in Figure 7.8 is the
optimal policy with respect to the casualty toll of blue agents given the constraint
that the mean of mission completion time has to be within 70 time steps.
These Pareto optimal policies discovered appear to be large and compli-
cated. (The policies shown here are relatively simple in comparison to the others
which are not shown.) It is also interesting to note the extensive use of min,
max, sin and cos operators, which do not commonly appear in human designed
functions. These findings concur with our intuition that the policy that is best
suited an operational environment can be complicated and the task of manually
specifying such a policy can be very difficult.
7.5 Evidence for the thesis and future work
This chapter introduces the idea of moving away from specifying and refining
a one-size-fits-all policy towards searching for a policy that has beneficial and
acceptable outcomes from a family of policies. It presents a simple scenario, in
which evolutionary algorithms are used to discover the (near) optimal policies
that fit the scenario. Here, GP/MOGP and DOO are used as optimisation tools
to synthesise the optimal policies, in terms of achieving the mission as well as
security objectives without violating some predefined constraints.
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Figure 7.6: The optimal policy with respect to the casualty toll of blue agents.
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Figure 7.7: The optimal policy with respect to the mission completion time.
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Figure 7.8: The optimal policy with respect to the casualty toll of blue agents given the constraint that the mean of
mission completion time has to be within 70 time steps.
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7.5 Evidence for the thesis and future work
Unlike experiments in previous chapters, we demonstrate how simulation can
be used to obtain the fitnesses of the policy candidates (feedback on how well
they perform), which are then used in turn to steer the search direction. Each
policy candidate is plugged into a set of simulated missions. The missions are
executed and the outcomes of these missions are measured and used as the fitness
of the policy.
The work is a significant deviation from the practice of fitting a policy a priori
without the details of the specific mission being taken into account. The concept
of “mission-specific policy” seems novel. Of course, our approach assumes that
some element of feedback/fitness can be determined via modelling or simulation.
This limits the applicability of the technique. However, simulation is used for a
great many things in military contexts, e.g., war-gaming. If simulation is good
enough for war-gaming strategies, why not for security policies?
By using MOGP (and MOEAs in general), our approach is very flexible,
allowing tradeoffs between a variety of criteria to be explored. The criteria chosen
are exemplary only; one could imagine tradeoffs being explored between a list
of relevant measurements of interest. The Pareto front discovered can reveal
useful information about the relationship among different objectives, which may
be difficult to obtain otherwise. Such information provides useful insight for
policy makers to select and apply the optimal policy that fits the needs of current
operational environment on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, it has the merit
of deferring the weight assignment that defines the relative importance of each
objective after the set of Pareto optimal solutions are discovered. This often
makes the weight assignment task easier as the set of Pareto optimal solutions can
unfold the relationship between the objectives. One possible avenue of research
is to investigate the possibility to extend the heuristic search concept to other
parameters used in the simulation. This includes the movement strategy, number
of agents, risk budget allocation, etc.
Having said that, the use of Pareto dominance relationship in the fitness
evaluation essentially places a practical constraint on the number of objectives
that they can cope with. Imagine that there are ten objectives required for
optimisation. It is likely that many individuals in the evolving population are non-
dominant to one another. The search therefore becomes more or less a random
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search. This is currently an active research topic in the evolutionary computation
community. Indeed, solving an optimisation problem with a large number of
objectives is an acknowledged problem generally.
7.6 Conclusions
This chapter first argues that traditional ways of developing security policies are
difficult and often inadequate in creating a policy that is optimal in terms of some
given objectives. It then attempts to shift the emphasis away from specifying and
refining a policy towards searching for a policy that has beneficial and acceptable
outcomes from a family of policies. This idea is entirely novel.
We have used a risk-budget based policy family as an example here; it is a
means to an end and stands as a proxy for any policy family from which we
seek an instance that is best suited to the need of a specific mission. We have
demonstrated how GP/MOGP and DOO can be used to search for the Pareto
optimal policies. The results show the approaches are very promising.
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Chapter 8
Evaluation and conclusions
The work reported in previous chapters provides evidence to support the thesis
hypothesis stated in Section 1.3, namely:
Evolutionary algorithms (EAs) have the potential to be an effective
means of determining the security policies that suit dynamic challeng-
ing environments.
This chapter reviews the work that has been done, evaluates the extent to which
they justify the thesis hypothesis and concludes the thesis by addressing the
directions for future work.
8.1 Evaluation
In the previous three chapters, we have detailed several experimentations that
serve to support the thesis hypothesis from three different strands of research.
We explored the potential of EAs in inferring optimal security policies, dynam-
ically updating security policies with new decision examples and searching for
policies with optimal tradeoffs between objectives using simulation runs. This
section summarises the work completed in each strand of research and outlines
the contributions and novelty of the work presented in this thesis.
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8.1.1 Static policy inference
Current security policy is often developed in a top-down approach. High-level
security goals are first determined, after which they undergo a series of refinement
processes to obtain the low-level executable rules. Although some work has been
done in applying machine learning techniques to aid the policy refinement process,
there is no previous work to my knowledge in the application of EAs or machine
learning techniques in inferring security policies.
Chapter 5 details the experiments in using EAs to infer security policies from
decision examples. Here EAs are used as a tool to generalise from a set of low-
level examples to a set of high-level rules. Various simple security policies have
been attempted and inferred successfully. These include the traditional MLS Bell-
LaPadula policy model, the budgetised MLS policy model and the Fuzzy MLS
policy model. Two different EAs, namely GP and GE are used. In all cases, the
results show that a minimal amount of design effort and domain knowledge are
required to infer the reference policy or a close approximation of it. The only
requirements are to have a good fitness function and training examples that form
a good representation of the target policy.
The last part of the chapter presents how other machine techniques can be
incorporated into the policy inference framework created. The fuzzy set concept
is used as an example here. Multiple policies are learnt independently. Each
focusses on inferring a fuzzy rule for a particular class of decisions (fuzzification).
The ultimate output policy, which is an ensemble of all these policies, is formed
using a weighted voting mechanism (defuzzification). Various experiments have
been carried out to examine different fuzzification and defuzzification techniques.
The results show that these approaches can consistently infer policies that closely
match with the original reference models used.
An important feature of the approaches investigated is that they can readily
handle “noise”, i.e., they can easily accommodate seemingly inconsistent decision
making in the training examples. This property would be essential if the technique
is to be applied in “dynamic challenging environments” referred to in the thesis
hypothesis.
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8.1.2 Dynamic policy inference
There will inevitably be times when unseen circumstances demand a decision
during operation. In some cases the default automated response may be imper-
ative; in other cases this may be ill-advised. Manual decisions made to override
the default one essentially define a new policy. Furthermore, even if the optimal
security policy can be developed or inferred automatically, it would eventually
become suboptimal due to the changes in either the operational environment or
security requirements, or both. Therefore, a security policy has to be able to
continually change and be updated to suit the operational needs to maintain its
optimality.
Chapter 6 details the experiments on dynamic security policy inference. As
there is no dynamic security policy model available and therefore no decision
example is available for us to work with, we designed a dynamic security policy
model. This model is used to generate time varying decision examples for training
and evaluation purposes.
To infer this dynamic security policy model, two novel dynamic learning
frameworks based upon MOEAs are designed: one based on Fan’s intuition [130]
and DOO. In DOO, an n-objective optimisation problem is treated as a 2n-
objective optimisation problem by adding an opposing objective for each of the
original objectives. With such a setting, DOO is able to maintain the diversity
among the individuals in the population whilst optimising the intended objectives.
This diversity can aid in preventing the population from premature convergence
and allows the concept drift in the policy to be continually relearnt. The results
show that these frameworks are very promising. Reasonably good approximators
to the model can be inferred from the examples using these frameworks.
Addressing the need for run-time adaptivity is, we believe, entirely novel.
Some degree of adaptability will likely be essential for the dynamic challenging
environment referred to in the thesis hypothesis. Our experiments are simple and
serve as proof of concept. We are aware that adaptive policies (and automated
adaptation in particular) will likely prove to be a controversial area in years to
come.
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8.1.3 Mission-specific policy discovery
Chapter 7 introduces the notion of mission-specific policy discovery. EAs are used
to search for the security policies that can provide the optimal, or at least excel-
lent, tradeoffs among security objectives for a specific mission. Here, EAs serve
as an optimisation tool to synthesise the optimal policies, in terms of achieving
the mission as well as security objectives without violating the constraints given.
We demonstrate here how simulation can be used to obtain the fitnesses of
the policy candidates that are used to guide the policy search. To evaluate the
fitness of an individual (policy) for a mission, the policy is first plugged into a
simulated mission, then the simulated mission is executed and the outcome of it
is measured. This is very different from the practice of fitting a policy a priori
without the details of the specific mission being taken into account. This concept
of “mission-specific policy” is entirely novel.
Various EA based techniques are used here to discover the optimal policies.
These include GP/MOGP and DOO. In all cases, the results show that these
techniques are able to discover the set of policies that are optimal for the mission
of concern. By using MOGP (and MOEAs in general), tradeoffs between a variety
of criteria can be explored. Such information can be valuable to policy makers to
select and apply the optimal policy that best fits the current operation. We are
unaware of any other work of this nature.
8.1.4 Thesis contributions
In summary, we demonstrate how:
• EAs can be used to infer static security policies from a set of decision
examples. Three different ways of representing security policies and two
different EAs are investigated. The results show that this idea is feasible.
• the fuzzy set concept can be integrated into the policy inference framework
to improve the policy inference performance. The idea is sufficiently generic
to be applied to other classification problems, provided that there is a partial
ordering among the classes.
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• multi-objective evolutionary algorithms (MOEAs) can be used to infer dy-
namic security policies from a set of decision examples. Two novel dynamic
learning frameworks based upon MOEAs are developed: one that is based
on Fan’s intuition and DOO. Both of them can be used as general dynamic
classification algorithms.
• an ensemble policy model can be constructed from multiple models in a
single EA run to achieve better performance. The improvement is especially
significant in the DOO setting.
• MOEAs can be used to infer a set of Pareto optimal policies that fit a
specific mission (or at least a specific family of missions).
• simulation runs can be used in place of a set of decision examples to provide
feedback in evaluating the fitness of a policy with respect to the specified
high-level objectives.
• MOEAs can be used as a decision making tool where tradeoffs between
objectives exist. The Pareto front of the security policies discovered us-
ing MOEAs can reveal useful information about the relationship among
different objectives, which may be difficult to obtain otherwise. Such in-
formation provides useful insight for policy makers to select and apply the
optimal policy that fits the needs of current operational environment on a
case-by-case basis.
8.2 Envisaged future work
Having discussed the contributions of the thesis, we now outline numerous possi-
ble directions for future work that have been identified during the course of this
research.
8.2.1 Policy fusion
In dynamic coalitions, parties with different policies can come together to collab-
orate. Prior to the formation of dynamic coalitions, each party may have its own
177
8.2 Envisaged future work
security policy. An interesting step forward would be to investigate how well EAs
could be used to combine these security policies together. One possible way is to
generate decision examples from both existing policies and use these examples as
the training input for the policy inference framework. MOEAs can also be used
to discover the Pareto optimal set of policy candidates, which are then chosen de-
pending on the security requirements. However there are still issues that require
further investigation. These include:
• Understanding how to deal with policies that consist of different sets of
decision-making factors, which may be measured using different scales.
• Understanding what the implicit priorities that EAs have assigned to the
conflicting rules are, what the factors that influence the priorities are and
how to control these priorities, etc.
8.2.2 The robustness of a security policy
The framework proposed in this thesis has been shown to be effective in dynam-
ically inferring the optimal policy. However, the optimality of a policy is not
always the only factor of concern; the robustness in performance of a security
policy in different environments may be equally important. This is especially so
in a pervasive operating environment where the deployment of a new policy can
be a difficult or expensive process. To incorporate this factor into the proposed
framework, a way to quantify the robustness in performance of a security policy
is required.
This measure also provides a way to determine the invariant part of the opti-
mal policies for different operational environments of concern. The determination
of this invariant part is doubly useful: firstly, it can serve as a template or testing
target in the policy development process; secondly, it can help to protect the
security policy inference framework from a poisoning attack, which attempts to
mislead the inference process in the favour of the attacker by the injection of spe-
cially crafted decision examples. (In general, we have assumed that the decision
examples used in training have authenticity and the provision of these examples
can be accomplished and is outside the scope of this thesis.)
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8.2.3 Scalability with the training set size
Scalability is a subtle issue. We have addressed some aspects of this issue. For
example, we have shown the method scales well with the size of the training set. In
the experiments presented in Chapter 5, we have increased the size of the training
set from 100 examples to 1000 examples and the results still remain consistent.
Obviously, the fitness evaluation time would increase; 1000 examples take ten
times longer than 100 examples to evaluate. This is unlikely to be an issue in
practice as the fitness evaluation of each individual can be executed in parallel if
necessary. In Chapter 6, we have shown that DOO is able to evolve and update
policies with decision examples in an incremental manner. However, there are still
some issues remaining with these frameworks that need to be investigated. This
includes searching for appropriate techniques to sample old decision examples
and examining the generality of the DOO framework.
8.2.4 More complex security policies
The security policies used in this thesis are rather simple. However, note that
these policies are either real-world policies or proposals from major research in-
stitutes for real world use. They are simple, but by no means “toy” policies.
Ultimately, we should strive for simple policies wherever is possible, but at the
same time, we should also need to acknowledge that MANET policies may need
legitimately to be much more complicated. To cope with complexity, instead of
attempting to extract and discover the policies as a whole, we could simply tar-
get the areas that need help. Humans produce security policies sequentially too,
i.e., they consider in turn authentication policy, file access control, audit policy,
etc. In practice, it is also often the case that there are some rules of thumb and
constraints that are dictated from on high. We do not need to extract these bits
of a policy. Yet, there is still much to answer here, for example:
• Can EAs be used to evolve more complex policies or policies of other types,
e.g., obligation policies? If not, how can we divide the security policies into
smaller addressable components in a systematic manner?
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• How to incorporate the constraints imposed from on high into the policy
inference framework to form a continuous learning loop in an efficient man-
ner? Should we take such constraints into consideration in the evolution
process? If so, how?
8.2.5 More complex scenarios
The scenario used in Chapter 7 is relatively simple. It has only one type of agent
in each team and one type of information. A real test of this approach would be
to embed it within a more realistic simulated scenario, with more sophisticated
information types, and realistic consequence models. Note that the simulated
scenario may be much more complex but we are really interested in some of the
measurable properties, which may only be few. For example, how many properties
would an operational commander be interested in trading off? The techniques
proposed here should be able to scale well with it.
8.2.6 Other deployment domains
Our focus has been on the development of policies for challenging dynamic envi-
ronments such as military MANETs. However, it may well be that other domains
prove also to be suitable deployment domains. For examples, can social network
policies be amenable to the techniques described in this thesis?
8.3 Closing remarks
The work reported in this thesis demonstrates a considerable degree of originality
supported by extensive experimentation. The case studies are necessarily lim-
ited. (MANETs of the sorts we envisage do not really exist right now.) However,
the results (published at both optimisation and security venues) demonstrate that
inference based approaches using evolutionary algorithms have very considerable
promise. Everyone accepts that policy specification is currently difficult, and
things are set to worsen as systems are deployed in ever more complex environ-
ments with increasing sophistication and subtlety of decision-making process. We
recommend these approaches to the research community for further investigation.
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